MARIO R. MONTES, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Mario Montes appealed the denial of his post-conviction motion challenging the adequacy of the criminal charges, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective. The Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint counsel for the post-conviction proceeding.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint counsel for the post-conviction proceeding because the proceeding was not complex and did not require substantial legal research. The underlying claim of ineffective assistance was also without merit because the State clearly established that sworn testimony was obtained before filing charges, and Montes had admitted to the charged offenses by entering a guilty plea.
[1] Appointment of appellate counsel in collateral attack proceedings is not a matter of right.
[2] Courts must apply standards to determine whether appointment of appellate counsel is constitutionally required in collateral attack proceedings.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is no automatic right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, and appointment of post-conviction counsel is a matter solely within the discretion of the trial court.”
Establishes the foundational principle that trial courts have discretion in appointing counsel for post-conviction relief proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMontes entered a guilty plea on February 12, 2003, to armed carjacking, armed robbery, and armed kidnapping, and was sentenced to twelve years incarce…
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ROTHENBERG, Judge.
The defendant appeals the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm.
On February 12, 2003, the defendant entered into a negotiated plea with the State wherein he pled guilty to armed carjacking in Count 1, armed robbery in Count 3, and armed kidnapping in Count 4 of the Information and was sentenced to twelve years incarceration for these crimes. On or about June 18, 2004, the defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850, alleging that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to dismiss the charges. The defendant claimed that the Information charging him with these offenses was filed by the State without the requisite sworn statements from material witnesses. On November 3, 2004, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Assistant State Attorney Daisy Rodriguez testified that she conducted the pre-trial investigation, and took sworn testimony from the witnesses including the victim, a witness named Carmen Rivera, and the detective assigned to the case, and in fact obtained a sworn affidavit from the victim. The defendant was present for this evidentiary hearing, and while unrepresented by counsel, was permitted to cross-examine Ms. Rodriguez.
The defendant claims that because he is a citizen of Haiti, has the equivalent of a third grade education, and only a limited understanding of the legal system, the trial court erred by failing to appoint him counsel to assist him at the evidentiary hearing.
“There is no automatic right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, and appointment of post-conviction counsel is a matter solely within the discretion of the trial court.” Lee v. State, 847 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); see also Rivero v. State, 796 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). In Graham v. State, 372 So. 2d 1363, 1366 (Fla.1979), the Florida Supreme Court established the following four factors to be considered by the trial court when determining whether to appoint counsel for a post-conviction proceeding: (1) the adversary nature of the proceeding, (2) the proceeding’s complexity, (3) the need for an evidentiary hearing, and (4) the need for substantial research.
While the proceeding resulted in an evidentiary hearing and the hearing was adversarial in nature, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to appoint the defendant legal counsel, as the proceeding was not complex nor did it require substantial research. The issue was in fact, quite simple: whether or not sworn testimony was obtained before the State filed the charges. Based upon the evidence presented, the State clearly established that it was. We also note that the defendant pled guilty and admitted to committing the charges filed.
Affirmed.
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Simmons v. State, 99 So. 3d 620 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…State, 372 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla.1979); Woodward v. State, [*624] 992 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Henderson v. State, 919 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). The decision rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Montes v. State, 907 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). The trial court abuses this discretion when, under the circumstances of a particular case, “the assistance of counsel is essential to accomplish a fair and thorough presentation” of a defendant’s claim(s) for collateral relief. S…
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Lutrische Dancy v. State, 2 So. 3d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Montes v. State, 907 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).…
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Eloy Tomas Fernandez v. State, 30 So. 3d 680 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Montes v. State, 907 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).…
Authorities Cited
- The Petition of Andrew A. Graham v. State, 372 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1979)
- Jontal R. LEE v. State, 847 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
- Rivero v. State, 796 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)