DONALD WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Williams appealed his adjudication as a sexually violent predator under Florida's Sexually Violent Predators Act, challenging both procedural compliance with statutory time requirements and the substantive basis for the commitment. The court affirmed, finding no procedural prejudice and holding that the statutory definition of sexually violent predator does not require consideration of less restrictive alternatives or availability of treatment programs.
The court affirmed Williams's adjudication, finding no procedural prejudice from the time requirement violations and holding that the statute expressly prohibits consideration of less restrictive alternatives to total confinement, and that absence of available treatment programs does not prevent adjudication as a sexually violent predator.
[1] A defendant may waive the statutory time limit for bringing them to trial after a probable cause order is rendered.
[2] A continuance may be granted for good cause to allow for completion of discovery prior to trial.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where the state seeks to curtail the rights of an individual, it must do so by the least restrictive means.”
Establishes the due process principle raised by Williams, though the court found it inapplicable to SVP commitments
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams was adjudicated as a sexually violent predator following a jury trial. He had served a 21-year prison term and engaged in sex offender treatm…
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Williams appeals from his adjudication as a sexually violent predator following a jury trial, pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predators Act (formerly known as the Jimmy Ryce Act). He raises numerous procedural issues as to the expiration of the 30-day requirement to bring him to trial after a probable cause order is rendered.1 There were two probable cause orders rendered in this case. With regard to the first, Williams suffered no prejudice. He also waived this time period. As to the second order, the court granted a continuance for good cause so that discovery could be completed prior to the trial.
William’s substantive argument that, based on the expert witness testimony at trial, he does not fit the definition of a sexually violent predator, presents a dilemma which we are unable to address. At trial, the two defense experts2 testified Williams did not meet the criteria for civil commitment. The two expert witnesses for the state, Dr. Shaw and Dr. D’errico, testified Williams is a good candidate for community-based treatment, after the institutional treatment he received in prison over the course of his 21 year prison term, as well as his active engagement in sex offender treatment at the civil commitment center. Both concluded that without a structured, supervised, release program he would have difficulty controlling his behavior. However, the Legislature has not funded any adjunct program in which Williams could be placed for supervision.
The defense argued that due process requires consideration of measures less restrictive than total confinement. Where the state seeks to curtail the rights of an individual, it must do so by the least restrictive means. Padgett v. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Services, 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991); State v. Leone, 118 So. 2d 781, 784-85 (Fla.1960). However, the statute expressly mandates that the circuit courts must not consider measures less, restrictive than total confinement,3 and in Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93 (Fla.2002), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the definition of a sexually violent predator renders consideration of less restrictive alternatives inapplicable.
Under-the current status of state programs being funded by the state for sexual predators, there is no program available to which Williams can be released from civil confinement. Thus, since he was found likely to reoffend if placed in a private half-way house as opposed to a supervised release program, he continues to meet the definition of a sexually violent predator. We have been given no citation to, nor have we found, any legal authority to support a claim that the state is required to provide such a program.
AFFIRMED.
THOMPSON and MONACO, JJ., concur. . § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2000).
. Dr. Benoit and Dr. Pritchard.
. § 394.911, Fla. Stat. (2000).
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Citator
Cited By
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Rico Emmanuel Sloss v. State, 925 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…“likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.” § 394.912(10)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). This excludes “measures- less restrictive than total confinement.” Williams v. State, 909 So. 2d 939, 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). The standard jury instruction correctly instructed the jury and was neither confusing nor misleading; thus, Sloss cannot overcome the presumption of its correctness. See Westerheide, 767 So. 2d at 656. Sloss’s argument th…
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Kolin v. State, 927 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…roceedings does not violate separation of powers doctrine).2 We also find no merit in Kolin’s procedural claim. The thirty-day deadline is not jurisdictional, Osborne v. State, 907 [*200] So. 2d 505 (Fla.2005), and may be waived. Williams v. State, 909 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Curry v. State, 880 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Williams v. State; 870 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); State v. Kobel, 757 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Further, section 394.916(2) of the Act provides for waiver of the deadl…
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Smith v. State, 920 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…reached the highest level of treatment to date, but that the State was in the process of adding two higher levels of treatment that Smith had not yet completed. Third, this Court recently rejected a similar due process argument in Williams v. State, 909 So. 2d 939, 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Smith next argues that the lower court erred in denying his requested jury instruction, which would require the jury to find that Smith was “highly likely,” instead of “likely,” to reoffend. This argument was rejected by…
Authorities Cited
- Padgett v. Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991)
- Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2002)
- State v. Leone, 118 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 1960)