ROY STEWART, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Roy Stewart appeals the revocation of his community control status based on his termination from a drug treatment program. The court reverses the revocation order, holding that the trial court impermissibly relied on hearsay evidence to establish the willful and substantial violation required for revocation.
The trial court's revocation order is reversed because the only evidence that Stewart's conduct constituted a willful and substantial violation of the community control condition was the program director's hearsay testimony regarding incidents she did not personally observe. While hearsay is admissible at revocation hearings, a violation cannot be found solely on the basis of hearsay; competent evidence is required.
[1] A trial court may revoke probation or community control only if the State proves by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant willfully and substantially viol…
[2] The State bears the burden of proving a willful and substantial violation of supervision by competent evidence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court may revoke probation or community control only if the State proves by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant willfully and substantially violated a specific condition of the probation or community control.”
Establishes the legal standard for revocation requiring proof of willful and substantial violation
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStewart was placed on community control with a condition requiring inpatient drug treatment. He participated in the program for slightly over a month …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Willful And Substantial Violation Of Community Control cases and more on FLexlaw
BENTON, J.
Roy Stewart appeals the revocation of his community control status on account of his termination from a drug treatment program. He contends the trial judge necessarily relied on hearsay in finding that he had willfully violated a condition of community control. We reverse the revocation order and ensuing prison sentence, and remand for further proceedings.
The condition at issue was imposed by checking a box on a form next to the phrase “Inpatient drug treatment.”' At the revocation hearing, the director of the drug treatment program testified that Mr. Stewart participated in inpatient drug treatment for a little over a month, before he was discharged after refusing to leave a building during a fire drill, saying he was cold and did not have anything warm to put on. Prior to this incident, moreover, the director testified, Mr. Stewart had been involved in “verbal altercations” with other residents and had demonstrated a “lack of tolerance of others.” But the director testified that she did not personally observe any of the behavior that she identified as the basis for his exclusion from the program.
Trial courts are not without discretion in revoking probation, see Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490, 495 (Fla.1974); Van Wagner v. State, 677 So. 2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), and presumably in revoking community control, as well. But the rule is:
The trial court may revoke probation or community control only if the State proves by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant willfully and substantially violated a specific condition of the probation or community control. Padelt v. State, 793 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
Yates v. State, 909 So. 2d 974, 974-75 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Whether a violation is willful and substantial must be decided case by case. See State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002). This determination is necessary because to revoke probation or community control, a violation must always be determined to have been willful and substantial. See generally Thomas v. State, 760 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); McCray v. State, 754 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Inman v. State, 684 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Green v. State, 620 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
State v. Meeks, 789 So. 2d 982, 987 (Fla.2001). “The State bears the burden of proving a willful and substantial violation of supervision” by competent evidence. Thompson v. State, 890 So. 2d 382, 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (“Although hearsay evidence is admissible at the revocation hearing, the defendant’s probation or community control cannot be revoked solely on the basis of hearsay. Knight v. State, 801 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).”).
At the hearing, the learned trial judge acknowledged that findings essential to revocation could not be based solely on hearsay (not falling within some exception to the rule excluding hearsay), but that admissible evidence was required. The trial court ruled:
Well, you can’t find someone in violation on hearsay. However, we have some direct testimony from Mr. Stewart himself, where he admits that he did not successfully complete the program.
I find he willfully violated Condition 32 [“Inpatient drug treatment”].
Competent evidence unquestionably established that Mr. Stewart was expelled from the drug treatment program before the program ended. But the only evidence that the conduct that led to the discharge amounted to a “willful” or “substantial” violation of the conditions of community control was the director’s hearsay testimony.
The trial court impermissibly relied on this hearsay evidence. See Thompson, 890 So. 2d at 383. See also Dawson v. State, 921 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Meade v. State, 799 So. 2d 430, 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Gammon v. State, 778 So. 2d 390, 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Thomas v. State, 711 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Andrews v. State, 693 So. 2d 1138, 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). As we said in Meade (in regard to revocation of probation), “[bjecause this hearsay evidence was the only evidence Appellant was terminated ... from the treatment program for willingly failing to participate, it is insufficient to support a finding of violation, of probation.” Meade, 799 So. 2d at 433.
Reversed and remanded.
ALLEN and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
-
del Valle v. State, 80 So. 3d 999 (Fla. 2011)…of the violation must be supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The state has the burden to establish that the probationer willfully violated the terms of his probation.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Stewart v. State, 926 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“[T]he rule is: 'The trial court may revoke probation or community control only if the State proves by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant willfully and substantially violated a specific condition of the p…
-
Limbaugh v. State, 16 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…5th DCA 2007). The State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of probation willfully and substantially. Ballien v. State, 942 So. 2d 981, 983 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citing Stewart v. State, 926 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)); Lawson v. State, 941 So. 2d 485, 488 (Fla. 5th DCA), approved, 969 So. 2d 222 (Fla.2007). It is well-established that where the violation alleged by the State is a failure to pay costs or restitution, there must be evidence pre…
-
Gauthier v. State, 949 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…9 (Fla.2002); Robinson v. State, 907 So. 2d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); King v. State, 817 So. 2d 935, 937 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). The State bears the burden of proving a willful and substantial violation by competent evidence. See Stewart v. State, 926 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Robinson, 907 So. 2d at 1286. In this case, there was no competent, substantial evidence that Mr. Gauthi [*327] er changed his residence. At best, hearsay testimony from the probation officer showed that Mr. Gauthier spen…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (18 total)
- Gideon Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974)
- State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2002)
- VAN Wagner v. State, 677 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- State v. Meeks, 789 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 2001)
- Thomas v. State, 711 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Ladon Maurice Green v. State, 620 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Gammon v. State, 778 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Myles Franklin Andrews v. State, 693 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Meade v. State, 799 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Thomas v. State, 760 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)