AVIS TANNIHILL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Avis Tannihill was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and argued that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a prior drug transaction he was not charged with. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that although the prior crime evidence was admissible, the reasoning differed from the trial court's identity theory—the evidence was properly admitted to refute Tannihill's innocent bystander defense by proving his knowledge and intent.
The evidence of the prior drug transaction was admissible, not to establish identity (which was not at issue), but to refute Tannihill's innocent bystander defense by proving his knowledge and intent under Florida Statutes section 90.404(2)(a). When collateral crime evidence is introduced to prove intent and knowledge rather than identity, there is no requirement that the two crimes share unique factors.
[1] Evidence of a prior uncharged crime is admissible to prove intent or knowledge when a defendant claims to be an innocent bystander with no involvement in the charged offe…
[2] When evidence of a collateral crime is admitted to prove intent or knowledge, the prior crime and the charged offense need not share unique factors.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.”
This is the statutory framework (Fla. Stat. § 90.404(2)(a)) governing admission of collateral crime evidence for various purposes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA confidential informant purchased cocaine from Tannihill in an apartment where she observed him cooking crack cocaine, though he was not charged with…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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KLEIN, J.
Appellant, who was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and other related offenses, argues that the trial court improperly allowed evidence of a prior drug transaction, which he was not charged with in this case. The trial court admitted the facts of the earlier crime to prove identity. We affirm, but based on different reasoning.
A confidential informant bad purchased cocaine from appellant in an apartment where she observed him cooking crack cocaine in the kitchen. Appellant was not charged, however, with that offense in this case. On this occasion, in the same apartment, the informant again observed appellant cooking crack, but another man handed her the drugs and took her money.
The trial court admitted the evidence of the prior transaction under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), reasoning that under Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959), this was the type of signature collateral crime which would be admissible to establish identity, i.e., that it was the appellant who committed the present crime.
Section 90.404(2)(a) provides:
Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.
Appellant argues that in order to introduce a collateral crime to establish identity, the collateral crime and the crime at issue must share some unique features suggesting the same perpetrator, citing Cox v. State, 869 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Black v. State, 630 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Appellant argues that because these were typical drug transactions, there was nothing unique about them and the trial court should not have admitted the collateral crime evidence.
We need not decide if these crimes were so uniquely similar as to allow admission of the collateral crime to establish identity, because there was no issue of identity in this case. It was conceded that appellant was present at the scene of the crime, and there was therefore no need to establish his identity. The challenged evidence was admissible, however, in order to refute appellant’s theory of defense that he was merely an innocent bystander with no knowledge or involvement in the drug sale.
In Damren v. State, 696 So. 2d 709 (Fla.1997), the defendant was on trial for burglarizing a business which he had burglarized two weeks earlier. His theory of defense was that, although he was at the scene of the crime, he was too drunk to have had the intent to commit the second burglary, and the Florida Supreme Court held that evidence of the uncharged earlier burglary was admissible to refute the defense theory of lack of intent.
In this case, as in Damren, the evidence of the prior crime was admissible to refute appellant’s theory that he was there as an innocent bystander. Because that was appellant’s theory of defense, the evidence was admissible under section 90.404(2)(a) as relevant to proving intent and knowledge. When evidence of a collateral crime is admitted for those reasons, there is no requirement that the two crimes share unique factors, as there is when the collateral crime is introduced to establish identity. Washington v. State, 737 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
Affirmed.
GUNTHER and MAY, JJ., concur.
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O'Flaherty-Lewis v. State, 230 So. 3d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…ning to A.D. was probative of appellant’s state of mind in accepting the money. Proper use of Williams rule evidence is “to refute [a defendant’s] theory .of defense that he was merely an innocent bystander” to criminal conduct, Tannihill v. State, 912 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), to “disprove a defendant’s attempt to explain [her own] intent,” Miller v. State, 667 So. 2d 325, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), or to show that a defendant “engaged in a plan” to separate victims from their money by a common schem…
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McCAIN v. State, 995 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…appellant,” and “the evidence of the matchbox was admitted solely to show propensity to possess cocaine at an earlier time, evidence which is inadmissible under the Williams Rule.” Id. at 982. By contrast, the Fourth District in Tannihill v. State, 912 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), affirmed the admission of Williams rule evidence concerning a previous drug sale, offered to rebut the defendant’s claim that he was an innocent bystander to the charged drug sale. The court rejected the argument that the charge…
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Fincher v. State, 137 So. 3d 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…e perpetrator of the charged crime. However, we need not decide whether the crimes contained a significant feature so as to allow the collateral crime to establish identity, because there is no issue of identity in this case. See Tannihill v. State, 912 So. 2d 2, 8 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (collateral crime evidence not used to establish identity where appellant conceded he was present at scene of crime, but was admissible to “refute appellant’s theory of defense that he was merely an innocent bystander”). The…
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)
- Washington v. State, 737 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Black v. State, 630 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Damren v. State, 696 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1997)
- COX v. State, 869 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)