TERRANCE AIKENS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Terrance Aikens appeals his re-sentencing on convictions for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, attempted first-degree murder, and armed robbery with a firearm. The appellate court reversed the trial court's imposition of a firearm minimum-mandatory sentence on the attempted murder count because the charging information did not allege a firearm was used in that crime, and remanded for re-sentencing.
Yes. The appellate court reversed the firearm minimum-mandatory sentence on Count 2 because the information charging attempted first-degree murder did not allege possession of a firearm, and a firearm minimum-mandatory may only be imposed if the charging document alleges the defendant possessed a firearm during commission of the crime.
[1] A firearm minimum-mandatory sentence may only be imposed if the charging instrument alleges that a firearm was used in the commission of the crime.
[2] A trial court may err by imposing a firearm minimum-mandatory sentence on a conviction when the charging instrument does not allege the use of a firearm.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a firearm minimum-mandatory sentence may only be imposed if the information charging the defendant with attempted first degree murder alleges that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of the crime”
Establishes the legal standard for imposing firearm minimum-mandatory sentences, requiring express allegation in the charging document
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAikens was convicted of three crimes: conspiracy to traffic in cocaine (Count 1), attempted first-degree murder (Count 2), and armed robbery with a fi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Robbery With A Firearm cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The defendant, Terrance Aikens, appeals from a re-sentencing on his convictions for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine (“Count 1”), attempted first degree murder (“Count 2”), and armed robbery with a firearm (“Count 3”). We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing a firearm minimum-mandatory sentence on Count 2 for the attempted first degree murder conviction because the information filed against him did not allege that he committed the attempted murder with a firearm. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 744 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(holding that a firearm minimum-mandatory sentence may only be imposed if the information charging the defendant with attempted first degree murder alleges that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of the crime).
The State contends that the trial court intended to impose the firearm minimum-mandatory sentence on Count 3. In support of its position, the State relies on the May 13, 2004 re-sentencing hearing, where the following statements were made:
THE COURT: So that one, both sides agree that the minimum on Count 2, attempted first degree murder, is 12 years and the maximum is 27 years?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct.
THE COURT: With no three year minimum mandatory, (emphasis added). [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct. That is what we would submit.
THE COURT: [Prosecutor], is that what you agree with as to Count 2?
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes.
THE COURT: Moving to Count 3, it is armed robbery with a firearm and this one it was alleged with a firearm.
THE COURT: All right. So that would be the same 12 to 27 years with a three year minimum mandatory, (emphasis added).
Contrary to the re-sentencing hearing, in its August 13, 2004 written order, it appears that the trial court mistakenly imposed the firearm minimum-mandatory sentence on Count 2 instead of Count 3.
We remand for re-sentencing with the instruction that a firearm minimum-mandatory sentence may not be imposed on Count 2.
We find no merit to the defendant’s remaining claims.
Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part; and remanded.