R.S.M., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile delinquent appealed a restitution order, challenging both the form of the order and the absence of an employment contingency. The Florida appellate court found merit in both claims: the written order contained a scrivener's error that failed to reflect the oral pronouncement of monthly installments, and the order failed to condition payment on the juvenile's obtaining suitable employment with reasonable efforts, as required by statute.
The court held that both errors entitled R.S.M. to relief. The written order must be amended to specify monthly installments of $50 as orally pronounced. Additionally, the restitution order must be conditioned upon the juvenile obtaining suitable employment, with a requirement that he make all reasonable efforts to obtain such employment, and payment obligations should commence only upon obtaining such employment.
[1] A written restitution order must conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement regarding payment terms.
[2] A juvenile court may order restitution to be paid in the future, even if the delinquent child is not presently able to pay, provided there is a reasonable likelihood of f…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The court may "require that restitution be paid in the future so long as there is a reasonable likelihood that the delinquent child is capable of obtaining remunerative employment that will provide sufficient earnings to meet that obligation."”
Establishes that juvenile courts may impose future restitution obligations without requiring present ability to pay, if there is reasonable likelihood of future earning capacity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceR.S.M., a juvenile, was found to have committed criminal mischief by vandalizing a building belonging to the Moose Lodge in Lakeland, among other offe…
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WALLACE, Judge.
In a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.135(b)(2), R.S.M. preserved two claims of error directed to the order requiring him to pay restitution. R.S.M. is entitled to relief on both claims.
The trial court found that R.S.M. committed criminal mischief for vandalizing the building belonging to the Moose Lodge on East Lake Parker Drive in Lakeland, in addition to other offenses unrelated to this appeal. The court committed R.S.M. to a low-risk residential facility and imposed restitution as a condition of postcommitment probation.
Following a restitution hearing, the court entered an order requiring R.S.M. to pay $2160 in restitution upon his release from commitment “at the rate of $50”— without further explanation. At the hearing, the trial court had orally pronounced that R.S.M. shall pay the restitution in monthly installments of $50 each. R.S.M. preserved the scrivener’s error in his rule 8.135(b)(2) motion. Therefore, we remand for correction of the written order to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement. See A.S. v. State, 714 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
In his rule 8.135(b)(2) motion, R.S.M. also contended that because he was unemployed and incarcerated at the time of the restitution order, the order should have provided that payments shall be made upon his release once he obtains “suitable employment that will enable him to comply with the order, for which he must make all reasonable efforts to obtain.” See R.D.S. v. State, 844 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
The statute authorizing the juvenile court to impose restitution as a penalty component of a probation program or postcommitment probation program does not require that the delinquent child have the present ability to pay. See § 985.231(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003); R.D.S., 844 So. 2d at 720; J.M.H. v. State, 589 So. 2d 394, 395-96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (construing thé predecessor statute in chapter 39). The court may “require that restitution be paid in the future so long as there is a reasonable likelihood that the delinquent child is capable of obtaining remunerative employment that will provide sufficient earnings to meet that obligation.” J.M.H., 589 So. 2d at 396. Accordingly, the restitution order should specify “that the obligation to pay begins upon the child’s obtaining earnings from employment that will permit him to comply with the condition.” Id. In addition, the child should be required to “make all reasonable efforts” to find suitable employment. R.D.S., 844 So. 2d at 721; L.J.H. v. State, 627 So. 2d 593, 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
At the hearing, the trial court contemplated that R.S.M. would pay restitution from his earnings upon his release from commitment. However, the court failed to direct that the payments shall begin once R.S.M. obtains suitable employment, which he must make all reasonable efforts to obtain, so as to enable him to comply with the restitution order. On remand, the trial court shall amend the restitution order accordingly. In all other respects, the order directing R.S.M. to pay restitution is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
FULMER, C.J., and DAVIS, J., concur.
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M.W.G. v. State, 945 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…asonable amount or manner to be determined by the court.” This court and others have repeatedly held that these statutes do not require that the trial court find that the child has the present ability to pay restitution. See, e.g., R.S.M. v. State, 910 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); R.D.S. v. State, 844 So. 2d 720, 720-21 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); A.J. v. State, 677 So. 2d 935, 938 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Instead, the court must determine what the child may reasonably be expected to earn upon finding suitable em…
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K.T.M v. State, 969 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…asonable amount or manner to be determined by the court.” This court and others have repeatedly held that these statutes do not require that the trial court find that the child has the present ability to pay restitution. See, e.g., R.S.M. v. State, 910 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); R.D.S. v. State, 844 So. 2d 720, 720-21 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); A.J. v. State, 677 So. 2d 935, 938 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Instead, the court must determine what the child may reasonably be expected to earn upon finding suitable em…
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J.A.B. v. State, 993 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…ry of the restitution order. [*1151] J.A.B. argues only that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount and payment schedule for restitution. We affirm. We have voted to consider this case en banc and to recede from R.S.M. v. State, 910 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); R.D.S. v. State, 844 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); and L.J.H. v. State, 627 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), to the extent that those cases suggest that a trial court issuing a restitution order with a monthly payment schedule aga…1 / 4
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- R.D.S. v. State, 844 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- L.J.H. v. State, 627 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- A.S. v. State, 714 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Kervin Keaton v. Dugger, 589 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- In the Interest of J.M.H. v. State, 589 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)