RALPH A. JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ralph Johnson appeals the denial of motions to correct illegal sentences for robbery and battery. The court holds that Johnson's concurrent fifteen-year HFO and PRR sentences for the robbery count violate the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act because the incarceration portions are equal, and reverses for resentencing.
The sentences violate the PRR because the incarceration portion of the HFO sentence does not exceed the PRR sentence. When HFO and PRR sentences are imposed concurrently for the same offense, the incarceration period of the HFO sentence must exceed the PRR sentence to be permissible under section 775.082(9)(c).
[1] A sentence violates the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRR) when the incarceration period of a habitual felony offender (HFO) sentence equals the PRR sentence…
[2] Concurrent habitual felony offender (HFO) and Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRR) sentences are permissible when the incarceration period of the HFO sentence…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to [the HFO statute] or any other provision.”
Establishes that HFO and PRR sentences may be concurrent only if the HFO incarceration period exceeds the PRR sentence, showing legislative intent to allow courts to impose sentences greater than the minimum.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1999, a jury convicted Johnson of robbery and battery on a person sixty-five years or older. For robbery, the trial court sentenced Johnson as a ha…
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LaROSE, Judge.
Ralph A. Johnson appeals the postcon-viction court’s orders denying two of his motions to correct illegal sentences filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Because his two rule 3.800(a) motions concern the same claim, we consolidate his appeals sua sponte. The postconviction court determined that Mr. Johnson’s sentences did not violate the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRR), § 775.082(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). We reverse and remand for resentencing.
In 1999, a jury convicted Mr. Johnson of robbery and battery on a person sixty-five years of age or older. For the robbery count, the trial court sentenced Mr. Johnson as a habitual felony offender (HFO), see § 775.084(1), Fla. Stat. (1999), to thirty years in prison, suspended after fifteen years, with the remainder to be served on probation. This was a true split sentence.1 The trial court also imposed a concurrent fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the PRR. For the battery count, the trial court sentenced Mr. Johnson as an HFO to a concurrent ten-year prison term.
Mr. Johnson argues that the sentences for the robbery count violate the PRR because the incarceration period for each sentence is equal. See Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000). Mr. Johnson’s claim meets the definition of an illegal sentence under Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1178 (Fla.2001). Because Mr. Johnson’s total HFO sentence (thirty years) exceeds his total PRR sentence (fifteen years), the postconviction court found Mr. Johnson’s sentences to be legal. We disagree.
In Grant, the defendant argued that his concurrent fifteen-year HFO and PRR sentences for sexual battery violated his double jeopardy rights. Id. at 657. The supreme court rejected this argument. Id. at 658. However, the supreme court concluded that the sentences violated the PRR because the HFO and PRR sentences were equal in length. Id. at 659. The supreme court observed that, under the PRR, “ ‘[njothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to [the HFO statute] or any other provision.’ ” Id. at 658 (citing § 775.082(8)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997), now § 775.082(9)(c)) (emphasis supplied). Consequently, concurrent HFO and PRR sentences for the same offense are permissible when the incarceration period of the HFO sentence exceeds the PRR sentence. Id. at 658-59.
The sentences in Grant involved equal periods of incarceration under the HFO and PRR. Grant’s reasoning is equally applicable to a true split sentence. We reiterate, section 775.082(9)(c) provides that “[njothing in-this subsection shall-prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law....” Thus, if the incarceration portion of an HFO sentence does not exceed the PRR sentence, the sentences violate the PRR. See Grant, 770 So. 2d at 659; Morales v. State, 901 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
Because the incarceration portion of Mr. Johnson’s HFO sentence equals his PRR sentence, we reverse and remand for re-sentencing.
Reversed and remanded.
WHATLEY and KELLY, JJ., Concur. . A true split sentence "consist[s] of a total period of confinement with a portion of the confinement period suspended and the defendant placed on probation for that suspended portion.” Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Crews v. State, 779 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Clark v. State, 72 So. 3d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…legal because the incarcera-tive portion of the HFO sentence was equal to the minimum prison releasee reof-fender (PRR) sentence length, which is not permitted under the PRRPA. See Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 658-59 (Fla.2000); Johnson v. State, 927 So. 2d 251, 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Clark filed a motion to correct illegal sentence in accordance with rule 3.800(a). The State conceded that the sentence was illegal; it suggested that the trial court could cure the problem by re-sentencing Clark to thirty…
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Davis v. State, 20 So. 3d 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…See Latson v. State, 882 So. 2d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (reversing in part summary denial of rule 3.800(a) motion, as to claim that offense in question was not enumerated in the prison releasee reoffender statute); see also Johnson v. State, 927 So. 2d 251, 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding that where the term of incarceration as a HFO did not exceed the PRR sentence, though it included a probationary term to follow, the sentence was an illegal one, correctable pursuant to rule 3.800(a)). We reverse th…
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Jurez Roshae Williams v. State, 129 So. 3d 453 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…en sentence appear to impose a sentence on Williams of fifteen years in prison as both an HFO and a PRR, followed by five years’ probation as an HFO. However, such a sentence is illegal. This court addressed the identical issue in Johnson v. State, 927 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). There, Johnson was sentenced on a robbery conviction to thirty years in prison as a habitual felony offender, to be suspended after fifteen years with the remainder to be served on probation. Id. at 251. The trial court also impo…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2001)
- Crews v. State, 779 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Hunter v. State, 779 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Wilmann Renaud v. State, 901 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)