JOSEPH A. STEFFEN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the value of stolen property for one of the grand theft convictions.
Defendant was convicted of three counts of grand theft. He appealed, arguing the State presented insufficient evidence of the value of the stolen good…
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FARMER, C.J.
Defendant was found guilty of, among other charges, three counts of grand theft. He appeals these three convictions, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence as to the value of the stolen goods. We affirm two of the convictions, but conclude that the evidence was insufficient for the third charge.
It is well established that the market value of the stolen property at the time of the theft must be established beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt to sustain a grand theft conviction. Gilbert v. State, 817 So. 2d 980, 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). If the market value cannot be ascertained, the replacement cost of the property within a reasonable time after the offense can be used to establish the value of the stolen goods. § 812.012(10)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (2004).
To withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal on-the value of stolen property, the “person testifying [must be] competent to testify as to the value of the property.” Gilbert, 817 So. 2d at 982. Here, as to the third charge, the State failed to elicit competent testimony of value. The State concedes that the victim did not testify to the value of the property in question, but argues that its value can be determined from the testimony of a different victim whose stolen property was similar in make and age. The State’s argument doesn’t work because such evidence is not based on knowledge of this particular property. Cofield v. State, 474 So. 2d 849, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (deeming the testimony of a company security officer, who lacked personal knowledge of the value of the stolen goods, insufficient to establish value).
Accordingly, we reverse the conviction of grand theft for Count VII, reducing the conviction from grand theft to petit theft, and remand for resentencing. See I.T. v. State, 796 So. 2d 1220, 1222 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
SHAHOOD and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Sanchez v. State, 101 So. 3d 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)….” § 812.012(10)(a)(l), Fla. Stat. (2010). “Value” is an essential element of grand theft that must be proven by the State beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. See Marrero v. State, 71 So. 3d 881, 887 (Fla.2011); Steffen v. State, 901 So. 2d 950, 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). In this case, the sole evidence introduced by the State to establish the market value of the stolen property was the direct testimony of the victim, who was the owner.2 It is well-established that “an owner is generally p…
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Carter v. State, 77 So. 3d 849 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…of the stolen property beyond a reasonable doubt. Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104, 108 (Fla.1974), receded from on other grounds by F.B. v. State, 852 So. 2d 226 (Fla.2003); Evans v. State, 452 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Steffen v. State, 901 So. 2d 950, 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). When the State offers evidence of solely the purchase price of an item without any testimony establishing the value at the time of the theft, courts have found the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction for grand th…
Authorities Cited
- Gilbert v. State, 817 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- I.T. v. State, 796 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Cofield v. State, 474 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)