EPICOR SOFTWARE CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
COOPERS & CLARKE, INC., APPELLEE
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Epicor Software Corporation obtained a default judgment against Coopers & Clarke after Coopers failed to file a timely answer. Over one year later, Coopers moved to set aside the judgment under Rule 1.540(b)(3), claiming Epicor had committed fraud by not disclosing Coopers' facsimile answer to the court. The trial court granted the motion, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the one-year statutory deadline for Rule 1.540(b)(3) motions is jurisdictional and cannot be extended.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the Rule 1.540(b)(3) motion because the motion was filed more than one year after the final judgment was entered. Rule 1.540(b)(3) expressly requires such motions to be filed within one year, and this time limit is jurisdictional and may not be extended for any reason.
[1] A motion to set aside a final judgment under Rule 1.540(b)(3) for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct must be filed within one year after the judgment was entered.
[2] Failure to file a Rule 1.540(b)(3) motion within the one-year time limit deprives the court of jurisdiction to consider the claim.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rule 1.540 expressly provides that a(b)(3) motion to set aside a final judgment for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct 'shall be filed ... not more than 1 year after the judgment ... was entered or taken.' Failure to raise this ground within that time deprived the court below of jurisdiction to address this claim”
Establishes that the one-year deadline in Rule 1.540(b)(3) is jurisdictional and cannot be waived or extended.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEpicor filed a complaint against Coopers on March 3, 2003, for an open account, account stated, and goods sold and delivered. Coopers sent a facsimile…
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WELLS, Judge.
Epicor Software Corporation appeals from an order granting a Rule 1.540(b)(3) motion to set aside a final judgment. We reverse.
On March 3, 2003, Epicor filed a three count complaint against Coopers & Clarke, Inc. claiming damages for an open account, for an account stated and for goods sold and delivered. Coopers filed no answer but sent a facsimile to Epicor claiming no obligation to Epicor and advising Epicor’s attorneys to “contact your client and try to resolve the matter as this lawsuit should not have been filed.” Epicor moved for and was granted a default.
Epicor thereafter filed, and served on Coopers, a motion for entry of a final judgment and accompanying affidavits of indebtedness and costs. On May 30, 2003, final judgment was entered against Coopers on Epicor’s claims. Over one year later, on August 27, 2004, Coopers filed a verified 1.540(b)(3) motion to set aside that judgment claiming that Epicor had “improperly obtained a judgment by failing to bring to the attention of the Court [Coo pers’] March 13, 2003 answer, which was sent via facsimile with facsimile confirmation requested.” The motion was granted, we reverse.
Rule 1.540 expressly provides that a(b)(3) motion to set aside a final judgment for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct “shall be filed ... not more than 1 year after the judgment ... was entered or taken.” Failure to raise this ground within that time deprived the court below of jurisdiction to address this claim:
The trial court’s authority to modify, amend, or vacate an order or final judgment after rendition of the final judgment is limited to the time and manner provided by rule or statute. Under the present rules, after the rendition of the final judgment, the trial court retains jurisdiction for the ten-day period during which a motion for rehearing may be filed and, if filed, until disposition of the motion. The trial court thereafter loses jurisdiction except to enforce the judgment and except as provided by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540.
Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1386, 1388-89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (footnotes and citations omitted); Bank One, N.A. v. Batronie, 884 So. 2d 346, 348-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (“After rendition of a final judgment, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case except to enforce the judgment and except as provided by rule 1.540. “[T]he one exception to the rule of absolute finality is rule 1.540, ‘which gives the court jurisdiction to relieve a party from the act of finality in a narrow range of circumstances.’ ” Among those circumstances ... is compliance with the time limit of rule 1.540(b)(3), which, like other jurisdictional time limits such as the time for filing a notice of appeal or a motion for a new trial, may not be extended for any reason.... Once beyond the reach of rule 1.540(b), [a] final judgment ... ‘passe[s] into the unassailable realm of finality.’ ”) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, we reverse the order granting Coopers’ 1.540(b)(3) motion and remand with directions to reinstate the final judgment.
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Nafh Nat'l Bank v. Aristizabal, 117 So. 3d 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…ition of the final judgment.” Bank One, N.A., 884 So. 2d at 348 (citations omitted). “Failure to raise this ground within that time deprive[s] the court below of jurisdiction to address this claim[.]” Epicor Software Corp. v. Coopers & Clarke, Inc., 928 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). The appellees’ motion did not fall under the exception to the one-year time limit for a rule 1.540(b) motion for “fraud upon the court” since it alleged only intrinsic fraud rather than extrinsic fraud. “[O]nly extrinsic…
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Hunt v. Alpheus Forbes, 65 So. 3d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…serves to toll rendition of final order). Further, once the ten days for rehearing expired, the trial court lost jurisdiction to do anything other than enforce the fee order previously entered. See Epi-cor Software Corp. v. Coopers & Clarke, Inc., 928 So. 2d 1249, 1250 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Thus, the trial court’s subsequent entry of an “Amended Final Judgment” could not serve to revive the appellant’s right to appeal the propriety of the trial court’s ruling requiring her to pay the fees. Accordingly, the i…
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Tedder v. Est. OF Mack Reed Tedder, Sr., 200 So. 3d 123 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…serves to toll rendition of a final order)). Moreover, once the ten days for rehearing expired, the circuit court lost jurisdiction to do anything other than enforce its earlier order. See id. (citing Epicor Software Corp. v. Coopers & Clarke, Inc., 928 So. 2d 1249, 1250 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). Thus, the November 17, 2015, order denying Tedder’s motion for rehearing was a nullity because it was entered without jurisdiction. A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of the date an order is rendered. Fla…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Bank ONE v. Arleen Batronie and Gene Batronie, 884 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)