KEITH COGGINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2006-02-22
No. 1D04-5333
KAHN, C.J., PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
921 So. 2d 758 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2006) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

Keith Coggins was convicted of sexual battery while in a position of familial or custodial authority. The court affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence because the trial court improperly assessed 80 points for sex penetration without a specific jury finding, violating the requirements of Blakely v. Washington.


Holding

The trial court erred by assessing 80 points for sex penetration without a specific jury finding. Because the jury never had the option to choose whether sexual battery occurred through union with or penetration of the victim's vagina, the jury made no specific finding of penetration. The scoresheet should have reflected 40 points for sex contact, which the jury necessarily found.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court errs in assessing sentencing guideline points for penetration when a defendant pleads to charges that allege, in the alternative, elements of union or penet…

[2] The assessment of victim injury points for penetration, in the absence of a jury finding or a stipulation by the defendant, constitutes reversible error in violation of Blakely v. …

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Key Quotes

“any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Establishes the constitutional standard from Blakely that facts used to enhance sentences must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt

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Facts & Procedural History

Coggins was charged with sexual battery by placing his penis in or upon the victim's vagina. The verdict form required the jury to find him either not…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is a direct appeal from Appellant’s conviction for sexual battery while in a position of familial or custodial authority.

We affirm Appellant’s conviction without further comment, but we reverse the imposition of Appellant’s sentence due to a scoresheet error. The information charged that Appellant committed sexual battery by “placing his penis in or upon” the victim’s vagina. The verdict form only allowed the jury to find Appellant either not guilty or guilty as charged in the information. At sentencing, the trial court included 80 points for sex penetration on Appellant’s guideline scoresheet.1 Appellant filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion and relied on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), to object to the imposition of the sex penetration points.

We find that the trial court incorrectly denied Appellant’s motion.

In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)). The court defined the statutory maximum as the maximum a trial court could impose without additional findings. Id. at 2537. To satisfy the reasonable doubt standard, any facts used to depart from a prescribed sentencing scheme must be determined by a jury. Id. In this case, the jury never had the option of choosing whether the sexual battery occurred through union with or penetration of the victim’s vagina.

Thus, the jury never made a specific finding that penetration occurred, and the trial court erred by assessing Appellant 80 points for sex penetration. Behl v. State, 898 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (reversing an appellant’s sentence because the trial court included 80 points for sex penetration without a specific jury finding).

However, the jury did necessarily find that sex contact occurred; thus, Appellant’s guideline score-sheet should have reflected 40 points for sex contact. Id. at 223-223; Gisi v. State, 909 So. 2d 531, 534 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

We therefore reverse Appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing as directed.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

KAHN, C.J., PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ., concur. . The information charged that Appellant committed the crime between March 1 and December 31, 1998. The Criminal Punishment Code only applies to crimes that were committed on or after October 1, 1998. § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (1999). Thus, Appellant was sentenced pursuant to the 1998 guideline scoresheet.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Chatman v. State, 943 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
    …ortunity to specify which alternative was the basis for the finding of guilty. In fact the nature of the actual charge, sexual activity with a minor, did not even require the State to prove penetration for a finding of guilt. As in Coggins v. State, 921 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), we find the sentencing enhancement in violation of Blakely, requiring a resentencing without the assessment of the victim penetration points. See also Whalen v. State, 895 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (sentence could not be en…
  • Scott v. State, 258 So. 3d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)
    …the crime which needed to be proven. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013); Insko v. State, 969 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 2007); see also Coggins v. State, 921 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). However, any error here is subject to a harmless error analysis. “Where an Apprendi/Blakely error has occurred, the harmless error analysis asks, ‘whether the record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury…
  • Bush v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
    …s. In preparing the scoresheet, victim injury points for sexual penetration should not be scored. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004); Monnar v. State, 939 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Coggins v. State, 921 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); accord Behl v. State, 898 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); see also Isaac v. State, 911 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). REVERSED and REMANDED. BROWNING, C.J., ALLEN and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.…

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