LEE MEMORIAL HEALTH SYSTEM; CAPE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC.; HEALTHPARK CARE CENTER INC.; LEE MEMORIAL REHABILITATION HOSPITAL; AND CYPRESS COVE AT HEALTHPARK FLORIDA, INC., PETITIONERS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION; AND SELECT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL-LEE, INC., RESPONDENTS
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Lee Memorial Health System sought review of an ALJ's denial of a motion to disqualify him in an administrative proceeding challenging a hospital construction certificate of need. The court granted the petition, holding that the ALJ improperly ruled on the merits of the disqualification motion rather than merely finding it legally insufficient, thereby establishing grounds for disqualification.
The court held that the ALJ exceeded the proper scope of inquiry by refuting the charges of partiality rather than merely finding the motion legally insufficient. When an ALJ or judge attempts to adjudicate the question of disqualification by refuting charges of bias, this alone establishes grounds for disqualification.
[1] A writ of prohibition is available to challenge an order denying a motion to disqualify an administrative law judge when the proceedings below have not been completed and…
[2] A judge presented with a motion for disqualification shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged nor adjudicate the question of disqualification.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a judge who is presented with a motion for disqualification "shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged nor adjudicate the question of disqualification."”
Establishes the fundamental principle that judges cannot rule on the merits of disqualification motions based on bias or prejudice
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSelect Specialty Hospital applied for a certificate of need to construct a new hospital. Lee Memorial and related entities intervened in the administr…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioners seek review of an order denying their motion to disqualify an administrative law judge (ALJ). They also seek certiorari review of an order denying their motion to vacate the recommended order. We grant both petitions.
Respondent, Select Specialty Hospital (Select), submitted an application for a cer-tifícate of need to construct a new hospital. When the Agency for Health Care Administration (agency) denied the application, Select challenged the denial in a formal administrative proceeding. Petitioners intervened in the proceeding and opposed the construction of the new hospital. In April 2005, the ALJ issued a recommended order that the agency approve the application. Petitioners moved to disqualify the ALJ after the entry of the recommended order and asked the agency to send the case back to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for consideration of the motion to disqualify as well as a motion to vacate the recommended order. The agency remanded the case to DOAH.
In their motion to disqualify, petitioners asserted that after the formal hearing but before the entry of the recommended order, the ALJ was retained to act as a lobbyist for Tenet, a non-party to the instant action. The attorney general had filed in federal court a RICO suit against Tenet in which petitioners were also a party plaintiff. The ALJ was engaged as a lobbyist for Tenet for approximately two months before entry of the recommended order. Petitioners argued that they had a reasonable fear that the ALJ was not impartial and was biased against them when the recommended order was entered.
The ALJ denied the motion to disqualify. In the order denying the motion, the ALJ stated that he had resigned from DOAH in early January 2005, to be effective later that month. The ALJ agreed to complete the balance of any outstanding case related work. He was retained by Tenet in March 2005, to monitor proposed legislation during the legislative session and did not serve as legal counsel to Tenet. The ALJ specifically stated that he was not and had never been affiliated with any firm involved in the federal lawsuit filed against Tenet, had not read the complaint and was not even aware that petitioners were parties to the federal case at the time the recommended order was issued. The ALJ further stated that he “provided each party with cold neutrality in a fair and impartial determination.” Therefore, the ALJ found that the motion to disqualify and vacate the recommended order lacked merit.
Generally, prohibition is not available to revoke an order already entered. See Sparkman v. McClure, 498 So. 2d 892 (Fla.1986). However, under the instant circumstances, the proceedings below have not been completed. No final order has been entered in the instant actions. Therefore, the writ of prohibition is available.
Courts have repeatedly held that a judge who is presented with a motion for disqualification “shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged nor adjudicate the question of disqualification.” Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla.1978); Dep’t of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Broward County, 810 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); J & J Indus., Inc. v. Carpet Showcase of Tampa Bay, Inc., 723 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). When a judge has looked beyond the mere legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify on the basis of prejudice and bias and attempted to refute such charges, he has exceeded the proper scope of his inquiry. Bundy, 366 So. 2d at 442. This basis alone establishes grounds for disqualification. Id.
In the order denying the motion to disqualify, the ALJ did not merely find the motion to disqualify legally insufficient. The ALJ specifically stated that the motion “lacks merit.” The ALJ also specifically refuted petitioner’s contention that there was bias on the ALJ’s part in connection with Tenet and the federal lawsuit. The ALJ looked beyond the mere legal sufficiency of the motion and refuted the charges of partiality. Thus, this basis alone establishes grounds for disqualification. Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition and the petition for writ of certiorari. We vacate the order denying the motions to disqualify and to vacate the recommended order. PETITION GRANTED AND ORDER VACATED.
ALLEN, LEWIS and HAWKES, JJ., concur.
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State v. Scharlepp, 255 So. 3d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…nd has attempted to refute the charges of partiality, he has then exceeded the proper scope of his inquiry and on that basis alone established grounds for his disqualification.”); accord Lee Mem’l Health Sys. v. State, Agency for Health Care Admin., 910 So. 2d 892, 893 (Fla 1st DCA 2005); Martin v. State, 820 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2002). We grant the petition but withhold formal issuance of the writ as we are confident the judge will promptly issue an order of disqualification. RAY, OSTERHAUS,…
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ST. Fleur v. Olive Schavon ST. Fleur, 929 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…ification of trial judge. When presented with a motion to disqualify, a judge must look only to the [*736] legal sufficiency of the motion and not pass on the truth of the facts alleged. Lee Mem’l Health Sys. v. State, Agency for Health Care Admin., 910 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The judge’s behavior in this case is similar to that in Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 783 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), where the trial judge merely vented his anger at the defendant for having destroyed certain documents and chas…
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Parmley v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Families, 254 So. 3d 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…elf in an adversarial position with him before the hearing at which she would be required to resolve disputed issues of material fact, see Fla. Admin. Code. R. 65-2.056, .057, .060(1), .066; Lee Mem'l Health Sys. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 910 So. 2d 892, 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (citing Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1978)); World Transp., Inc. v. Cent. Fla. Reg'l Transp., 641 So. 2d 913, 914 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (explaining that the hearing officer's attempt to refute the movant's factu…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- THE Florida BAR v. Sanford Freed, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1978)
- Sparkman v. McCLURE, 498 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1986)
- Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Broward Cnty., 810 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- J & J Indus., Inc. v. Carpet Showcase OF Tampa BAY, Inc., 723 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)