AMOS D. EVANS, SR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Evans appealed the summary denial of his postconviction relief motion, challenging a PRR (prison releasee reoffender) designation and his sentence. The court held that Evans's constitutional right to be present at sentencing is cognizable in a Rule 3.850 motion and that he must be given the opportunity to present mitigating evidence at resentencing.
A defendant's right to be present at sentencing, a critical stage of proceedings, is a constitutional right that can be raised in a Rule 3.850 motion. Where resentencing is not merely ministerial and mitigating evidence could have been presented, the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to be present, represented by counsel, and present such evidence at resentencing.
[1] A defendant is entitled to a de novo resentencing when a prior prison releasee reoffender sentence is determined to be illegal.
[2] When a defendant successfully challenges an illegal prison releasee reoffender sentence, resentencing requires the defendant to be present with counsel and have an opport…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant's most basic constitutional rights include the right to be present at every critical stage of the proceeding. The imposition of a sentence is a critical stage at which a defendant is entitled to be present.”
Establishes the fundamental constitutional right at issue and its application to sentencing proceedings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEvans was convicted of unlawful sexual activity with a minor and initially sentenced as a PRR to fifteen years in prison. His conviction was affirmed …
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ORFINGER, J.
Amos D. Evans, Sr. appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Evans was tried and convicted of unlawful sexual activity with a minor and sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) to fifteen years in prison. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. See Evans v. State, 851 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Evans then filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, contending that he did not qualify for PRR treatment. The trial court agreed, struck the PRR designation and left Evans’s fifteen-year prison sentence intact. We conclude that one issue raised by Evans, his failure to be present at resentencing, merits discussion.
We first address whether the alleged error is cognizable in a rule 3.850 motion. Arguably, Amos could have appealed the order striking the PRR designation and reaffirming his fifteen year sentence. Nonetheless, rule 3.850(a)(1) provides that postconviction relief can be granted on sentences imposed in violation of the United States or Florida Constitution. As the court in Jackson v. State, 767 So. 2d 1156 (Fla.2000), explained, a defendant’s most basic constitutional rights include the right to be present at every critical stage of the proceeding. The imposition of a sentence is a critical stage at which a defendant is entitled to be present. See Capuzzo v. State, 596 So. 2d 438 (Fla.1992). Consequently, we conclude that this issue can be raised in a rule 3.850 motion.
On the merits, Evans alleges that his trial counsel did not offer mitigating evidence at his original sentencing based on the erroneous belief that a PRR sentence was mandatory. Evans asserts that there is mitigating evidence that could have been presented. Consequently, we conclude that this is not a case where resentencing was only a ministerial act, and, thus, the trial court should have permitted Evans to be present at sentencing, represented by counsel, with an opportunity to present mitigating evidence.
We reverse this matter for resentencing with Evans present, represented by counsel, and that he be given an opportunity to present mitigating evidence. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Evan’s postconviction motion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
PLEUS, C.J. and GRIFFIN, J., concur.
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Leronnie Lee Walton v. State, 106 So. 3d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…section 775.087(2), we reverse Appellant’s sentences because he was not present at re-sentencing. A defendant has a basic constitutional right to be present at every critical stage of a criminal proceeding, including sentencing. See Evans v. State, 909 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Capuzzo v. State, 578 So. 2d 328, 330 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.180(a)(9) (2010) (stating a defendant “shall” be present during the “imposition of sentence”). A defendant’s right to be present extends…
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Blair v. State, 25 So. 3d 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…ut hearing, Mr. Blair appealed. Among a criminal defendant’s most basic constitutional rights is the right rooted in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to be present at every critical stage of a criminal proceeding. See Evans v. State, 909 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)(citing Jackson v. State, 767 So. 2d 1156 (Fla.2000)); see also United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985); Francis v. State, 413 So. 2d 1175 (Fla.1982), receded from on other grounds by Muhammad…
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Authorities Cited
- Capuzzo v. State, 596 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1992)
- Jackson v. State, 767 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2000)