RICARDO ELLIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2005-11-16
No. 2D05-990
WALLACE, J., Concurs., ALTENBERND, J., Concurs with opinion.
913 So. 2d 1255 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2005) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

Ricardo Ellis appeals the denial of his postconviction relief motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, challenging his resentencing for aggravated child abuse convictions. The court affirms two of his three claims but reverses as to one claim involving double jeopardy violations in resentencing.


Holding

The court held that once a legal sentence is imposed and jeopardy attaches, a defendant cannot be resentenced to a greater term of imprisonment, and a defendant cannot be resentenced on offenses for which the defendant's prison term has expired. Therefore, the December 2001 resentencing violated Ellis's double jeopardy rights.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant cannot be resentenced to a greater term of imprisonment once a legal sentence has been imposed, as jeopardy attaches at that point.

[2] A defendant cannot be resentenced on offenses for which the prison term has already expired.

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Key Quotes

“Once a legal sentence is imposed, jeopardy attaches and a defendant cannot be resentenced to a greater term of imprisonment.”

Establishes the fundamental double jeopardy principle that prevents resentencing to greater terms once jeopardy has attached

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Facts & Procedural History

Ellis was originally convicted of nine counts of aggravated child abuse and initially sentenced in 1996. Following a direct appeal, he was resentenced…

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Opinion of the Court
NORTHCUTT, Judge.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Ricardo Ellis appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Ellis raised' three claims in his motion. We affirm without comment as to two of Ellis’s claims, but reverse as to the remaining one.

Ellis was originally convicted of nine counts of aggravated child abuse in violation of section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1993). On June 3, 1996, the circuit court sentenced Ellis to concurrent terms of fifteen years’ imprisonment on counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 (as designated in the written judgment), followed by a consecutive term of four years’ imprisonment on counts 9 and 10. In 1998, on remand following Ellis’s direct appeal, the circuit court re-sentenced Ellis to fifteen years’ imprisonment on counts 1, 2, 3, and 8, to run concurrently with a term of five years’ imprisonment on counts 5, 6, and 7. The four-year sentence on counts 9 and 10 was ordered to run consecutively with the above’ sentences. In 2001 we reviewed the denial of a prior motion for postconviction relief, and again remanded for resentencing. Ellis v. State, 795 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Thereafter, in December 2001 the circuit court resentenced Ellis to concurrent terms of fifteen years’ imprisonment on counts 1, 2, and 3, to be followed..by a consecutive term of thirty months’ imprisonment on counts 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

In his 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, Ellis pointed out that at the time of the December 2001 resentencing he had already completed the five-year sentence on counts 5, 6, and 7, which in 1998 had been imposed to run concurrently with the fifteen-year term for counts 1, 2, and 3. Therefore, Ellis argued, the circuit court violated his double jeopardy rights when it resentenced him on those counts to thirty months’ consecutive to the fifteen-year term. We agree.

Once a legal sentence is imposed, jeopardy attaches and a defendant cannot be resentenced to a greater term of imprisonment. Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla.2003). Further, a defendant cannot be resentenced on offenses for which the defendant’s prison term has expired. Willingham v. State, 833 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

'Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the circuit court with instructions to vacate the December 2001 sentences imposed on counts 5, 6, and 7, and to reinstate the October 1998 sentences as to those counts.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

WALLACE, J., Concurs.

ALTENBERND, J., Concurs with opinion.

Concurrence
ALTENBERND, Judge,

ALTENBERND, Judge,

Concurring.

I fully concur in this opinion. I write only to observe that the relief we grant today is meaningless from any practical perspective. The sentences we vacate for counts 5, 6, and 7 were imposed concurrently with counts 8, 9, and 10. There is no challenge here to the convictions themselves. Thus, double jeopardy is invoked to clean up an error that appears to be entirely harmless. In a postconviction proceeding, it seems to me that a defendant should need to allege that the sentencing error he seeks to correct will have some practical impact upon his overall sentence when multiple offenses are involved.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Jimenez, 173 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)
    …onsecutive to counts 1 (15 years) and 2 (30 years). As such, double jeopardy would bar any resentencing on these counts, and the Defendant is entitled to relief on this ground, resulting in a sentence reduction of fifteen (15) years. Ellis v. State, 913 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Palmer v. State, 182 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966). The State contends that the trial court erred in granting in part the Rule 3.800(a) motion based upon a claim of double jeopardy. For the following reasons, we affirm in part…
    1 / 2
  • Andrews v. State (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)
    …ct that Andrews be resentenced on these counts. Second, it is undisputed that Andrews had already completed these three sentences. A defendant “cannot be resentenced on offenses for which the defendant’s prison term has expired.” See Ellis v. State, 913 So. 2d 1255, 1257 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citing Willingham v. State, 833 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). AFFIRMED, in part, REVERSED, in part, and REMANDED with directions. EDWARDS and SASSO, JJ., concur. 3…

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