CHAVIS ZEIGLER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE; TRISTAN ELLIS, APPELLANT, V. STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2006-03-07
Nos. 1D05-314, 1D05-315
VAN NORTWICK and HAWKES, JJ., concur.
922 So. 2d 384 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2006) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Two appellants challenged the trial court's denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. The court affirmed, holding that although the officer impermissibly asked for identification after discovering the vehicle had a valid temporary tag, the marijuana smell detected during the lawful initial contact provided independent probable cause for detention, and the subsequently discovered cocaine and marijuana were admissible under the inevitable discovery rule.


Holding

The court held that although the officer impermissibly requested identification after the initial purpose of the stop was satisfied, the evidence need not be suppressed because the officer had lawful authority to make personal contact to explain the reason for the stop, during which he detected marijuana odor that provided independent probable cause. The inevitable discovery rule also applies because the marijuana would have been discovered through lawful means.


Headnotes

[1] A continued detention of a driver is improper once the officer fully satisfies the purpose for the initiated stop.

[2] An officer may use his sense of smell from a place where he may lawfully be to develop probable cause for a detention.

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“the sheriffs deputies could lawfully make personal contact with Mr. Diaz only to explain to him the reason for the initial stop”

Establishes that officers may make personal contact during a traffic stop for the limited purpose of explaining the reason for the stop

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Officer Brownfield stopped a vehicle driven by Ellis with passenger Zeigler because he could not initially see the license tag. Upon approach, the off…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
THOMAS, J.

THOMAS, J.

This is a consolidated appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ motions to suppress. Because we agree with the trial court that this case is distinguishable from State v. Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435 (Fla.2003), and because we find it distinguishable from this court’s decision in Fernandez v. State, 917 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), we affirm.

Appellant Ellis was the driver and Appellant Zeigler was a passenger in a vehicle which was stopped by Officer Brownfield, an officer with the Columbia County Sheriffs Office, because he was unable to see the vehicle’s license tag, in violation of section 320.13(4), Florida Statutes (2003).

However, as Officer Brownfield was approaching the stopped vehicle, he saw that a temporary tag was properly displayed. Officer Brownfield continued to approach the vehicle and asked to see Appellants’ identification. Appellant Ziegler rolled down his window, and almost immediately Officer Brownfield smelled burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Thereafter, Officer Brownfield detained Appellants and called for back-up assistance. Officer Brownfield obtained consent for a search of the vehicle and discovered 50 grams of cocaine, several small bags of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and $676. Appellants pled no contest to trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana and preserved their right to appeal the trial court’s denial of their dispositive motions to suppress.

Appellants argued below that the contraband should have been suppressed under the holding in Diaz because Officer Brownfield was not allowed to ask for their identification once it was established that the license tag was properly displayed. In Diaz, the supreme court held that continued detention of a driver is improper once the officer fully satisfies the purpose for the initiated stop. 850 So. 2d at 440. However, as the court explained, “the sheriffs deputies could lawfully make personal contact with Mr. Diaz only to explain to him the reason for the initial stop.” Id.

According to the supreme court’s ruling, Officer Brownfield had the legal authority to make personal contact with Appellants and to be in a position to smell the marijuana. An officer may use his sense of smell from a place where he may lawfully be to develop probable cause for a detention. See Lara v. State, 497 So. 2d 1311, 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Once Officer Brownfield smelled the marijuana, he was entitled to detain Appellants. See, e.g., State v. Betz, 815 So. 2d 627 (Fla.2002).

Although Officer Brownfield im-permissibly asked for Appellants’ identification, the trial court correctly determined that the contraband was not required to be suppressed. Under the inevitable discovery rule, when evidence is obtained through the result of unconstitutional police procedures, the evidence will still be admissible if it would have been discovered through legal means. See Jeffries v. State, 797 So. 2d 573, 577-578 (Fla.2001).

Here, the trial court determined that Officer Brownfield smelled marijuana when he went to Appellants’ stopped vehicle. Had Officer Brownfield immediately explained the reason for the stop when he made personal contact with Appellants, rather than first asking Appellants for their identification, he would have still smelled marijuana and thus developed probable cause to detain Appellants. We also reject Appellants’ argument that Officer Brownfield was constitutionally required to make personal contact with Appellants through a closed vehicle window.

Therefore, because the trial court properly denied Appellants’ motions to suppress, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

VAN NORTWICK and HAWKES, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Joelis Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
    …”). With or without the canine alert, the contraband would inevitably have been detected. On this basis alone, the motion to suppress should have been denied. See Robb, 920 So. 2d at 1196 n. 8 (Gross, J., dissenting); see generally Zeigler v. State, 922 So. 2d 384, 385 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“Under the inevitable discovery rule, when evidence is obtained through the result of unconstitutional police procedures, the evidence will still be admissible if it would have been discovered through legal means.”). See Je…
  • State v. LEE, 957 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)
    …king, from forty to fifty feet away, was sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the taillight was, in fact, inoperable and to stop the vehicle. A circumstance similar to the facts of this case appears in Zeigler v. State, 922 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). In that case, an officer stopped the defendants’ vehicle “because he was unable to see the vehicle’s license tag, in violation of section 320.13(4), Florida Statutes (2003).” Id. at 385. However, as the officer “was approaching…
  • State v. Rori Sherlene Bultman, 164 So. 3d 144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)
    …tman’s purse, however, we reverse. First, the officers lawfully detained Bult-man after smelling marijuana inside the house, a place they were lawfully allowed to be after Bultman gave consent to search for the missing suspect. See Zeigler v. State, 922 So. 2d 384, 385 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (holding that probable cause for detention existed after an officer smelled marijuana in a place where he was lawfully allowed to be). Second, because Bultman was being lawfully detained due to the smell of marijuana at the…

Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw