S.D., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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In this juvenile delinquency appeal, the court affirmed the disposition, holding that a violation of the 10-day period for adjudicatory hearing following a motion for discharge hearing is harmless error if the trial occurs within 15 days of filing the motion for discharge, consistent with Florida Rule 8.090(m)(3).
A violation of the 10-day period for adjudicatory hearing following a motion for discharge hearing is harmless error if the defendant is actually brought to trial within 15 days of filing the motion for discharge. The intent of Rule 8.090(m) is to require trial within 15 days of the motion filing, and so long as this deadline is met, any timing error is legally insignificant.
[1] A violation of the five and ten-day periods provided in rule 3.191(p)(3) is harmless if a defendant is actually brought to trial within fifteen days of filing his notice…
[2] The express intent of rule 3.191(p)(3) is to afford the State Attorney 15 days in which to bring the defendant to trial from the date of the filing of the motion for disc…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a violation of the five and ten-day periods provided in rule 3.191(p)(3) is harmless if a defendant is actually brought to trial within fifteen days of filing his notice of expiration”
Establishes the harmless error standard from Salzero, which the court applied to this juvenile case
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceS.D., a juvenile defendant, filed a motion for discharge arguing that the time for trial set by rule had elapsed. The trial court held a hearing on th…
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FARMER, J.
We grant defendant’s motion for clarification and amend our original opinion as follows. We deny the other motions.
Defendant complains on appeal that he was denied his speedy trial rights under rule 3.191(h) when the State failed to bring him to an adjudicatory hearing within the 10 day period following a hearing on his motion for discharge. We affirm the disposition.
We think the issue is controlled by State v. Salzero, 714 So. 2d 445 (Fla.1998), where the same argument was made about the same provision in rule 3.191(p)(3). Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(p)(3). There, as here, the defendant filed a motion for discharge, arguing that the time for trial set by rule had elapsed. 714 So. 2d at 445. The trial court held a hearing two days after the motion was filed, and set a trial date within 10 days of the hearing. Id. Owing to a discovery failure by the state, the court moved the trial date forward by 3 days, which is more than 10 days after the hearing but within 15 days from defendant’s motion. Id. The supreme court held that “a violation of the five and ten-day periods provided in rule 3.191(p)(3) is harmless if a defendant is actually brought to trial within fifteen days of filing his notice of expiration.” 714 So. 2d at 447. The court noted that the express intent of the rule was to afford the State Attorney 15 days in which to bring the defendant to trial from the date of the filing of the motion for discharge. Id.
In this case, the adjudicatory hearing in this juvenile delinquency case was held within the 15 day period after the juvenile’s motion for discharge. In their pertinent parts, rule 8.090(m)(3) is substantively indistinguishable from rule 3.191(p)(3). The analysis applied to rule 3.191(p)(3) in Salzero applies to rule 8.090(m)(3). See also State v. C.A.J., 886 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“The intent of Rule 8.090(m) is to require trial within fifteen days of the filing of the motion for discharge; so long as the trial court’s order does not violate this time limit, the timing of the order setting trial is legally insignificant.”). Any error in failing to try defendant within 10 days after the hearing on his motion for discharge was harmless. Accordingly the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
KLEIN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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State v. D.O., 56 So. 3d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…an adult case, “a violation of the five and ten-day periods provided in [Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure] 3.191(p)(3) is harmless if a defendant is actually brought to trial within fifteen days of filing his notice of expiration”); S.D. v. State, 924 So. 2d 963, 964 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (finding rule 8.090(m)(3) substantively indistinguishable from rule 3.191(p)(3), and that the rule 3.191(p)(3) analysis in Salzero applies to rule 8.090(m)(3)). [*116] Despite D.O.’s confession of error, he argues that this…
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State v. D.A., 939 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…eedy trial-rule 3.191-and rule 8.090 form continuum within which all aspects of speedy trial lie in neat relationship and are to be read as in pari materia”) (citing J.B. v. Korda, 436 So. 2d 1109, 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)); see also, S.D. v. State, 924 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). . Both the original petition and the amended petition correctly alleged D.A.’s date of birth as October 8, 1989 (making him 15 years old at the time of the alleged crime). . Justices Wells and Bell have concluded that this jud…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Salzero, 714 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1998)
- State v. C.A.J., 886 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)