TRAVE LAVELL BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Brown appeals his conviction for liquor law violations after a deputy sheriff found ten 5-gallon jugs of moonshine in the back of his ranch wagon. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the search was lawful because it was incident to a valid arrest for reckless driving and Brown's voluntary admission of possessing illicit liquor.
The search was valid and constitutional. A search incident to a lawful arrest is legal, and the arrest for reckless driving was justified by Brown's erratic operation of the vehicle. Moreover, Brown's voluntary admission that he possessed moonshine constituted commission of an offense in the officer's presence, authorizing arrest without a warrant.
“only unreasonable searches of an automobile are condemned by the Constitution Declaration of Rights, § 22; F.S.A.”
Establishes the standard that governs automobile searches under Florida law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown was driving a ranch wagon on U.S. Highway 301 when a deputy sheriff observed the vehicle weaving within its lane and veering off the pavement tw…
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THORNAL; Justice.
Appellant Brown, who was defendant below, seeks reversal of a judgment of conviction pursuant -to-a finding of guilt in a liquor law violation case.
The point to be determined is the legality of the search which produced ten 5-gallon jugs of moonshine' from .the back of appellant’s ranch wagon.
Brown was driving a ranch wagon over U. S. Highway 301. A deputy sheriff followed him for some distance. He noticed the Brown automobile weaving from side to side within its proper traffic lane. It veer.ed off the pavement twice although, it did not cross the center .line of the road. The. officer stopped the. car. He testified at the trial that: Brown “told me that ¡Jie had had quite a bit to drink” and also' that Brown had a bottle on the seat with him. Whereupon appellant , was arrested for reckless-driving. The beam-of the headlights of Brown’s car. was exceptionally high suggesting that the back end of the ranch wagon was heavily loáded. The officer then flashed1 a" light through the window and saw the suspicious jugs on the floor of the car. He inquired of the appellant and was advised', “Well, T might as well tell you. * * * I’ve got some ‘shine’ on there.” The back end of the ranch, wagon was searched with the result that the ten 5-gallon jugs of moonshine were found.
At the trial for violation of the liquor laws, appellant moved to suppress the 'evidence. The judge denied the motion and permitted the illicit liquor to be placed in evidence. The cause was tried before the judge without a jury. The trial judge found appellant guilty and placed him on: probation fpr two years. Reversal of this judgment i.s now sought.
Many times have, we held that only unreasonable searches of an automobile are condemned by the Constitution Declaration of Rights, § 22; F.S.A. It is the responsibility of the trial court in the first instance to determine the validity of the search upon consideration of the circumstances and the manner under which the search was made. A search pursuant to a lawful arrest is perfectly legal. Admittedly the officer in this instance had been “on the loolc-out” for appellant’s automobile because of a-tftip” from a beverage agent. However, this record clearly indicates that the appellant himself invited ‘ his arrest and subsequent search by his own conduct in the operation of the motor --vehicle. We do not have-here-a nebulous or “flimsy” charge of violating traffic laws as was the case in Collins v. State, Fla.1953, 65 So. 2d 61. The operation of the motor vehicle’ here was certainly such as to' justify the arrest for reckless driving.' The-fact that'appellant was subsequently acquitted of this charge in the traffic court is of no consequence insofar-as the validity -of'the arrest-itself is concerned. Moreover, when appellant voluntarily admitted'that .his ranch wagon was stocked with moonshine, such admission was tantamount to the commission of the offense of possessing illicit liquor in the presence of the officer.' When an offense is committed in an. officer’s presence, he is authorized .to arrest without a wárrant.
Under the circumstances suggested by. this'record, the deputy sheriff would have been failing in the .performance of his . duty if he had neglected to take the appellant into custody and confiscate the contraband ’liquor! The case is controlled by óur holdings in Longo v. State, 157 Fla. 668, 26 So. 2d 818; James v. State, Fla. 1955, 80 So. 2d 699; and Gaskins v. State, Fla.1956, 89 So. 2d 867. The officer having been literally invited to make the search, wé cannot condemn the results of his acceptance. '
The judgment appealed from is
Affirmed.
DREW, C. J., and TERRELL and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (18 total)
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Dixon v. State, 343 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…h must be met to convict. Lemus v. State, 158 So. 2d 143 (Fla.3d DCA 1963). “The legality of an arrest does not depend on the conviction or acquittal of the accused. . . . ” Canney v. State, 298 So. 2d 495, 496 (Fla.2d DCA 1973): See Brown v. State, 91 So. 2d 175 (Fla.1956). . Other jurisdictions have affirmatively ruled that the odor of burning marijuana emanating from an automobile provides sufficient probable cause to arrest and/or to search the occupants as evidence of a crime committed in the presence…
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State v. Holmes, 256 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)…. 2d 61; Brown v. State, Fla.1953, 02 So. 2d 348; Byrd v. State, Fla.1955, 80 So. 2d 094; James v. State, Fla.1955, 80 So. 2d 699; Ippolito v. State, Fla.1955, 80 So. 2d 332; Gaskins v. State, Fla.1956, 89 So. [*35] 2d 867; Brown v. State, Fla.1956, 91 So. 2d 175; Cameron v. State, Fla.App. 1st 1959, 112 So. 2d 864; Smith v. State, Fla.App.2d 1963, 155 So. 2d 826; Beacham v. State, Fla.App.3d 1905, 175 So. 2d 796; Riddlehoover v. State, Fla.App. 3d 1967, 198 So. 2d 651; Gagnon v. State, Fla.App.3d 1968, 212…
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Edelmira Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1957)…searches”. We have many times held that evidence obtained as the result of a search is inadmissible only if the search is “unreasonable.” Weiner v. Kelly, Fla.1955, 82 So. 2d 155; Gaskins v. State, Fla.1956, 89 So. 2d 867; Brown v. State, Fla.1956, 91 So. 2d 175. The question of “reasonableness” or “unreasonableness” is a judicial prob [*589] lem in each instance to be resolved on the basis of the factual situation presented in each case. Every situation is to be tested by the traditional requirements of o…
Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Collins v. State, 65 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1953)
- Longo v. State, 157 Fla. 668 (Fla. 1946)
- Gaskins v. State, 89 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1956)
- James v. State, 80 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1955)