TIP TOP ENTERPRISES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION D/B/A TIP TOP TREE AND LANDSCAPING SERVICE, APPELLANT,
v.
SUMMIT CONSULTING, INC., AS ADMINISTRATOR FOR FLORIDA RETAIL FEDERATION SELF INSURERS FUND, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, APPELLEE
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Tip Top Enterprises appeals a venue change order granted to Summit Consulting, arguing Summit waived its venue objection by failing to raise it in its answer or in a pre-answer motion. The Third District Court of Appeal agrees, holding that under Florida Rule 1.140, failure to timely assert a venue defense results in waiver.
Summit waived its venue defense. Florida Rule 1.140 requires venue defenses to be raised either by motion before pleading or specifically and with particularity in a responsive pleading. Failure to do so constitutes waiver. Summit's subsequent motion to change venue came too late and was improper.
[1] A defense of improper venue must be stated with particularity in a responsive pleading or motion, or it is waived.
[2] A simple denial of a venue allegation in an answer is insufficient to plead the defense of improper venue with particularity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“failure to raise a venue defense in a motion, if made, waives the defense, and if raised in a responsive pleading where no motion is made, must be alleged specifically and with particularity”
States the core rule from Florida Rule 1.140(b) that governs when venue defenses must be raised to avoid waiver
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTip Top, a Miami-Dade County landscaper, notified its workers' compensation insurer Summit of an employee injury in December 2002. Summit denied the c…
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WELLS, Judge.
Tip Top Enterprises, Inc., the plaintiff below, appeals a non-final order granting Summit Consulting, Inc.’s motion to change venue, claiming that Summit waived its venue objection by failing to affirmatively plead it in either the answer or in a pre-answer motion. We agree and reverse.
Summit is the fund administrator for Florida Retail Federation Self Insurers Fund, Tip Top’s worker’s compensation insurer. On December 10, 2002, Tip Top, a Miami-Dade County landscaper, notified Summit that one of its employees had sustained an on-the-job injury. Summit denied the claim on the ground that the policy had lapsed for failure to pay the premium. Tip Top, alleging that venue was proper in Miami-Dade County, brought suit in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages for breach of contract. Summit answered, generally denying a number of paragraphs, including the paragraph alleging venue in Miami-Dade County, and moved to dismiss the breach of contract count. Summit alleged only a single affirmative defense regarding cancellation of Tip Top’s policy for non-payment.
Almost four months after it filed its answer and motion to dismiss, Summit filed its motion to change venue, attaching a copy of Tip Top’s policy which stated that “[i]n the event litigation becomes necessary in regard to collection or any other dispute that may arise as a result of this Agreement, the member agrees that Polk County, Florida, will be the proper venue for the legal action.” The motion was granted. We reverse.
Rule 1.140 provides that improper venue may be raised by motion, and if no motion is made, as a defense in a responsive pleading. Subsection (b) of the rule also provides that failure to raise a venue defense in a motion, if made, waives the defense, and if raised in a responsive pleading where no motion is made, must be alleged specifically and with particularity:
Every defense in law or fact to a claim for relief in a pleading shall be asserted in the responsive pleading, if one is required, but the following defenses may be made by motion at the option of the pleader: ... (3) improper venue.... A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. The grounds on which any of the enumerated defenses are based and the substantial matters of law intended to be argued shall be stated specifically and with particularity in the responsive pleading or motion. Any ground not stated shall be deemed to be waived except any ground showing that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter may be made at any time.
Here, Summit made no 1.140 motion and stated no grounds, specifically, particularly, or otherwise in its answer regarding Tip Top’s venue selection, opting instead for a subsequently filed motion for change of venue. As the rule makes clear, the defense was waived. See Aquaco, Inc. v. Hopkin, 323 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)(finding that the defendants waived their venue privilege when “they did not file a timely motion therefor or claim the privilege in their answer but asserted the venue privilege ... by motion filed subsequent to the answer”); Fixel v. Clevenger, 285 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)(finding that the privilege of venue was waived where the defendant “filed an answer in which he denied all the allegations of the complaint, but made no objection to venue”); 56 Fla. Jur. 2d Venue § 106 (footnotes omitted) (“An assertion of the statutory privilege of being sued in a county other than the one in which the suit or action is brought should, by specific averment, negative a right of the plaintiff to legally maintain the suit in the county in which it is brought.... If the defendant fails to assert, sufficiently, a venue objection, it is the defendant who must bear the consequences”).
Summit’s reliance on Host Marriott Tollroads, Inc. v. Petrol Enters., Inc., 810 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), where the court found the venue defense had been properly raised, is misplaced. • There, the defendant had filed a responsive pleading not only denying that the selected venue was proper, but also affirmatively asserting where venue was proper and why. No similar allegations exist here.
Accordingly, the order on review is reversed with this cause remanded for further proceedings in Miami-Dade County.
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Three Seas Corp. v. FFE Transp. Servs., Inc., 913 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…quires the defendant to plead “specifically and with particularity” the defense of improper venue, failing which the point will be waived. Id.; see Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 78 So. 2d at 103; Tip Top Enters., Inc. v. Summit Consulting, Inc., 905 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Host Marriott Tollroads, Inc. v. Petrol Enters., Inc., 810 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). As the defense of improper venue was not [*75] pled with particularity in this case, the point was waived. The defendant argues th…
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Klem v. Espejo-Norton, 983 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…with a Broward County res was never properly asserted below, and therefore cannot be [*1239] relied upon on appeal. See Three Seas Corp. v. FFE Transp. Servs., Inc., 913 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Tip Top Enters., Inc. v. Summit Consulting, Inc., 905 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); see also Sun-Sentinel, Inc., 865 So. 2d at 1284 n. 9. Affirmed. GREEN, J., concurs. . Admittedly, there was no personal service of process on Ms. Klem. Moreover, we reject the appellee’s contention that the defense of lack of…
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Green v. Ivey, 220 So. 3d 475 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…r venue in either the answer or the pre-answer motion constitutes a waiver of the defense. Here, Appellee, by failing to object to venue in his answer or pre-answer motion, waived his objection. See Tip Top Enters., Inc. v. Summit Consulting, Inc., 905 So. 2d 201, 201-02 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (reversing order granting appellee’s motion to change venue, reasoning that appel- [*477] lee waived its venue objection “by failing to affirmatively plead it in either the answer or in a pre-answer motion”). Additionally,…
Authorities Cited
- Fixel v. Clevenger, 285 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Host Marriott Tollroads, Inc. v. Petrol Enters., Inc., 810 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Aquaco, Inc. v. Hopkin, 323 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)