SERGIO LUIS QUINTANA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2005-12-28
No. 3D04-3276
Before FLETCHER, WELLS, and SHEPHERD, JJ.
917 So. 2d 991 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2005) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Sergio Luis Quintana appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea, arguing the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he was misinformed that the fifteen-year minimum mandatory sentence for firearm possession could be waived. The court reverses and remands, holding that a plea based on misadvice regarding mandatory sentencing requirements must be withdrawn.


Holding

The court holds that a guilty plea entered based on a misunderstanding or misapprehension of facts—here, the belief that a mandatory minimum sentence could be waived—must be withdrawn. The defendant must elect to withdraw his plea as to all charges or none, and cannot partially withdraw while retaining benefits from the plea agreement.


Headnotes

[1] A guilty plea is involuntary and requires reversal when based upon affirmative misadvice from the State, counsel, and the court regarding sentencing.

[2] A defendant should be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea if the plea was based upon a misunderstanding or misapprehension of facts considered by the defendant in making th…

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Key Quotes

“It is a well established principle of law that a defendant should be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty where the plea was based upon a misunderstanding or misapprehension of facts considered by the defendant in making the plea.”

Establishes the controlling legal standard for withdrawal of guilty pleas based on misunderstanding or misapprehension of facts.

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Facts & Procedural History

Quintana was charged with possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal, procuring another to commit prostitution, and fleeing a law enforcemen…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order denying Sergio Luis Quintana’s motion to vacate guilty plea on the ground that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.

Appellant, Sergio Luis Quintana, was charged with possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal pursuant to § 790.235, Fla. Stat. (2004), procuring another to commit prostitution under § 796.07(2)(f), Fla. Stat. (2004), and fleeing a law enforcement officer under on § 316.1935(2), Fla. Stat. (2004).

Based upon advice provided to him pursuant to an erroneous impression by all concerned — the State, his counsel and the court — that the fifteen-year minimum mandatory sentence mandated for a violation of section 790.235 could be waived, see State v. Ferguson, 691 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(“the minimum mandatory sentence for possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal contained in section 790.235 is not permissive”)(emphasis added), appellant entered guilty pleas on all charges in exchange for a sentencing delay of ninety days and the promise by the State that if appellant provided the State with “good cases” in the interim, it would consider waiving the minimum mandatory sentencing feature of section 790.235 on the possession charge at the time of sentencing.

On the date of the delayed sentencing hearing, appellant filed a motion to vacate plea on the ground of affirmative misad-vice received by him at the earlier plea hearing.1 The trial court denied the motion on the ground that he had not cooperated with the State and that he had been arrested for another crime in the interim period. It then proceeded to sentence him to fifteen years in state prison on the possession charge and time served on the prostitution and flight charges. The State concedes that the plea in this case was involuntary and requires reversal.

We agree. See, e.g., Forbert v. State, 437 So. 2d 1079, 1081 (Fla.1983)(“It is a well established principle of law that a defendant should be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty where the plea was based upon a misunderstanding or misapprehension of facts considered by the defendant in making the plea.”); Wade v. State, 488 So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)(accord); see also Waldrop v. State, 882 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)(trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw where defendant was misinformed that a withholding of adjudication of guilt, probation, and no sex-offender registration were possibilities at sentencing).

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand with directions that appellant be allowed to withdraw his plea. In so doing, appellant must elect to either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none. See Boatwright v. State, 637 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)(The defendant “should not be permitted to renege on one portion of his agreement with impunity.”); Williams v. State, 650 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(To afford the defendant the opportunity to withdraw from sentences on certain counts while retaining the benefit of the remainder of plea agreement “would be to rewrite the agreement between the parties, to appellant’s distinct benefit.”). The State’s request that the judgment and sentences as to the unaffected charges remain undisturbed is likewise rejected. Id.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

. It is not immediately apparent from the motion to vacate, the transcripts of the hearings held below or the briefs of the parties whether appellant seeks to withdraw his plea only as to the affected count or as to all three counts.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Cornett v. State, 922 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
    …Because the first three counts were part of a negotiated settlement including all ten counts, the entire plea agreement was tainted by counsel’s misadvice. Cor-nett is therefore entitled to withdraw his plea on all ten counts. See Quintana v. State, 917 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (holding that a defendant who is “allowed to withdraw his plea” must either “withdraw his plea to all charges or to none” when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the State); Whitaker v. State, 881 So. 2d 80 (Fla…
  • DeANGULO v. State, 21 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)
    …hree only, but leave the remainder of the plea agreement in place. The trial court denied relief and the defendant has appealed. In this situation, the defendant “must elect to either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none.” Quintana v. State, 917 So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Here the defendant did not request withdrawal of the entire plea, so the trial court reached the correct result in denying relief. The defendant maintains that the court must grant relief because attempted trafficking is a…
    1 / 2
  • Matthews v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2023)
    …motion."). The postconviction court struck all of the pleadings as facially insufficient, finding that Matthews had impermissibly requested to withdraw his pleas in only one of the cases that the negotiated plea resolved. See Quintana v. State, 917 So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (holding that a defendant who is "allowed to withdraw his plea" must either "withdraw his plea to all charges or to none" when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the State); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.…

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