ULYSSES JACKSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jackson appeals his conviction and sentence for attempted sexual battery on a child and indecent assault. The court reverses the illegal sentence for indecent assault (27 years exceeded the 15-year statutory maximum for second-degree felonies) and the failure to enter a written probation revocation order, but affirms the conviction and rejects Jackson's claim that the court was materially misinformed about his prior sentence.
The court held that the sentence of twenty-seven years for indecent assault was illegal because it exceeded the fifteen-year statutory maximum for second-degree felonies, that the trial court erred in failing to enter a written order specifying probation violations, and that the court was not materially misinformed about Jackson's prior sentence. The conviction is affirmed; the sentencing errors are reversed.
[1] A sentence exceeding the statutory maximum for a felony constitutes an illegal sentence.
[2] A trial court must enter a written order specifying the conditions of probation violated upon revocation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court erred in sentencing him above the statutory maximum and failed to enter a proper order revoking probation”
Establishes the primary errors on appeal regarding sentencing and probation revocation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJackson was convicted of attempted sexual battery upon a child and indecent assault. He was originally sentenced to twenty-two years in prison and ser…
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WARNER, J.
Ulysses Jackson appeals the final judgment and sentence for the crimes of attempted sexual battery upon a child and indecent assault. He claims that the court erred in sentencing him above the statutory maximum and failed to enter a proper order revoking probation. Although Jackson had filed a motion to correct these sentencing errors, the trial court failed to enter an order within the sixty-day time limit, and thus the motion was deemed denied. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(1)(B).
The state concedes that Jackson’s sentence for the indecent assault charge was illegal, as he was sentenced to twenty-seven years in prison when the maximum sentence for a second degree felony is fifteen years. It also concedes that the court erred in failing to enter a written order specifically indicating which conditions of probation Jackson violated.
We reverse for correction of these sentencing errors.
Jackson also claims that in sentencing him on the violation of probation, the court was misinformed about the amount of time he had actually served on his original sentence. Because of this material misinformation, he claims the case should be remanded to determine if the mistake affected the current sentence.
We conclude that the court was not misinformed about his original sentence. Jackson was originally sentenced to twenty-two years for his crime, and he actually served eight years in prison.
At the hearing for sentencing on the probation violation, the prosecutor informed the court that Jackson was sentenced to twenty-two years, and the court indicated that it would sentence him to Department of Corrections time, “whatever it is, it is.” The court then sentenced Jackson to twenty-seven years. There is no indication in the record that the court was operating under a misapprehension of fact as to the time Jackson had already spent in prison.1 We therefore affirm the conviction.2
KLEIN, J., and BAILEY, JENNIFER D., Associate Judge, concur. . The state cites to Lacey v. State, 831 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), for the proposition that the standard of review for sentencing after a revocation of probation is de novo. Lacey cites to Hannah v. State, 814 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). However, Hannah cites to Schaal v. State, 743 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), for the proposition, but Schaal never mentions this. Our understanding is that a sentencing error constituting an illegal sentence would be reviewed de novo. The reliance on a material mistake of fact would not be reviewed de novo.
. Although there is no evidence that the court was mistaken, Jackson can file a motion for reduction of the sentence pursuant to rule 3.800(c) after our mandate issues if he believes that the trial court may be inclined to lessen his sentence.
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Kesner Etienne v. State, 15 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…a firearm during a single criminal episode where the episode occurred without interruption in time and location. See, e.g., Weatherspoon v. State, 624 So. 2d 405, 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Our review of this argument is de novo. See Jackson v. State, 925 So. 2d 1168, 1170 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“[A] sentencing error constituting an illegal sentence would be reviewed de novo.”). Etienne’s second argument is unconvincing for two reasons. Factually, this case involved two separate criminal episodes. In the ini…
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Norvil v. State, 162 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…w applies to a claim that the trial court committed a sentencing error that rendered the sentence illegal. State v. Valera, 75 So. 3d 330, 331-32 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Etienne v. State, 15 So. 3d 890, 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citing Jackson v. State, 925 So. 2d 1168, 1170 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). Here, the defendant claims that the trial court violated his due process rights at sentencing by considering a pending charge that resulted from an arrest which occurred after the crime for which he was being senten…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rahmah Jakouch v. State, 831 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Hannah v. State, 814 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Schaal v. State, 743 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)