GLENN ROBERT MILLER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2005-11-04
No. 2D04-1923
SILBERMAN, J„ and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur.
912 So. 2d 1282 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2005) Positive Treatment
Cited by 18 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Glenn Miller appealed costs imposed at his sentencing for drug and prescription offenses. The Florida appellate court reversed two cost assessments ($150 court facilities fee and $800 public defender's fee) due to procedural deficiencies, but affirmed the $2 criminal justice education cost.


Holding

The court reversed the $150 court facilities cost and the $800 public defender's fee because the court failed to provide proper notice and failed to comply with statutory requirements, but affirmed the $2 criminal justice education cost as mandatory. The court remanded for compliance with proper procedures.


Headnotes

[1] Mandatory costs imposed at sentencing do not require notice to the defendant.

[2] Discretionary costs imposed at sentencing require notice and an opportunity to be heard.

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Key Quotes

“when imposing discretionary costs the court must give the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard”

Establishes the procedural requirement for discretionary costs

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Facts & Procedural History

Miller was sentenced for drug and prescription offenses. The sentencing court orally announced a lump sum costs amount and public defender's fee, then…

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Opinion of the Court
NORTHCUTT, Judge.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Glenn Miller disputes some of the costs imposed at his sentencing for drug and prescription offenses. His arguments are well-taken in part.

A sentencing court may impose mandatory costs without notice. Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). On the other hand, when imposing discretionary costs the court must give the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. In either case, the record must contain citations to the statutory authorities for imposing the costs. Id.

In Miller’s case, the court orally announced the imposition of a lump sum amount in costs and a public defender’s fee. The court then entered a written order detailing the various assessments. After taking this appeal Miller challenged several of the costs by filing a motion in the circuit court pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). The motion was deemed to be denied when the court did not rule on it within the time specified by that rule.

The written costs order listed a $150 item for court facilities, a discretionary assessment under section 939.18(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2002). But to impose this cost, the court was required to find that Miller has the ability to pay the additional assessment and that doing so would not prevent him from making restitution, paying other legally authorized compensation to victims, or paying child support. § 939.18(l)(b). Because the court failed to provide notice to Miller regarding the imposition of the discretionary court facilities cost and failed to make the financial inquiries required by the authorizing statute, we reverse it. See Ayoub v. State, 901 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). On remand, the court may again impose this cost if it complies with the statute. See id.

The court orally announced the imposition of an $800 fee for the public defender’s services pursuant to section 938.29, Florida Statutes (2002), which authorizes the fee and grants the state a lien to secure its payment. The imposition of this fee is mandatory, see Cook v. State, 896 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), but the statute requires the court to give notice and an opportunity for the defendant to object to the amount, see § 938.29(6). Further, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1) provides that at sentencing the defendant must be advised of his right to a hearing to contest the amount of the public defender’s lien. Here, the court failed to inform Miller of his right to contest the amount. Therefore, we reverse the public defender’s fee. See Laurain v. State, 708 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). On remand, Miller shall have thirty days from our mandate to file a written objection to the amount assessed for the public defender’s fee. See id. If he files such an objection, the court shall hold a hearing. If Miller fails to timely file an objection, the court may reimpose the public defender’s fee without a hearing.

Finally, we affirm the $2 cost for criminal justice education imposed pursuant to section 938.15, Florida Statutes (2002). See Waller v. State, 911 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (en banc) (holding that this cost is mandatory in Pasco County).

Convictions and sentences affirmed, costs affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

SILBERMAN, J„ and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Awilda Rodriguez v. State, 964 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …imposed. On remand, the circuit court shall revisit the imposition of costs in light of this decision. Any cost imposed shall be supported by a citation to the statute authorizing it either orally or in the written costs order. See Miller v. State, 912 So. 2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Mrs. Rodriguez raised a number of issues concerning the original costs assessment in a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), but the circuit court denied the motion. Because we are reversing th…
  • Bruno v. State, 960 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …the $300 in fees and immediately reimposing the fees. The order then provided Ms. Bruno the opportunity to file a written objection within thirty days. As authority for this procedure, the circuit court cited this court’s opinion in Miller v. State, 912 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In Miller, the circuit court orally announced the imposition of $800 in fees for the services of the public defender at the sentencing hearing, and the defendant voiced no initial objection. The circuit court did not, however, i…
  • Hayes v. State, 957 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …a hearing to contest the amount. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.720(d)(1) (requiring court to give notice at sentencing of defendant’s right to hearing to contest amount of attorney’s fee lien). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment lien. See Miller v. State, 912 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). On remand, if Hayes files a written objection to the amount within thirty days after the issuance of our mandate, the court shall hold a hearing. If Hayes fails to timely file a written objection, the court may reimpose the lien…

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