J.D., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for battery on a detention facility staff member under Florida Statute § 784.075, but the appellate court reversed, finding insufficient evidence that the victim was a qualifying staff member as defined by the statute. The court held that the state must prove the victim was employed by the Department of Juvenile Justice, at a DJJ-licensed facility, or at a facility operating under a DJJ contract.
The court reversed J.D.'s conviction, holding that the state presented insufficient evidence that the victim was a qualifying staff member as defined by the statute. The conviction was reduced to simple battery because the statute's plain language requires proof of employment by the DJJ, at a DJJ-licensed facility, or at a facility under a DJJ contract.
[1] A conviction for battery on a detention or commitment facility staff member requires proof that the victim was employed by the Department of Juvenile Justice, employed at…
[2] The rule of lenity requires that any ambiguity in a criminal statute be resolved in favor of the defendant.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When read as a whole, the statute's language compels the conclusion that in the absence of evidence that the victim was employed by the DJJ, employed at a facility licensed by the DJJ, or employed at a facility operated under a contract with the DJJ, J.D.'s conviction cannot stand.”
Establishes the court's interpretation of what must be proven under § 784.075 to sustain a conviction
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJ.D., a juvenile inmate at Thompson Academy, punched victim Charles Bush in the chin while Bush was attempting to help restrain J.D. Bush testified he…
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PER CURIAM.
The trial court found J.D. guilty of battery on a detention or commitment facility staff member, in violation of section 784.075, Florida Statutes (2003), and adjudicated the child delinquent. In this appeal, J.D. argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal,1 insisting the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate the victim of the crime was a “staff member” within the meaning of the statute. We find merit in J.D.’s argument.
Here, the evidence before the trial court was that J.D. punched the victim in the chin at the Thompson Academy while J.D. was an inmate there. The victim, Charles Bush, testified that he was employed by Psychotherapeutic Services at Thompson Academy and that the battery occurred while he was trying to help restrain J.D. Bush stated that his paychecks came from Psychotherapeutic Services and that “to [his] knowledge,” Psychotherapeutic Services was “a private agency that contracted with the state.”
J.D. was charged with violating section 784.075, which provides:
A person who commits a battery on a juvenile probation officer, as defined in s. 984.03 or s. 985.03, on other staff of a detention center or facility as defined in s. 984.03(19) or s. 985.03(19), or on a staff member of a commitment facility as defined in section 985.03(45), commits a felony of the third degree.... For purposes of this section, a staff member of the facilities listed includes persons employed by the Department of Juvenile Justice, persons employed at facilities licensed by the Department of Juvenile Justice, and persons employed at facilities operated under a contract with the Department of Juvenile Justice.
When read as a whole, the statute’s language compels the conclusion that in the absence of evidence that the victim was employed by the DJJ, employed at a facility licensed by the DJJ, or employed at a facility operated under a contract with the DJJ, J.D.’s conviction cannot stand. The State presented no such evidence here.2 Moreover, under the rule of lenity, see section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes, any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of J.D. We thus reverse J.D.’s conviction and remand with directions that the conviction be reduced to one for simple battery. See G.S. v. State, 761 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
STEVENSON, C.J., WARNER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. . We note that while J.D.'s counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, in juvenile cases, it is appropriate to move for dismissal of the charges pursuant to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.110(k).
. The evidence before the trial court could have likely sustained a conviction for viola tion of section 784.076, Florida Statutes, which makes battery by a person "committed to or detained by the Department of Juvenile Justice” upon "a person who provides health services" a third degree felony. J.D., however, was never charged with this crime.