KENNETH ADAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2005-04-29
No. 5D05-320
PETERSON and PLEUS, JJ., concur.
901 So. 2d 275 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2005) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

Kenneth Adams appeals a summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence for attempted sexual battery on a child. The trial court imposed 30 years incarceration plus 10 years probation (40 years total), exceeding the 30-year statutory maximum for his offense. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing.


Holding

The sentence is illegal and exceeds the statutory maximum. Attempted capital sexual battery is a first-degree felony punishable by a maximum of 30 years imprisonment, and a defendant cannot accept a plea agreement that results in a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, even through probation.


Headnotes

[1] A sentence exceeding the statutory maximum for the offense to which a defendant pled and was sentenced is illegal and subject to correction.

[2] A defendant cannot accept a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum through a plea agreement.

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Key Quotes

“A defendant cannot by a plea agreement accept a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum.”

Establishes the fundamental legal principle that plea agreements cannot result in sentences exceeding statutory caps

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Facts & Procedural History

Adams was charged with capital sexual battery on a person less than 12 years of age but pleaded no contest to the lesser included offense of attempted…

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Opinion of the Court
SHARP, W., J.

Adams appeals from a summary denial of his motion filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a), seeking to correct an illegal sentence on the ground that his sentence of 30 years incarceration, followed by 10 years probation, exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the crime for which he was convicted — attempted sexual battery on a person less than 12 years of age.1 This crime is classified as a first degree felony punishable by up to 30 years incarceration. We reverse and remand.

The trial court’s order does not demonstrate that Adams is not entitled to relief. The court refers to sentencing documents which are attached to the order, and to the Sentencing Transcript, which is also attached. At the sentencing hearing, Adams pled no contest to attempted capital battery. As the trial judge expressed it, it was a lesser included offense of the crime with which Adams had been charged — capital sexual battery — pursuant to section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes. The evidence against Adams was overwhelming, but the state agreed to allow him to plead to attempt. Because Adams was facing a life sentence, he accepted the plea bargain. The court acknowledged that was the reason Adams agreed to plead no contest.

The ambiguity in this case is that the sentencing document refers to Adams as having been sentenced pursuant to section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes, and entitles it “Attempted Sexual Battery on a Person Less than 12 years of Age.” Section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes, contains an attempt offense if the sexual organs of the victim are injured. However, these facts were not alleged nor established, in this case. That attempt offense is a life felony, punishable by a “term of imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for a term of years net exceeding life imprisonment.”2 However, an attempted capital sexual battery is classified as a first de gree felony.3 It is punishable at a maximum of 30 years. § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. The state concedes that if Adams received a cumulative 40 year sentence, he is entitled to resentencing. The attached sentencing documents and transcript demonstrate Adams received a combined term of prison and probation in excess of the thirty year statutory maximum for the offense to which he pled, and for which he was sentenced. See Gonzales v. State, 816 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Fuentes v. State, 711 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). A defendant cannot by a plea agreement accept a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum. See Gonzales at 722.

REVERSED and REMANDED for re-sentencing.

PETERSON and PLEUS, JJ., concur. . §§ 794.011(2), 777.04(4)(b), 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. . § 775.082(3)(a)3, Fla. Stat. . § 777.04(4)(b), Fla. Stat.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Parks v. State, 223 So. 3d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)
    …e 3.800(a) from illegal sentences imposed pursuant to plea agreements include Gamez v. State, 944 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), Kelly v. State, 816 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), Howell v. State, 764 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), Adams v. State, 901 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), Taylor v. State, 899 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), Gifford v. State, 744 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and Ruiz v. State, 537 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). . We note that the plea form and the judgment incorrectly list t…
  • Hagan v. State, 25 So. 3d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
    …07. By statute a defendant is entitled to “credit for all of the time she or he spent in the county jail before sentence.” § 921.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). Unless it would result in a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum, see Adams v. State, 901 So. 2d 275, 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“A defendant cannot by a plea agreement accept a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum.”); Collins v. State, 697 So. 2d 1305, 1307-08 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“Even with a defendant’s assent, the court is without jurisdic…
  • Echevarria v. State, 296 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020)

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