MARIA JULIETA SANCHEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
JESUS ANTONIO FERNANDEZ, A/K/A JESUS ANTONIO FERNANDEZ ZUNIGA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the UCCJEA does not apply and Florida courts retain subject matter jurisdiction over a paternity action when the parties do not dispute custody.
[1] The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) applies only to the issue of child custody.
[2] Where parties to a paternity action do not dispute child custody, the UCCJEA does not prohibit Florida courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant filed a paternity action in Florida, alleging the child was born abroad and resided there with her, while the appellee resided in Florida. T…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Maria Julieta Sanchez, appeals a final order dismissing with prejudice her action against appellee, Jesus Antonio Fernandez, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to section 61.506(1), Florida Statutes (the “UCCJEA”). We reverse.
On or about February 6, 2004, Sanchez filed a petition for adjudication of paternity and awards of custody and child support. The petition pled that the minor child was born in Bogota, Colombia, and that Sanchez and the minor child reside in Bogota, Colombia. Fernandez is alleged to be a resident of Broward County — an allegation he does not deny.
The trial court dismissed the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA. Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. See Jacobsen v. Ross Stores, 882 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).1 We hold, under the narrow facts of this case, that the trial court incorrectly applied the UCCJEA in dismissing Sanchez’s paternity case. Where, as in the instant case, the putative father agrees that the mother should be awarded permanent primary residency of the child, custody is not an issue and the UCCJEA is inapplicable. This court has held that “[t]he UCCJA2 applies only to the issue of custody.” Patterson v. Tomlinson, 875 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004);3 see also Wilson v. Zambito, 773 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“The UCCJA applies to paternity actions when custody is an issue.”).
In Keveloh v. Carter, 699 So. 2d 285, 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the fifth district held that, because the UCCJA applies to paternity actions where custody is in issue, the father’s complaint to establish paternity invoked the provisions of the UCCJA where he “sought a determination of shared parental responsibility, custody and visitation.”
We recognize that, according to the Florida Supreme Court, chapter 742, Florida Statutes, considered the “exclusive remedy for establishing paternity,” provides that “any determination of paternity also involves a determination of custody.” Amendments to Fla. Fam. L.R.P., 723 So. 2d 208, 211 (Fla.1998).4 However, where the parties do not dispute that the mother shall retain custody of the minor child, custody is not an issue and, therefore, the UCCJEA does not prohibit Florida courts from maintaining subject matter jurisdiction over the paternity action.5
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred in dismissing Sanchez’s paternity action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We hereby reverse the order of dismissal and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
GUNTHER, WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur. . We note that the de novo standard of review used here for this issue is in conflict with the abuse of discretion standard of review used in the third and fifth districts. See Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 615 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) ("[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion or authority in concluding it was vested with subject matter jurisdiction to proceed on the issue of custody.”); Munnerlyn v. Wingster, 825 So. 2d 481, 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ("A trial court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.”).
. Effective October 1, 2002, the UCCJA was amended as the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and renumbered to sections 61.501-542, Florida Statutes (2002). Patterson v, Tomlinson, 875 So. 2d 646, 647 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
. Patterson is not applicable to this case because it was decided under an old provision of the UCCJA which, unlike the UCCJEA, did not consider a foreign country a state for jurisdiction purposes. 875 So. 2d at 647.
. The Supreme Court made this declaration in reference to the provision of section 742.031(1), (2), which states, in pertinent part;
(1) ... The court may also make a determination as to the parental responsibility and residential care and custody of the minor children in accordance with chapter 61.
(2) If a judgment of paternity contains no explicit award of custody, the establishment of a support obligation or of visitation rights in one parent shall be considered a judgment granting primary residential care and custody to the other parent without prejudice. If a paternity judgment contains no such provisions, custody shall be presumed to be with the mother. .We note that if custody would have been disputed by the parties in the present case, thus invoking the UCCJEA, the trial court would have been correct in dismissing Sanchez's petition. Where Florida was never the home state of the minor child, Florida can have jurisdiction only if, under section 61.514(l)(b), no other state is the home state of the child, or if another state is, it has declined to exercise jurisdiction because this state is the more appropriate forum. S.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 851 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
In this case, there is nothing in this record to demonstrate that Colombia has declined to exercise jurisdiction.
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Mobley v. State, 197 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…ts subsequent extension and later revocation must be réversed because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. [*574] Analysis “Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Sanchez v. Fernandez, 915 So. 2d 192, 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). “It is axiomatic that ‘[o]nce a term of probation has expired, a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an application for revocation of probation based on a violation which occurred during the probation period unless, durin…
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Giuffre v. Edwards, 226 So. 3d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…risdiction to consider the motion for sanctions, and further, [Giuffre] lacks standing in this case.” The Trial Court’s Continuing Jurisdiction Generally, a trial court’s determination on jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. See Sanchez v. Fernandez, 915 So. 2d 192, 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). A trial court’s jurisdiction ends with the termination of litigation. Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 1986). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1) governs the voluntary dismissal of actions by…
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In the Interest of D.N.H.W. v. L.H.D. and S.W., 955 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…he issue of whether the Florida circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA involves a question of law and is therefore subject to de novo review. See Arjona v. Torres, 941 So. 2d 451, 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Sanchez v. Fernandez, 915 So. 2d 192, 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); see also Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Fla.2006) (“The interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de novo standard of review.”). But see Munnerlyn v. Wingster, 825 So. 2d 481…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Amendments to the Fla. Fam. Law Rules of Procedure, 723 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1998)
- Jacobsen v. Ross Stores & Sedgwick Claims, 882 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
- Keveloh v. Carter, 699 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
- Munnerlyn v. Wingster, 825 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Birnbaum v. Brigette Birnbaum, 615 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Patterson v. Leathy Tomlinson, 875 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Wilson v. Zambito, 773 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- S.S. v. Dep't OF Child. & Families, 851 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)