JOHNNY L. RICHARDSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Johnny Richardson challenges his upward departure sentence for a RICO and cocaine trafficking conviction, arguing it violates Blakely v. Washington because the trial court imposed the enhancement based on a finding that Richardson occupied a leadership role in a criminal organization, a fact to which Richardson neither stipulated nor consented during his guilty plea.
The court reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that the upward departure sentence violated Blakely because Richardson, although entering a guilty plea, neither stipulated to nor consented to judicial factfinding regarding his leadership role in the criminal organization.
[1] A trial court violates Blakely v. …
[2] A defendant does not waive the right to challenge a Blakely violation by entering an open guilty plea without stipulating to facts supporting a sentence enhancement.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a defendant pleads guilty, the State' is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding.”
Establishes the Blakely standard that governs sentence enhancements after a guilty plea
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRichardson entered an open guilty plea in March 2003 to violating the Florida RICO Act and conspiring to traffic in cocaine for events occurring in 19…
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VILLANTI, Judge.
Johnny Richardson claims a violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), because the trial court imposed an upward departure sentence based on its finding that Richardson occupied a leadership role in a criminal organization. The State properly concedes error, and we reverse and remand for resentencing.
In March 2003, Richardson entered an open guilty plea to violating the Florida RICO Act1 and to conspiring to traffic in cocaine for events occurring in 1997 and 1998. During the plea colloquy, Richardson did not stipulate to occupying a leadership role in a criminal organization or consent to judicial factfinding. The court sentenced him to an upward departure sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment. The court listed as its reason for departure, “leadership role by Def.” See § 921.0016(3)(f), Fla. Stat. (1995) (providing for an upward departure if “[t]he defendant occupied a leadership role in a criminal organization”).
On November 23, 2004, while his appeal was pending, Richardson filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion, arguing that the court’s upward departure sentence violated Blakely. In its January 12, 2005, “Order Denying Motion for Appeal Bond [and] Interim Order on Motion to Correct Sentence,” the trial court addressed Richardson’s claimed Blakely violation, concluding that Richardson “may be entitled to relief.” The trial court made no further rulings on Richardson’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, and the motion is therefore deemed denied. See O’Neill v. State, 841 So. 2d 629, 629 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing Jackson v. State, 793 So. 2d 117, 118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)). However, the issue Richardson raised in his motion is preserved for review. See Jackson, 793 So. 2d at 118.
According to Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 2531:
When a defendant pleads guilty, the State' is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding. If appropriate waivers are procured, States may continue to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty. Even a defendant who stands trial may consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements, which may well be in his interest if relevant evidence would prejudice him at trial.
(Citations omitted.) Here, although Richardson entered a guilty plea, he did not stipulate to the fact that he occupied a leadership role in a criminal organization or consent to judicial factfinding. Therefore, the court’s upward departure sentence violated Blakely. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for resentencing.
Reversed and remanded.
DAVIS and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur. . Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (§§ 895.01-895.06, Fla. Stat.(1997)).
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Leeks v. State, 973 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…arture sentence would prevail. But Leeks’s sentencing hearing was not the end of it. After this appeal was filed, Leeks timely moved to have his sentence corrected pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). See Richardson v. State, 915 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (noting that defendant preserved objection to upward departure sentence by filing 3.800(b)(2) motion); Doyle v. State, 788 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Beck v. State, 817 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Leeks’s motion c…
Authorities Cited
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (U.S. 2004)
- Robbie Jackson v. State, 793 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Gunn v. State, 841 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- O'Neill v. State, 841 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)