JUAN B. LUSUNARIZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that a motion to enforce a plea agreement, based on a subsequent statutory change, is a motion for postconviction relief and is time-barred if not filed within the statutory period.
[1] A motion to enforce a plea agreement, which seeks to withdraw a plea based on a subsequent legislative enactment creating additional financial exposure, is properly treat…
[2] A motion for postconviction relief based on a claim that a subsequent legislative enactment breached a plea agreement is time-barred if not filed within two years of the…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1982, the defendant entered a plea agreement for murder and armed robbery, with assurances of no associated costs. In 1994, the legislature enacted…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion To Enforce Plea Agreement cases and more on FLexlaw
COPE, C.J.
Juan B. Lusunariz appeals an order denying his motion to enforce plea agreement. We affirm.
In 1982 defendant-appellant Lusunariz entered into a plea agreement whereby he was sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence for first degree murder, and a suspended sentence for armed robbery. In his sworn motion, the defendant asserts that when he entered into the plea agreement, his counsel assured him that there were no liens, costs, or restitution associated with his plea.
Over a decade later, the Legislature enacted the Florida Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims’ Remedy Act of 1994. See ch. 94-342, Laws of Fla. (codified as §§ 960.29-960.297, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994)) (“Civil Restitution Act”). For offenders who were already incarcerated, the Act allows governmental entities to seek reimbursement of costs of incarceration for that part of the offender’s sentence re maining after July 1, 1994. See § 960.297, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). See generally Goad v. State, 845 So. 2d 880 (Fla.2003).
In 2003 the defendant filed a motion to enforce his plea agreement, and thereafter an amended motion. He asserts that the Legislature’s enactment of the Civil Restitution Act breached his plea agreement with the State, because it created an additional potential financial exposure to him which was not part of the original plea bargain. The trial court denied the motion and the defendant has appealed.
We agree with the Fourth District that the motion to enforce the plea agreement is in substance a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. That is so because the defendant actually seeks to withdraw his plea. See Mayolo v. State, 901 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Because the defendant contends that the enactment of the statute created a breach of the plea agreement, the defendant should have filed his motion within two years of the July 1, 1994 effective date of the Act. Treating the defendant’s motion as a Rule 3.850 motion, it is time barred. We therefore need not reach the merits of the claim.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Allen v. State, 928 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Lusunariz v. State, 908 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (stating that a motion filed to enforce a plea agreement will be treated as a motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and must be filed within two years of the date of conv…
-
Jamaal A. Hameen v. Sheriff John H. Rutherford, 909 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…entence or for a withdrawal of his 2003 plea. Given the unsworn allegations presented in his petition, we believe Harneen might have a claim for postconviction relief based on an involuntary plea. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(a)(5); Lusunariz v. State, 908 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). The unsworn petition does not conform to the oath requirement of Rule 3.850(c), but it was filed within the timetable established in Rule 3.850(b). See Lyell v. State, 872 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). According to the petition,…
Authorities Cited
- Goad v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 845 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 2003)
- Mayolo v. State, 901 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)