CAROLYN FROST, APPELLANT,
v.
NICOLE BOSS, MARY DRAKE AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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In this settlement proposal case, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's denial of Frost's motion to tax costs and fees, holding that Boss's pre-proposal costs should not be apportioned between multiple defendants when determining whether a settlement offer was 25% greater than the judgment.
The court held that costs incurred by a plaintiff against multiple defendants should not be apportioned based on the jury's assessment of each defendant's percentage of liability. The costs are properly attributed in full when comparing the judgment to the settlement offer to determine fee-shifting eligibility.
[1] A proposal for settlement is not 25% greater than the judgment if the judgment appellee's pre-proposal costs are included in the calculation.
[2] Costs incurred by a plaintiff against multiple defendants are not apportioned based on the jury's assessment of each defendant's percentage of liability.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Frost's offer of settlement was not 25% greater than the judgment when appellee Boss's pre-proposal costs were included”
The court's core holding that costs are not apportioned when calculating settlement offer compliance
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNicole Boss was injured in two separate automobile accidents and filed a consolidated action against both drivers, Mary Drake and Carolyn Frost, alleg…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the trial court’s order denying appellant Frost’s motion to tax costs and fees pursuant to a proposal for settlement, as we agree that Frost’s offer of settlement was not 25% greater than the judgment when appellee Boss’s pre-proposal costs were included.
Appellee, Nicole Boss, was injured in two separate automobile accidents for which she filed one consolidated action against both drivers, Drake and appellant Frost, alleging that her damages could not be apportioned between the defendants. Frost filed a proposal for settlement in the amount of $27,500, inclusive of costs and attorney’s fees, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. The case was tried before a jury, which apportioned negligence for each accident, assigning fault to both drivers and to Boss. After apportionment in accordance with the jury verdict, a final judgment was entered against Frost for $19,687.50. Frost filed a motion to tax fees and costs based upon her proposal for settlement. Frost argued that Boss’s costs, which could be added to the judgment obtained pursuant to section 768.79(6), Florida Statutes, for purposes of determining whether the judgment is at least 25% less than the offer, should be apportioned between Drake and Frost. If that occurred, then Boss’s net judgment would be less than 75% of the offer, entitling Frost to costs and fees.
In Deleuw, Cather & Co. v. Grogis, 655 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), we rejected a rule that required the court to apportion costs between joint tortfeasors based upon the jury’s assessment of their percentage of liability. We explained that we did not think such a rule “makes any sense, since the amount of costs a plaintiff incurs against multiple defendants is not proportionate to the fault which a jury may assess against those defendants.” Id. at 240. While Deleuw involved joint tortfeasors concurrently contributing to a single injury, the rationale for our opinion also applies to cases such as this in which tortfea-sors in multiple accidents each contributed to the plaintiffs damages.
Affirmed.
FARMER, C.J., GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ., concur.