LEON OLIVER JACKSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2006-02-10
No. 5D05-1398
SAWAYA and ORFINGER, JJ„ concur.
920 So. 2d 737 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2006) Negative Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Jackson appealed his convictions for lewd and lascivious battery and interference with child custody, challenging the trial court's denial of a jury instruction on simple battery as a lesser included offense. The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the defendant was entitled to the requested instruction and reversed the lewd and lascivious battery conviction for a new trial, while affirming the child custody interference conviction.


Holding

The defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on simple battery as a permissive lesser included offense of lewd and lascivious battery upon request. Because children of tender years are legally incapable of consenting to sexual activity and lack of consent is presumed by law, the omission of an express allegation of non-consensual touching does not preclude the instruction. The trial court erred in denying this instruction, requiring reversal and a new trial on the lewd and lascivious battery charge.


Headnotes

[1] Lewd or lascivious battery is a permissive lesser included offense of sexual battery when the accusatory pleadings and evidence encompass the elements of both offenses.

[2] The statutory definition of sexual activity in Florida Statutes section 800.04 and sexual battery in Florida Statutes section 794.011 are identical in pertinent part.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“What the State overlooks is the historic principle that children of tender years have always been considered as legally incapable of giving consent to sexual abuse, so that their lack of consent is presumed by law, and thus need not be specifically alleged or proved.”

Establishes the legal principle that parental consent is presumed for children, making lack of consent unnecessary to allege in lewd battery charges involving minors.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Jackson was charged with lewd and lascivious battery involving a minor victim between 12 and 16 years old, and with interference with child custody. A…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PLEUS, C.J.

PLEUS, C.J.

The defendant appeals from his convictions and sentences for lewd and lascivious battery and interference with child custody. His sole point on appeal relates to the denial of his requested jury instruction on simple battery as a lesser included offense of lewd and lascivious battery. Because decisional law dictates that this instruction should have been given, we are obligated to reverse for a new trial on the lewd and lascivious battery charge.

The trial court declined to give the lesser charge on simple battery explaining that based on the victim’s own testimony, there was no evidence that anything that occurred was against her will. Defense counsel repeatedly requested the lesser be given but was unable to articulate precisely why the instruction on battery should be given.1

First degree misdemeanor battery is a category two, permissive lesser included offense of lewd and lascivious battery, the crime proscribed by section 800.04(4)(a) and charged in Count II of the amended information. Sherrer v. State, 898 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses, § 800.04. As such, the defendant, upon request, was entitled to receive a jury instruction on battery as a lesser included offense of lewd and lascivious battery if the count alleges all the elements of battery and the evidence supports all the elements of that offense. State v. Von Deck, 607 So. 2d 1388 (Fla.1992); Cook v. State, 736 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Biles v. State, 700 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

While, as the State points out, Count II did not specifically allege that the defendant’s sexual activity with the minor victim was un-consented to, it did allege that the defendant “engaged in sexual activity with [the victim], a child older than 12 years of age but less than 16 years of age.” In Caulder v. State, 500 So. 2d 1362, 1363-64 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), this Court explained:

What the State overlooks is the historic principle that children of tender years have always been considered as legally incapable of giving consent to sexual abuse, so that their lack of consent is presumed by law, and thus need not be specifically alleged or proved.

500 So. 2d at 1363-64 (footnote omitted).

The Caulder court held that in a prosecution for sexual battery on a child 11 years of age or younger, lack of consent, though an element, need not be specifically alleged or proved as it is presumed by law, and thus the jury should be instructed upon request on the lesser offense of simple battery. The court went on to find the failure to so instruct to be harmless error because the trial court did (albeit erroneously but without objection) instruct on lewd assault as a lesser included, thus permitting the jury the opportunity to exercise its pardon power. In this case, unlike in Caulder, no lessers were instructed upon.2

The absence of an express allegation of an un-consented-to touching in this case did not preclude an instruction on simple battery as a permissive lesser included, anymore than the omission of such specific allegation in charging lewd and lascivious battery rendered the amended information defective.

The defendant was entitled, upon request, to an instruction on battery as a lesser included offense of lewd and lascivious battery even though the overwhelming evidence favored the State’s charge. Belser v. State, 854 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). See also Corpstein v. State, 872 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The conviction for interference with child custody is affirmed. The conviction and sentence for lewd and lascivious battery are reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial on that charge.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

SAWAYA and ORFINGER, JJ„ concur. . The issue was preserved for appellate review. The trial court was aware of the legal issue and ruled directly upon it. See Spurlock v. State, 420 So. 2d 875 (Fla.1982).

. The trial court declined to instruct on any lessers. Under the Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses, there are four category 2 (permissive lessers) for lewd and lascivious battery: attempt, assault, battery and unnatural and lascivious act.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Saysinh Khianthalat v. State, 974 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2008)
    …ence presented at trial does not support lack of consent? In Khianthalat v. State, 935 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), the Second District Court of Appeal determined that [*360] the defendant was not entitled to this instruction. In Jackson v. State, 920 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), the Fifth District Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion. As explained below, we agree with the Second District and hold that a defendant facing these circumstances is not entitled to a jury instruction on simple batte…
    1 / 3
  • Saysinh Khianthalat v. State, 935 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
    …ond degree. (Emphasis added.) . If it did apply, battery would be a necessarily lesser-included offense, not a permissive lesser-included offense as Khianthalat contends. Khianthalat's argument is not without support, however. In Jackson v. State, 920 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), the court, relying on the presumption of incapacity where the victim was over the age of twelve, concluded that a defendant was entitled to an instruction on simple battery even though there was no allegation of nonconsensual to…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw