BRADLEY MORRIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed most of the appellant's convictions and sentences but reversed the habitual felony offender designation for three specific counts. This was because the trial court improperly applied both the habitual felony offender statute and the prison releasee reoffender statute to impose concurrent life sentences.
The court held that the trial court erred in imposing habitual felony offender sentences concurrently with prison releasee reoffender sentences. The habitual felony offender statute does not authorize deviation from the prison releasee reoffender scheme to impose a greater sentence, and a life term under both statutes is not greater.
[1] A trial court errs by imposing sentences of equal length under both the habitual felony offender statute and the prison releasee reoffender statute when the habitual felo…
[2] A life term under the habitual felony offender statute is not greater than a life term under the prison releasee reoffender statute.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“because section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes the court to deviate from the prison releasee reoffender sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration.”
Explains the statutory limitation on deviating from the prison releasee reoffender statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery, including Counts II, VIII, and X. For these three counts, the trial court imposed concurr…
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PER CURIAM.
In this direct appeal from judgments and sentences, we affirm all of appellant’s convictions. We also affirm all of appellant’s sentences with the exception of the habitual felony offender designation on the sentences imposed for Counts II, VIII, and X. The sentences imposed for Counts II, VIII, and X are reversed and this cause remanded with directions to strike the habitual felony offender designation thereon.
Appellant was charged with and convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery, three of which were Counts II, VIII, and X. For each of these three armed robbery convictions, appellant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment under both the habitual felony offender statute and the prison releasee reoffender statute. Imposing sentences of equal length under both of these two statutes was error “[bjecause section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes the court to deviate from the prison releasee reoffen-der sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration.” Walls v. State, 765 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(emphasis supplied), review dismissed, 779 So. 2d 275 (Fla.2000). “[B]e-cause a life term under the habitual felony offender statute is not greater than a life term under the prison releasee reoffender statute, the trial court was without authority to sentence appellant under the habitual felony offender statute,” id., “even where such sentence is imposed concurrently with the PRR sentence.” Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 659 (Fla.2000).
Therefore, although we do not disturb the prison releasee reoffender designation on the sentences imposed for Counts II, VIII, and X, we reverse and remand with directions to strike the portions of these sentences which indicate that appellant was adjudicated and sentenced as a habitual felony offender. In all other respects, appellant’s judgments and sentences are affirmed.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with directions to strike appellant’s habitual felony offender sentences as to Counts II, VIII, and X.
DAVIS, BENTON and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
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Selvin Daniels v. State, 31 So. 3d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…o Grant v. [*191] State, 770 So. 2d 655, 659 (Fla.2000) (finding a court is without authority to sentence a defendant to equal, concurrent terms under the prison releasee reoffender statute and the habitual felony offender statute); Morris v. State, 910 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that “[ijmpos-ing sentences of equal length under both of these two statutes was error”); Lewis v. State, 819 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (finding a defendant’s sentence to life imprisonment as a prison re…
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Dolansky v. State, 964 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…). Appellant’s sentence is REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to strike that portion of Appellant’s sentence reflecting his adjudication as an HFO. See Walls, 765 So. 2d at 734; Lee v. State, 917 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Morris v. State, 910 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Appellant’s convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED in all other respects. BENTON, HAWKES, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.…
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Renardo Clark v. State, 20 So. 3d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…iolent felony offender does not impose a greater sentence of incarceration than his sentence as a prison releasee reoffender, we conclude that the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant as an habitual violent felony offender. See Morris v. State, 910 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Walls v. State, 765 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion and remand for the trial court to strike the habitual violent felony offender sentence. REVERSED AN…
Authorities Cited
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- Walls v. State, 765 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)