ESSEX INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
FRED SIMPLER AND LORETTA M. BURTON, APPELLEES
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The trial court erred in using parol evidence and the doctrine of estoppel to find insurance coverage where the policy was unambiguous and did not provide such coverage.
Essex Insurance Company challenges a trial court order finding its policy provided liability coverage for a personal injury claim against its insured,…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Essex Insurance Company, challenges a final order by which the trial court ruled that a policy of insurance issued by Essex to Appellee Fred Simpler provided liability coverage in relation to a personal injury claim brought against Simpler by Appellee Loretta Burton. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon parol evidence to determine the intent of the parties, and also relied upon the doctrine of estoppel. Concluding that the trial court erred in both respects, we reverse the order under review.
As both parties acknowledge, the standard of review applicable to the determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is the de novo standard of review. See V & M Erectors, Inc. v. Middlesex Corporation, 867 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Centennial Mortgage, Inc. v. SG/SC, Ltd., 772 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Applying this standard, we conclude that the insurance contract in question is not ambiguous, but plainly provides that the policy issued to Simpler does not include coverage for the premises where Burton allegedly sustained her personal injuries. Accordingly, the trial court erred by considering parol evidence to determine the parties’ intent on this issue.
As to the trial court’s application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, we conclude that this case does not involve circumstances that would place it within the narrow exceptions to the general rule that estoppel will not operate to create or extend coverage where coverage does not exist. See Doe v. Allstate Insurance Company, 653 So. 2d 371 (Fla.1995); Crown Life Insurance Company v. McBride, 517 So. 2d 660 (Fla.1987). Cf. Florida Municipal Insurance Trust v. Village of Golf, 850 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Florida Physicians Insurance Company v. Stem, 563 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
ALLEN, DAVIS and BENTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Schmachtenberg v. Schmachtenberg, 34 So. 3d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…easonably inferred from the terms of the contract, the agreement is ambiguous.” Id. (citing Miller v. Kase, 789 So. 2d 1095, 1097-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). “[W]hether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law.” Essex Ins. Co. v. Simpler, 911 So. 2d 794, 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Therefore, “the standard of review applicable to the determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is the de novo standard of review.” Weisfeld-Ladd, v. Estate of Ladd, 920 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting W…
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Weisfeld-Ladd v. In re Est. OF Norman K. Ladd, 920 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…sion of evidence extrinsic to the contract bearing upon the intent of the parties.”). Upon review of the Prenuptial Agreement, we agree with the trial court’s determination that the Prenuptial Agreement was ambiguous. See Essex Ins. Co. v. Simpler, 911 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“[T]he standard of review applicable to the determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is the de novo standard of review.”); Wagner v. Wagner, 885 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that “whether an ambiguity exists i…
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Torwest, Inc. v. Killilea, 942 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…ned the compensation portion of the agreement was not ambiguous and awarded Killilea commissions of $650,899.27. Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law subject to a de novo standard of review. See Essex Ins. Co. v. Simpler, 911 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Wagner v. Wagner, 885 So. 2d 488, 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Language in a contract is ambiguous where it is “fairly susceptible to more than one interpretation.” McInerney v. Klovstad, 935 So. 2d 529, 531-32 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Crown Life Ins. Co. v. McBRIDE, 517 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1987)
- DOE v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1995)
- Centennial Mortg., Inc. v. SG/SC, Ltd., 772 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- V & M Erectors, Inc. v. The Middlesex Corp., 867 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Fla. Mun. Ins. Tr. v. Vill. OF Golf, 850 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Fla. Physicians Ins. Co. v. Richard L. Stern, M.D., 563 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)