ROY HALL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Roy Hall appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to enforce a plea agreement, which the appellate court construes as a rule 3.850 motion for ineffective assistance of counsel. The court reverses and remands because Hall made a facially sufficient claim that his counsel misadvised him about his maximum sentencing exposure, causing him to enter a guilty plea he would not otherwise have accepted.
The court holds that Hall states a facially sufficient claim for relief under rule 3.850. Counsel's affirmative misrepresentations about sentencing consequences can support an ineffective assistance claim where the defendant demonstrates a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty. Hall's assertion that he would not have entered the plea absent counsel's assurance of guideline-range sentencing, combined with the plea agreement's guideline-sentencing provision, satisfies this test.
[1] A motion to enforce a plea agreement may be construed as a rule 3.850 motion if it meets the procedural requirements of rule 3.850 and states a facially sufficient claim…
[2] Affirmative misrepresentations by counsel regarding sentencing exposure can form the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Counsel's affirmative misrepresentations can be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance seeking leave to withdraw a guilty plea.”
Establishes that misrepresentations by counsel about plea consequences constitute ineffective assistance grounds for withdrawal.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHall entered a 'straight up' plea pursuant to a written plea agreement that included a provision stating he would be sentenced within the guidelines. …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his Motion to Enforce a Plea Agreement, which this Court construes as a rule 3.850 motion. We reverse the denial of the appellant’s claim asserting that he was denied effective assistance of counsel where he was misadvised by counsel regarding his maximum sentencing exposure.
A motion to enforce a plea agreement should be construed as a rule 3.850 motion where the motion meets the procedural requirements of rule 3.850 and where the motion states a facially sufficient claim for relief. See Flowers v. State, 881 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Here, the appellant’s motion is properly sworn, timely, and procedurally correct. Further, as discussed below, the appellant’s motion states a facially sufficient claim for relief.
In his motion, the appellant asserts that his counsel affirmatively misadvised him of the consequences of his “straight up” plea. Specifically, the appellant asserts that his written plea agreement included a provision stating that the appellant would be sentenced within the guidelines. Further, the appellant asserts that he was informed by counsel that the trial court would impose a sentence within the recommended guideline range as opposed to a more severe sentence as allowed by the statutory maximum for the offenses. Counsel’s affirmative misrepresentations can be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance seeking leave to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Leroux, 689 So. 2d 235, 236 (Fla.1996).
However, when an appellant pleads guilty, the appellant must also demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Brazeail v. State, 821 So. 2d 364, 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Here, the appellant asserts he would not have entered the “straight up” plea absent his counsel’s assurance that the trial court would sentence the appellant within the recommended guideline range.
Furthermore, the trial court’s record attachments demonstrate that the appellant’s plea agreement included a provision stating that the appellant’s sentencing disposition would be “per the guidelines.” Thus, the appellant has made a facially sufficient claim for relief in his Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement, which should be construed as a rule 3.850 motion. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order summarily denying the appellant’s rule 3.850 motion and remand with instructions to either hold an evidentiary hearing or attach portions of the record conclusively refuting the appellant’s claims.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ERVIN, DAVIS, and BENTON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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State v. Midkiff (Fla. 5th DCA 2020)…otion to enforce plea agreement.’” Dellofano v. State, 946 So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (Lawson, J., concurring). However, rule 3.850 has repeatedly been utilized as the procedural vehicle for asserting such claims. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 913 So. 2d 712, 713 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). 6 circuit court had “explained that this resentencing ‘for purely legal reasons’ had no bearing on [the petitioner’s] culpability and therefore would not probably result in a less severe sentence for [the petitioner].” Id.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Leroux, 689 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1996)
- Brazeail v. State, 821 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Dewayne Flowers v. State, 881 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)