WILLIAM MARK REED, APPELLANT,
v.
MARSHA REED, APPELLEE
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In this follow-up to an earlier reversal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's classification of mortgage payment obligations as support-based. The court held that former spousal mortgage obligations arising from a final judgment constitute settlement of property rights rather than support, and remanded for clarification that such amounts are enforceable under the marital settlement agreement.
The court held that a former spouse's obligation to make mortgage payments is in the nature of a settlement of property rights, not support, and therefore reversed the trial court's order to the extent it classified the mortgage payments as support. The court remanded for clarification that the mortgage payment amounts are enforceable as part of the marital settlement agreement.
[1] Appellate review is not precluded when an error of law appears on the face of the order being appealed, even in the absence of a transcript or approved statement of evide…
[2] A former spouse's obligation to make mortgage payments pursuant to a final judgment is generally considered a settlement of property rights, not an obligation for support…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We have consistently held that a former spouse's obligation to make mortgage payments is in the nature of a settlement of property rights, rather than an obligation for support.”
Establishes the core legal principle governing classification of mortgage payment obligations in divorce cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court, following an evidentiary hearing on remand from a prior appeal, ordered William Reed to pay his former wife Marsha Reed's attorney's …
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STEVENSON, C.J.
In Reed v. Reed, 857 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), this court reversed an award of $4,000 in attorney’s fees to the former wife, Marsha Reed, and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court ordered the former husband, William Reed, to pay the former wife’s attorneys’ fees, ratified the general master’s report, and denied the former husband’s exceptions to the report. The former husband timely appealed. We reverse the final order in part.
No court reporter was present during the hearing and neither party has submitted an approved statement of evidence.
Nevertheless, appellate review is not precluded when an error of law appears on the face of the order being appealed. See Dorsett v. Dorsett, 902 So. 2d 947, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
The trial judge’s order upon report of the general master adopted the general master’s opinion that the “obligations that are represented by [the] final judgment continue to have the same character of being in the nature of support as they carried with them when established by the final judgment.” According to the general master’s report, the former husband owed $20,514 towards the first mortgage on the former marital home, $38,124.64 towards the second mortgage, and $20,199.14 towards the third mortgage. We have consistently held that a former spouse’s obligation to make mortgage payments is in the nature of a settlement of property rights, rather than an obligation for support. See Filan v. Filan, 549 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (holding that because the former husband’s obligation to pay off a mortgage was in the nature of settlement of property rights and not support, the contempt power of the trial court was erroneously invoked); Mandy v. Williams, 492 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (holding that a trial court lacks the authority to modify mortgage payments required by a final judgment because they are property rights).
We therefore reverse the trial court’s order upon report of the general master to the extent that the mortgage payments are classified as support.
We have considered' the other arguments on appeal and find no error. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand with directions to clarify that the amounts owed in mortgage payments are enforceable as part of a marital settlement agreement instead of “being-in the nature of support.”
Affirmed in part, Reversed in part and Remanded.
POLEN, J., and CROW, DAVID F., Associate Judge, concur.
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Connell v. Cap. City P'rs, LLC, 932 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…of the trial court’s order requiring him to transfer the $49,000 to Capital City. Because there was no transcript of the hearing below, the order on appeal may be reversed only if an error of law appears on the face of the order. See Reed v. Reed, 914 So. 2d 26, 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Burke v. Burke, 864 So. 2d 1284, 1284-85 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Kanter v. Kanter, 850 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). We find that the order on appeal reflects an error on its face, as it reveals a denial of due process.…
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ST. Fleur v. Olive Schavon ST. Fleur, 929 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…at portion of the final judg [*737] ment and remand to the trial court to enter an amended final judgment clarifying that child support should be paid through SED and appellant’s marital debt be paid directly to appellee. See generally Reed v. Reed, 914 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (reversing and remanding for trial court to clarify that amounts owed for mortgage payments are not support obligations). As his final point on appeal appellant urges reversal arguing that the trial court erred in ordering the h…
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Anicama v. Anicama (Fla. 4th DCA 2026)…dissolution trial court lacked jurisdiction to provide. We have “consistently held that a former spouse's obligation to make mortgage payments is in the nature of a settlement of property rights, rather than an obligation for support.” Reed v. Reed, 914 So. 2d 26, 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Consequently, “[i]f an obligation is in the nature of settlement of property rights as opposed to alimony, support or maintenance of one to whom the duty is owed, the contempt power of the court cannot be invoked." Whelan v.…
Authorities Cited
- Dorsett v. Granvill Dorsett, 902 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
- Mandy v. Williams, 492 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Filan v. Filan, 549 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Reed v. Reed, 857 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)