HAGER D. STEVENS, APPELLANT,
v.
MONTE C. STEVENS, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2006-05-26
No. 5D05-4492
GRIFFIN and PALMER, JJ., concur.
929 So. 2d 721 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2006) Negative Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A mother appeals an order enforcing a custody provision of a final divorce decree requiring her to surrender custody of the parties' children to the father in 2003 as agreed in their marriage settlement agreement. The court affirmed, holding that the father was merely enforcing an existing final judgment rather than seeking to modify it, and therefore did not need to prove a substantial change of circumstances or the children's best interests.


Holding

The court held that the father was merely enforcing the final judgment rather than seeking to modify it, and therefore did not bear the burden of proving a substantial change of circumstances or the children's best interests. The mother, who sought to alter the custody arrangement decreed in the final judgment, would bear that burden if she filed a motion to modify.


Headnotes

[1] A party seeking to enforce a final divorce decree's custody provisions need not prove a substantial and material change of circumstances.

[2] A party seeking to modify a final divorce decree's custody provisions must prove a substantial and material change of circumstances and that the modification would promot…

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Key Quotes

“A final divorce decree providing for the custody of a child can be materially modified only if (1) there are facts concerning the welfare of the child that the court did not know at the time the decree was entered, or (2) there has been a change in circumstances shown to have arisen since the decree.”

Establishes the heightened burden for modifying a final custody decree, which the mother must meet if she seeks to alter the agreed arrangement.

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Facts & Procedural History

Hager and Monte Stevens divorced in early 2000 and executed a marriage settlement agreement providing that the mother would retain custody of their mi…

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Opinion of the Court
LAWSON, J.

LAWSON, J.

Hager D. Stevens appeals from an order enforcing the custody provisions of the final divorce decree that dissolved her marriage to Monte C. Stevens. We affirm, and write to address one point raised on appeal.

The parties were divorced in early 2000. They entered a marriage settlement agreement, (“MSA”), providing that Hager Stevens, (“mother”), would retain custody of their minor children until 2003, at which time Monte Stevens, (“father”), would take custody of both children.1 The MSA was adopted and incorporated into a final divorce decree (“final judgment”).

Therefore, as part of the final judgment, the parties were ordered to obey all provisions of the MSA. When the father was ready to take custody pursuant to the MSA and final judgment, however, the mother refused to relinquish the children.

Therefore, the father filed a motion for contempt seeking to enforce the final judgment.

The trial court ordered the mother to deliver the children to the father, who would become the primary residential parent pursuant to the MSA and final judgment. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the mother argues that the trial court erred by ordering a change in custody without first requiring the father to plead and prove: (1) a substantial and material change of circumstances; and (2) that the custody change would promote the best interests of the children. Ironically, all of the cases cited by the mother deal with the heavy burden that a party must sustain when seeking to modify a final divorce decree providing for child custody. See, e.g., Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 932 (Fla.2005) (“A final divorce decree providing for the custody of a child can be materially modified only if (1) there are facts concerning the welfare of the child that the court did not know at the time the decree was entered, or (2) there has been a change in circumstances shown to have arisen since the decree.”).

Here, however, the father is simply seeking to enforce the final judgment. It is the mother who wants to alter the custody arrangement decreed in the final judgment.

Therefore, the cases she cites set forth the burden that she must meet in the event she files a motion to modify the final judgment.

AFFIRMED.

GRIFFIN and PALMER, JJ., concur. . The father serves in the United States Marine Corps. At the time of the marriage settlement, he was scheduled for overseas deployment but knew that he could get a stateside assignment by volunteering to extend his overseas tour. Therefore, the MSA was designed to allow the children to reside with the mother until the father completed his overseas assignment and secured stable housing in the United States, at which point he would take custody. Because the father would have sixteen years in the service by 2003, he anticipated that he could retire after this final assignment and remain in the United States.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Snowden v. Snowden, 985 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
    …07. Consistent with his argument below, Mr. Snowden argues on appeal that the trial judge erred in considering the best interests of the children. According to Mr. Snowden, under Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928 (Fla.2005), and Stevens v. Stevens, 929 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), the trial court should have simply enforced the marital settlement agreement based upon the finding that Ms. Snowden had consumed alcohol while the children were in her custody. We find that the [*587] trial court properly rejec…
  • Rivera v. Purtell, 252 So. 3d 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
    …arguing that the trial court may prospectively determine timesharing based upon an objectively and reasonably certain future event, citing to this court's decisions in Snowden v. Snowden , 985 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) and Stevens v. Stevens , 929 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Mother, on the other hand, argues that Arthur and J.P. apply here, and that the trial court's timesharing plan is improperly prospective. We review the trial court's order granting rehearing and a new trial de novo because the…
    1 / 2
  • Rivera v. (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)

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