HOWARD MOSS, APPELLANT,
v.
PATRICIA L. MOSS, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage case, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the Wife under section 61.16, Florida Statutes, and affirmed the denial of the Husband's request for attorney's fees. The court certified a question of great public importance regarding whether parties can contract away future attorney's fee obligations in prenuptial agreements.
The court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the Wife because the Husband's challenge to compliance with Rule 1.525 was not preserved for appellate review, having been raised for the first time on appeal. The court also affirmed the denial of the Husband's request for attorney's fees, noting the issue was controlled by Lashkajani v. Lashkajani.
[1] A reviewing court will not consider points raised for the first time on appeal.
[2] A party seeking attorney's fees must comply with the procedural requirements for filing such a motion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Any party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys' fees, or both shall serve a motion within 30 days after filing of the judgment....”
Statement of the procedural requirement under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 that the Husband claimed the Wife violated
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHoward Moss and Patricia Moss were parties to a dissolution of marriage. The Wife sought attorney's fees and costs, which the trial court awarded. The…
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STRINGER, Judge.
Howard Moss (the “Husband”) seeks review of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage and the final order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Patricia Moss (the “Wife”). Because the trial court did not err in awarding the Wife attorney’s fees pursuant to section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2002), or in denying the Husband’s request for fees, we affirm the trial court’s order. We affirm the final judgment of dissolution of marriage without comment.
The Husband challenges whether the trial court had the ability to award the Wife attorney’s fees and costs when the Wife failed to satisfy the requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525, which provides that “[a]ny party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys’ fees, or both shall serve a motion within 30 days after filing of the judgment....” Though the Husband correctly notes that the Wife failed to serve the motion required by rule 1.525, the Husband’s counsel failed to properly raise this argument below. Thus, this issue is not preserved for our review. Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla.1978) (“As a general matter, a reviewing court will not consider points raised for the first time on appeal.”); see also Utterback v. Utterback, 861 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 793 So. 2d 128, 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Accordingly, we affirm the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the Wife.
Further, we affirm the denial of the Husband’s request for attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2002), finding that this issue is controlled by our recent decision in Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 855 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), review granted, 879 So. 2d 622 (Fla.2004). As we did there, we certify the following question as one of great public importance.
MAY THE PARTIES, BY AN EXPRESS PROVISION IN A PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, CONTRACT AWAY A FUTURE OBLIGATION TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS DURING THE TERM OF THE MARRIAGE BY PROVIDING FOR PREVAILING PARTY ATTORNEY’S FEES IN ACTIONS SEEKING TO ENFORCE OR PREVENT THE BREACH OF THE PRENUPTIAL CONTRACT?'
Affirmed and question certified.
WHATLEY and CASANUEVA, JJ„ Concur.
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Moss v. Moss, 914 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2005)…CANTERO, J. We have for review Moss v. Moss, 901 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), which cites to and certifies the same question of great public importance as Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 855 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), quashed, 911 So. 2d 1154 (Fla.2005). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3)-(4), Fla. C…
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Moss v. Moss, 939 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…marriage for purposes of determining the proper lump sum to be awarded the Wife under the Agreement. The Husband also raised three issues concerning the attorney’s fees awarded to the Wife. We affirmed the trial court on these issues. Moss v. Moss, 901 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). The Husband also argued that the trial court had erred in denying his request for attorney’s fees. He argued that the Wife’s claims were meritless and therefore that he was entitled to an award of fees pursuant to section 57.105…
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Est. OF Nelson Brungart v. Smallwood, 901 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…did not reserve jurisdiction to award fees. See Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 888 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). However, we find that we need not reach this issue because it was not raised below and preserved for appeal. See Moss v. Moss, 901 So. 2d 177, 2005 WL 562757 (Fla. 2d DCA March 11, 2005) (holding that a failure to object to the tardiness of a motion for attorneys’ fees waives the 30-day requirement of R. 1.525). In all other respects, we likewise affirm the judgment below. Applegate v.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1978)
- City OF Hollywood v. Diamond ON THE Beach, Inc., 855 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Bingham v. State of Fla. & Michael W. Moore, 793 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Hoffman v. Hoffman, 793 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Utterback v. Utterback, 861 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)