STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
N.P., APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2005-06-15
No. 2D04-2927
NORTHCUTT and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.
913 So. 2d 1 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2005) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The State appealed a juvenile delinquency disposition for criminal mischief (graffiti), arguing the trial court failed to impose two mandatory statutory provisions: a fine and driver's license sanctions. The court held the fine was not mandatory for juveniles (since it applies only to "convicted" persons, and juveniles receive adjudications of delinquency rather than convictions), but the driver's license sanctions were mandatory and thus the case was remanded.


Holding

The fine was not mandatory because section 806.13(6)(a) applies only to those who have been "convicted," and juveniles adjudicated delinquent are not deemed convicted under Florida law. However, the driver's license sanctions under section 806.13(7) were mandatory because that subsection uses the language of delinquency rather than conviction and is clearly intended to apply to minors.


Headnotes

[1] A fine for criminal mischief involving graffiti is not mandatory for a juvenile found to have committed a delinquent act, as the statute requires a "conviction," which do…

[2] A juvenile found to have committed a delinquent act of criminal mischief involving graffiti is subject to mandatory driver's license sanctions.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Because juveniles are not deemed to be "convicted" by adjudications of delinquency, se.e § 985.228(6), Fla. Stat. (2003), N.P. could not be considered to have been convicted of criminal mischief in violation of the statute.”

Establishes that the fine provision does not apply to juveniles because it requires a "conviction" and juveniles receive adjudications of delinquency, not convictions.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

N.P., a juvenile, was found delinquent for placing graffiti on bathroom doors and walls at John Hopkins Middle School in violation of Florida Statute …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
DAVIS, Judge.

DAVIS, Judge.

N.P., a juvenile, was found delinquent for having committed criminal mischief in violation of section 806.13, Florida Statutes (2003). She had participated in placing graffiti on bathroom doors and walls at John Hopkins Middle School. The trial court withheld adjudication and imposed a number of unchallenged sanctions as part of the disposition. The State argues that the trial court erred in failing to impose two additional mandatory provisions pursuant to sections 806.13(6) and .13(7). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The first of these two allegedly mandatory provisions is contained in section 806.13(6)(a), which provides for the imposition of a fine. The second is contained in section 806.13(7), which provides for the revocation, withholding, or extension of an existing suspension or revocation of the minor’s driver’s license. In the instant case, we conclude that the fíne is not mandatory but that the driver’s license provisions are.

Section 806.13(6)(a) provides as follows:

Any person who violates this section when the violation is related to the placement of graffiti shall, in addition to any other criminal penalty, be required to pay a fine of:

1. Not less than $250 for a first conviction.

2. Not less than $500 for a second conviction.

3. Not less than $1,000 for a third or subsequent conviction.

(Emphasis added.) While the statute does provide that a fine “shall” be imposed, it also provides that such a fine is to be imposed only on those individuals who have been “convicted.” Because juveniles are not deemed to be “convicted” by adjudications of delinquency, se.e § 985.228(6), Fla. Stat. (2003), N.P. could not be considered to have been convicted of criminal mischief in violation of the statute. As such, she could not be subject to the imposition of a fine for violating the statute, and the trial court’s failure to impose such a fine was not error. By contrast, however, the trial court did err in failing to impose the driver’s license sanctions contained in section 806.13(7), which are required when a minor is found to have committed a delinquent act under section 806.13 by placing graffiti on any public or private property. Unlike subsection (6) of the statute, subsection (7) is clearly intended to apply to minors. It does not use the term “conviction” but uses the language of delinquency, stating that the court shall impose the appropriate driver’s license sanctions once the minor is found to have committed a delinquent act.

In the instant case, the trial court should have imposed the driver’s license sanctions because N.P. was found to have committed a delinquent act, as evidenced by the trial court’s entry of a withhold of adjudication. See State v. Menuto, 912 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Given the fact that N.P. was found to have committed a delinquent act, and given the mandatory language of section 806.13(7), the trial court was required to revoke, withhold, or extend the suspension or revocation of N.P.’s driver’s license. The failure to do so was error.1

In conclusion, we determine that the trial court correctly refused to impose a fine in the instant case because N.P. could not be considered to have been convicted under the statute. However, given the mandatory language contained in section 806.13(7), in addition to that section’s clear application to juveniles, we conclude that the trial court erred in refusing to either revoke, withhold, or extend the revocation or suspension of N.P.’s driver’s license after it withheld adjudication.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

NORTHCUTT and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur. . We note that section 806.13(6) appears to contain an internal conflict. While the sanction of a fine pursuant to section 806.13(6)(a) may not be applied to minors because the violator must be "convicted,” section 806.13(6)(c) expressly applies to minors and provides that if a minor "commits a delinquent act prohibited by paragraph (a), the parent or legal guardian of the minor is liable along with the minor for payment of the fine.”


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • A.M.P. v. State, 927 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
    …hermore, an adjudication of delinquency does not qualify as a “conviction” for the purposes of section 775.083, which allows the imposition of varying fines for the. conviction of varying degrees of criminal offenses. See J.S., supra; State v. N.P., 913 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (finding of delinquency was not “conviction,” for purpose of statute requiring imposition of fine for criminal mischief [*101] conviction). Nonetheless, as is argued by the State, the issue is not cognizable on appeal because of t…
  • D.A. v. State, 11 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
    …35(6), Fla. Stat. (2007) ; see also A.M.P. v. State, 927 [*424] So. 2d 97, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (stating that “an adjudication of delinquency does not qualify as a ‘conviction’ for purposes of section 775.083”) (Florida Statutes); State v. N.P., 913 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (stating that juveniles are not deemed to be “convicted” by adjudications of delinquency). Thus, section 938.27, Florida Statutes (2007), which expressly applies to all “convicted persons” in “criminal cases”, does not apply to…
  • State v. J.C., 916 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
    …iscussed above, a delinquent act is by definition a “violation of any law.” § 985.03(58). Therefore, by imposing surcharges for a “violation” in sections 938.08 and 938.085, the legislature specifically included juvenile offenses. Cf. State v. N.P., 913 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (finding that the fine in section 806.13(6)(a) did not apply to juveniles because the language of the statute applied to individuals who have been “convicted ” and “juveniles are not deemed to be ‘convicted’ by adjudications of…

Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw