STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
JEFFREY LOVELACE, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 2006-04-06
No. SC05-1395
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, and BELL, JJ„ concur., WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., dissent.
928 So. 2d 1176 Florida Supreme Court (2006) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Holding

The court held that there is no conflict between the two certified cases because they address different factual and legal situations regarding speedy trial rights.


Facts & Procedural History

The court reviewed two cases, Jackson and Lovelace, concerning speedy trial rights for DUI charges. Jackson involved refiling a misdemeanor charge bef…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

[*1177] PER CURIAM.

We initially accepted jurisdiction to review Lovelace v. State, 906 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal which certified conflict with the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in State v. Jackson, 784 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Upon further consideration, we have now determined that Lovelace and Jackson address different situations and are not in conflict.

In Jackson, the defendant was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence. The prosecutor filed a nolle prose-qui in county court before the ninety-day speedy trial period expired. The misdemeanor charge was refiled in circuit court along with the felony driving under the influence charge well before the applicable 175-day speedy trial period had expired. See Jackson, 784 So. 2d at 1230. However, in Lovelace, the “no information” on the misdemeanor driving under the influence charge was filed in county court after the speedy trial time had run, and the misdemeanor was not refiled in circuit court along with the felony charge. See Lovelace, 906 So. 2d at 1259. Thus, the courts in Jackson and Lovelace addressed two distinct situations — one where the misdemeanor speedy trial period had not expired and one where the period had expired. Moreover, the factual circumstances under which the Jackson court found the county court no longer had jurisdiction was based on the fact that the circuit court acquired jurisdiction over the misdemeanor charge when it was filed with the felony. That situation is not present in Lovelace.

Based on the aforementioned distinctions, there is no conflict between Lovelace and Jackson. We therefore exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction. Accordingly, the review proceeding is hereby-dismissed.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, and BELL, JJ„ concur. WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., dissent.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Quenten Walden v. State, 979 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
    …’s obligation to bring him to trial during the recapture period. Prohibition lies to review a trial court’s denial of a motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds. See, e.g., Lovelace v. State, 906 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), rev. dismissed, 928 So. 2d 1176 (Fla.2006). The waiver of speedy trial in Matthews case has no effect on this case. Even though the two crimes arose from the same fight, distinct acts against different victims constitute separate crimes for the purpose of the speedy trial rule. S…
  • Bush v. State, 937 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
    …mely followed. We determine that the facts in this case are indistinguishable from those presented to our sister court in Lovelace v. State, 1 [*1149] 906 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 917 So. 2d 195 (Fla.2005), and review dismissed, 928 So. 2d 1176 (Fla.2006). Based on the fourth district’s analysis, which we approve, the judgment and sentence are reversed. REVERSED. PLEUS, C.J. and PALMER, J., concur. . The trial judge; in his defense, did not have the benefit of Lovelace at the time of hi…

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