PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; NANCY BOSTOCK, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF AND AS CHAIRPERSON OF THE PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; CAROL COOK, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF AND AS VICE CHAIRPERSON OF THE PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; MARY BROWN, JANET CLARK, JANE GALLUCCI, LINDA LERNER, AND MARY L. RUSSELL, ALL IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; AND DR. CLAYTON WILCOX, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOLS SUPERINTENDENT, APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIAM CROWLEY, BY AND FOR HIS MINOR SON, AKWETE OSOKA, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 2005-09-28
No. 2D04-3428
KELLY and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.
911 So. 2d 881 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2005) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Pinellas County School Board appealed the trial court's order certifying a class action lawsuit brought by Black students alleging racial discrimination in the school system. The appellate court affirmed the class certification, finding that the trial court properly applied the procedural requirements for class actions and did not abuse its discretion.


Holding

The appellate court affirmed the class certification order, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the class met the procedural requirements for certification. The court noted that the standing issue was not properly before it on appeal because it involved whether the complaint stated a cause of action, which is outside the limited scope of reviewing a class certification order.


Headnotes

[1] Appellate jurisdiction over a nonfinal order of class certification is limited to reviewing the propriety of that order.

[2] A trial court's determination of class certification requirements, such as commonality and typicality, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

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Key Quotes

“A 'determination that a case meets the requirements of a class action is ... within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed on appeal only if an abuse of discretion is shown.'”

Establishes the standard of review for class certification orders on appeal.

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Facts & Procedural History

William Crowley, on behalf of his minor son Akwete Osoka and all other Black students in Pinellas County public schools, filed a class action complain…

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Opinion of the Court
WALLACE, Judge.

WALLACE, Judge.

The Pinellas County School Board challenges a nonfinal order certifying a class defined as “[a]ll Pinellas County Students of Black descent, who are, or may in the future be, attending public elementary, middle or high schools.” The class representatives’ complaint alleged claims of racial discrimination in the Pinellas County school system and sought declaratory and equitable relief under article IX, section 1, of the Florida Constitution — the public education provision; the equal protection clause of article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution; and section 228.2001(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000),1 a part of the Florida Educational Equity Act. On appeal, the School Board makes two arguments. First, the School Board asserts that the class representatives have no standing to bring their lawsuit. Second, the School Board maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the class representatives met the “commonality” and “typicality” requirements of rule 1.220(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm. We will briefly address each of the School Board’s arguments.

The School Board’s argument based on the class representatives’ asserted lack of standing actually addresses the issue of whether the class representatives’ complaint stated a cause of action. This issue is not properly before us, and we express no opinion on it. Our jurisdiction in this nonfinal appeal is limited to the review of the propriety of the order of class certification. Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi); see also Samples v. Hernando Taxpayers Ass’n, 682 So. 2d 184, 185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

A “determination that a case meets the requirements of a class action is ... within the trial court’s discretion and will be reversed on appeal only if an abuse of discretion is shown.” Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Updegraff, 807 So. 2d 768, 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citing Marco Island Civic Ass’n v. Mazzini, 805 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)). In this case, the trial court entered a thoughtful and comprehensive order with detailed findings of fact concerning each of the prerequisites for class certification, including commonality and typicality. After a careful review of the record, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its considerable discretion in deciding to certify the class. We also note that from the landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education

to the present, courts have generally allowed claims such as the ones presented by the class representatives involving allegations of racial discrimination in the public schools to proceed as class actions. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 156 L.Ed.2d 257 (2003); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 118 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992); Raney v. Bd. of Educ. of Gould Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 443, 88 S.Ct. 1697, 20 L.Ed.2d 727 (1968); Mannings v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 277 F. 2d 370 (5th Cir.1960).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order of class certification.

KELLY and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur. . In 2002, the legislature repealed section 228.2001 effective January 7, 2003, see ch.2002-387, §§ 1058, 1065, Laws of Fla., and reenacted it as section 1000.05 effective the same date, see ch.2002-387, §§ 7, 1065.

. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Hernando Cnty. v. Morana, 979 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
    …. Tobacco Co., 519 So. 2d 987 (Fla.1987)) (emphasis added). Therefore, I question whether the Florida courts can create a rule of procedure that provides trial courts with discretion to certify class actions, see Pinellas County Sch. Bd. v. Crowley, 911 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that a trial court has “considerable discretion” in deciding whether to grant or deny certification), and then create a mandatory jurisdictional rule that all claims be aggregated to require that all class actions be…
  • The LAW Offs. OF David J. Stern, P.A. v. Rory Hewitt, 106 So. 3d 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
    …to review of the propriety of the class certification. The trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment on appellee’s claim for a violation of FDUTPA is not before us at this point. See Pinellas Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Crowley, 911 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“The School Board’s argument ... actually addresses the issue of whether the class representatives’ complaint stated a cause of action. This issue is not properly before us, and we express no opinion on it. Our jurisdiction…
  • Amen E. Idumwonyi v. Colette N. Belizaire, 129 So. 3d 1110 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)
    …timesharing with his children. Because the circuit court did not either grant or deny the husband’s motion in the order on appeal, the circuit court’s handling of that motion is beyond the scope of our review. See Pinellas Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Crowley, 911 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (recognizing that jurisdiction to review a non-final order certifying a class was limited to review of the propriety of that order); see also Stanberry v. Escambia Cnty., 813 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that…

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