HENRY LINCOLN SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2006-02-24
No. 5D05-3017
SAWAYA and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
921 So. 2d 794 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2006) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Smith appeals the trial court's summary denial of his motion for jail time credit under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The court reversed, holding that the oral pronouncement of sentence granting 18 months plus 42 days credit for time-served must be reflected in the written sentencing documents, even though the trial court may delegate to the Department of Corrections the administrative calculation of the exact amount.


Holding

A defendant's claim regarding jail time credit is cognizable in a 3.800 motion when the court records demonstrate on their face that the defendant was entitled to receive additional credit for time-served. When the trial court orally pronounces a sentence granting credit for time-served, the written sentencing documents must reflect that credit, even if the trial court delegates to the Department of Corrections the administrative task of calculating the exact amount.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant is entitled to credit for all time served, including gain time awarded prior to being placed on probation, for offenses committed before October 1, 1989.

[2] The sentencing court has the responsibility to ensure compliance with credit for time served requirements.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“A defendant's claim regarding jail time credit is cognizable in a 3.800 motion so long as the motion alleges that the court records demonstrate on theirface that the defendant was entitled to receive additional credit for time-served.”

Establishes the standard for cognizability of time-credit claims under Rule 3.800(a)

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Smith was sentenced to five years in the Department of Corrections for violating his probation. At sentencing, the trial court orally pronounced that …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PALMER, J.

PALMER, J.

Henry Lincoln Smith (defendant) appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion for credit for time-served filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Concluding that the written sentence entered in this matter fails to provide credit for time-served as required by the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence, we reverse.

The defendant was sentenced to serve a term of five years in the Department of Corrections for violating his probation. He filed a rule 3.800(a) motion, alleging that he is entitled to receive credit for 18 months and 42 days time-served, but that the Department of Corrections has refused to award him same. The trial court summarily denied the motion.

A defendant’s claim regarding jail time credit is cognizable in a 3.800 motion so long as the motion alleges that the court records demonstrate on theirface that the defendant was entitled to receive additional credit for time-served.

A review of the defendant’s sentencing transcript reveals that the trial court orally sentenced the defendant to confinement in the Department of Corrections for a period of five years with credit for approximately 18 months previously served in the Department of Corrections and 42 days served after being arrested for violating his probation. Specifically, the trial court stated:

I will adjudicate you guilty of this violation of probation, and order you be confined to the Department of Corrections for a period of five years with credit for 18 months. It was originally a 15-month sentence. I’ll sentence you to five years in the Department of Corrections. Forty-two days time served is what you have served here, plus I need the Department of Corrections time. I think it’s going to be 18 months and six days, but they’ll have to calculate that.

However, the written sentencing documents only reflect credit for the 42 days time-served.

Although it is permissible for the trial court to delegate to DOC the administrative task of calculating the amount of prison credit which is due, it is the trial court’s responsibility to order that such credit be provided. See Thistle v. State, 769 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (citing Wilson v. State, 603 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429, 433 (Fla.1998)). Here, the defendant attached a copy of his sentencing transcript which reflects that the trial court intended for him to receive 18 months of credit for time which had been served in prison as part of his split sentence. Thus, his claim was facially sufficient.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SAWAYA and LAWSON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • McCALL v. State, 88 So. 3d 1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
    …time that he served in prison on the incarcerative portion of his split sentence. See § 921.0017, Fla. Stat. (1995); Downing v. State, 779 So .2d 562, 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Saavedra v. State, 59 So. 3d 191, 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Smith v. State, 921 So. 2d 794, 796 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Accordingly, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the issue of Mr. McCall’s right to credit for the time that he served in prison before the probationary portion of his sentence began. After review…
  • Mason v. State, 18 So. 3d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)
    …under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Appellee, the State of Florida, filed a confession of error noting that it is the trial court’s responsibility to order that the amount of prison credit which is due be provided. See Smith v. State, 921 So. 2d 794, 796 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Here, the State admits that the trial court did not address Mason’s claim concerning prison credit. The [*1226] trial court credited Mason with “896 days of credit for time served in the Miami-Dade County Jail.” Although th…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw