HESH MAYERSDORF AND MELISSA MAYERSDORF, APPELLANTS,
v.
PARAMOUNT BOYNTON, L.L.C., A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for a developer in a dispute over the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The purchasers sought to revoke a purchase agreement based on alleged noncompliance with disclosure requirements, but the court held that the transaction fell within a statutory exemption for subdivisions containing fewer than 100 lots, and therefore the purchasers' revocation rights did not apply.
The court held that the subdivision's status as containing fewer than 100 lots qualifies it for exemption under section 1702(b) of the Act. Because sections 1703(b) and 1703(d) expressly apply only to contracts that are "not exempt under section 1702," these revocation provisions do not apply to this transaction, and the developer is entitled to summary judgment.
[1] The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act imposes registration and disclosure requirements on developers of residential subdivisions.
[2] Contracts for the sale or lease of lots not exempt under section 1702 of the Act may be revoked by the purchaser within seven days of signing.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Clearly, the sale in this case falls under the "100-lot" exemption allowed in section 1702(b)(1). Thus, because both sections 1703(b) and (d) expressly apply only to those contracts which are "not exempt under section 1702," those sections do not apply to this contract because it is exempt under section 1702.”
The court's principal holding explaining why the purchasers' revocation rights do not apply to this transaction
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Mayersdorfs purchased a lot in Paramount Boynton's subdivision, which contained fewer than 100 lots. The purchasers sought to revoke their purchas…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act cases and more on FLexlaw
SHAHOOD, J.
This case involves the interpretation of two provisions of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (the Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq., which imposes certain obligations on developers of residential subdivisions in the interest of consumer protection. The purchasers in this case sought to revoke a purchase and sale agreement and have their deposits refund ed due to the developer’s alleged noncompliance with section 1703. The developer claimed exemption from the Act, specifically, the disclosure and registration requirements, and moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether the transaction was subject to the Act. The trial court granted summary judgment. We affirm.
Section 1703 imposes upon developers who are selling or leasing lots various registration and disclosure requirements. Purchasers are allowed seven days to revoke a contract, which is “not exempt under section 1702,” due to a developer’s non-compliance. See 15 U.S.C. § 1703(b). In some cases, a purchaser may revoke a contract, which is “not exempt under section 1702,” within two years. See 15 U.S.C. § 1703(d).
Section 1702(a) allows exemptions from the “the provisions of this chapter” in circumstances which are delineated in that section. See 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a). Section 1702(b), titled “[s]ale or lease of lots subject to other statutory registration and disclosure requirements,” states, “the provisions requiring registration and disclosure (as specified in section 1703(a)(1) of this title and sections 1704 through 1707 of this title)” shall not apply to “the sale or lease of lots in a subdivision containing fewer than one hundred lots which are not exempt under subsection (a) of this section.” Id. It is undisputed that the subdivision in this case contains fewer than 100 lots and falls within the exemption provided in section 1702(b).
The purchasers sought to revoke the contract under sections 1703(b) and 1703(d). Subsection (b) states the following:
Any contract or agreement for the sale or lease of a lot not exempt under section 1702 of this title may be revoked at the option of the purchaser or lessee until midnight of the seventh day following the signing of such contract or agreement or until such later time as may be required ... and such contract or agreement shall clearly provide this right.
15 U.S.C. § 1703(b) (emphasis added). Subsection (d) authorizes a purchaser to revoke a contract, which does not provide certain disclosures and which is “not exempt under section 1702 of this title,” within two years. See 15 U.S.C. § 1703(d).
The purchasers take the position that the only exemption to which the developer is entitled is exemption from section 1703(a) because, according to them, the “fewer than one hundred lots” exemption under section 1702(b)(1) is expressly limited to exemption from “the provisions requiring registration and disclosure (as specified in section 1703(a)(1)....)” The purchasers argue that, based on this language, the developer is not entitled to exemption from subsections (b) and (d) of section 1703; therefore, the purchasers are entitled to revoke the contract.
We do not agree with the purchasers’ overly narrow interpretation of the word “exempt.” Clearly, the sale in this case falls under the “100-lot” exemption allowed in section 1702(b)(1). Thus, because both sections 1703(b) and (d) expressly apply only to those contracts which are “not exempt under section 1702,” those sections do not apply to this contract because it is exempt under section 1702. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
Affirmed.
STEVENSON, C.J., and GROSS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Saverio Pugliese v. Pukka Dev., Inc., 550 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2008)…at “full agency deference is not always warranted.” The district court acknowledged that the Florida court of appeals had issued an opinion finding that lots exempt under § 1702(b)(1) were exempt from § 1703(d), Mayersdorf v. Paramount Boynton, LLC, 910 So. 2d 887 (Fla.Ct.App.2005), but noted that that case was not binding authority. The district court held that, under the plain language of the statute, § 1703(d) “simply ... refer[s] the reader to where the exemptions are found” and that § 1702(b)(1) “clearly…
-
Pugliese v. Pukka Dev., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2007)…th the Defendant’s reliance on the opinion letter. 14.There is no case law addressing this issue, save for one. The final element of the Defendant’s argument relies on the opinion rendered in the case of Mayersdorf v. Paramount Boynton, LLC, 910 So.2d 887 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). In that case the Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the interpretation the Defendant now advances. This Court has taken Mayersdorf into consideration, and the case does support the Defendant’s position. However, i…
-
Meridian Ventures, LLC v. One N. Ocean, LLC, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2007)…” means “receiving any exemption under section 1702” or “receiving a complete exemption under section 1702.” At the time the motions were filed, the only reported decision on this issue was Mayersdorf v. Paramount Boynton, LLC, 910 So.2d 887 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). The Florida District Court of Appeal held that 1702(b) agreements were exempt from the requirements of 1703(d). The court reasoned that because 1703(d) applies only to agreements “not exempt under section 1702,” and because the…