MARIO FERRYMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Mario Ferryman appeals his thirty-year burglary conviction, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his home and vehicle, and the allowance of a peremptory strike against an African-American juror. The appellate court affirmed, finding the search valid based on consent by Ferryman's wife and the peremptory strike properly justified on race-neutral grounds.
The court affirmed both rulings. Third-party consent to search is valid when the consenting party has joint access and common authority over the premises or effects, as Mrs. Ferryman did here. The peremptory strike was properly exercised based on the race-neutral reason that the juror knew prosecution witnesses, and the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous.
[1] Third-party consent to a search is valid when given by a person with mutual use of the property and joint access or common authority over it.
[2] A co-occupant of commonly occupied property has the right to consent to a search of that property.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Third-party consent to a search is valid where it arises out of the mutual use of property by persons having joint access, or common authority over, or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects to be inspected.”
Establishes the legal standard for validating searches based on third-party consent, the primary basis for affirming the suppression denial.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLaw enforcement officers searched Ferryman's home and vehicle and seized items stolen in burglaries. Ferryman's wife gave consent to both searches. Th…
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MONACO, J.
Mario Ferryman appeals the judgment and sentence of thirty years imprisonment imposed on him after his conviction by jury of burglary. He argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on two asserted errors. First, he posits that the trial court erred in permitting the State to strike an African-American juror. Next, he maintains that a motion to suppress the results of a search of his home was improperly denied. Because we conclude that the peremptory strike was validly exercised, and that the search was author ized based on the consent to it by Mr. Ferryman’s wife, we affirm.
We turn our attention, first, to the issue concerning the motion to suppress. In considering the denial of a motion to suppress an appellate court reviews legal conclusions using a de novo standard, but generally defers to the factual findings of a trial court. See Backus v. State, 864 So. 2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). If the evidentiary findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, we will ordinarily not disturb the decision of the trial court. See Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688, 696 (Fla.2003); see also Taylor v. State, 848 So. 2d 1191, 1193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
Mr. Ferryman seeks to suppress the seizure from his house and from a vehicle by law enforcement officers of numerous items that were stolen in burglaries. Mr. Ferryman’s wife gave consent to the searches. The trial court found that Mrs. Ferryman shared dominion and control of the premises, as well as the vehicle; that she voluntarily gave consent to the searches; and that law enforcement justifiably acted in good faith in carrying out the searches. With respect to the vehicle the trial judge found that Mrs. Ferryman had joint access to it, and had common authority over it. There is substantial competent evidence to support these findings.
Third-party consent to a search is valid where it arises out of the mutual use of property by persons having joint access, or common authority over, or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects to be inspected. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); State v. Purifoy, 740 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Where property is commonly occupied, it is reasonable to conclude that a co-occupant has the right to consent to a search. Id. We, accordingly, find no error in the denial of the motion to suppress because there is sufficient evidence to support that action. See also State v. Radcliffe, 483 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
Likewise, we find no error in overruling Mr. Ferryman’s Neil
challenge. The trial court properly followed the procedure outlined in Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla.1996), and found that the State’s challenge was race neutral, and not pretextual. The reason given by the State for the challenge — that the potential juror knew some of the witnesses that might be called by the State — appears to be a sufficient basis for the trial court to allow the challenge. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 646 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); cf, Hightower v. State, 666 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Moreover, the trial court reasonably noted that Mr. Ferryman had previously struck two African-American potential jurors, and that a third juror of the same race remained on the panel and served on the jury. As the ruling of the trial court was not clearly erroneous, we affirm on this basis, as well. See Sharp v. State, 789 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), review denied, 817 So. 2d 850 (Fla.2002); Burris v. State, 748 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), review denied, 767 So. 2d 454 (Fla.2000).
AFFIRMED.
GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1984).
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Hernandez v. State, 98 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). Mutual use of the property by persons with joint access is commonly recognized as a sufficient relationship to the premises to validly consent to a search. See Ferryman v. State, 919 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); State v. Purifoy, 740 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). In the instant case, Ms. Romero, the alleged victim, advised Deputy Connelly that she had been living in the residence the prior two weeks, that her personal belongings were…
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Friedson v. State, 207 So. 3d 961 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…phernalia, to run concurrently. In considering a motion to suppress, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo, but we defer to its factual findings provided that they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Ferryman v. State, 919 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Evidence obtained from an unlawful search cannot serve as the basis for issuance of a search warrant. State v. Hood, 68 So. 3d 392, 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). However, “[t]he inclusion of illegally obtained evidence in the sup…
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State v. Trinidad, 351 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)…in granting Appellee’s motion to suppress. In considering rulings on a motion to suppress, “an appellate court reviews legal conclusions using a de novo standard, but generally defers to the factual findings of a trial court.” Ferryman v. State, 919 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). As an initial matter, we agree with the State that the recorded audio constitutes relevant evidence. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 171 So. 3d 210, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“Partially inaudible or unintelligible audio record…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (U.S. 1974)
- State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984)
- Jeanie H. Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996)
- Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2003)
- Backus v. State, 864 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- State v. Purifoy, 740 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Sharp v. State, 789 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
- Burris v. State, 748 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Pervis Taylor v. State, 848 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- State v. Radcliffe, 483 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)