CARLOS SAINZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Carlos Sainz appeals his re-sentencing following a prior appellate decision interpreting his plea agreement to require thirty years of actual incarceration. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences totaling sixty-one years, eleven months, and nine days to accomplish the goal of thirty years served when accounting for gain time and credit for time served. The court affirms, holding that the sentences comply with the plea agreement and do not violate double jeopardy.
The court holds that the consecutive sentences comply with the plea agreement and do not violate double jeopardy. The sentence represents the necessary calculation under applicable sentencing statutes to ensure thirty actual years of incarceration as required by the plea agreement. If gain time is forfeited and the defendant serves longer than thirty years, he may seek appropriate relief to enforce the plea agreement.
[1] A plea agreement requiring a defendant to serve thirty actual years of incarceration mandates a sentence that results in thirty years of actual time served, not a maximum…
[2] Resentencing a defendant to terms of years that provide for thirty years of actual incarceration, after vacating a life sentence, does not violate double jeopardy when do…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we ruled in the prior appeal that the plea agreement provided for the defendant to serve thirty actual years of incarceration on the charges in this ease”
Establishes the critical distinction between thirty years as a sentencing term versus thirty actual years of incarceration, which justifies the longer nominal sentence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a prior appeal (Sainz v. State, 811 So.2d 683), this court interpreted Sainz's plea agreement to require vacating his life sentence and re-sentenci…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal after remand for re-sentencing in Sainz v. State, 811 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). We affirm.
In the earlier appeal by defendant-appellant Carlos Sainz to this court, we interpreted the plea agreement to require vacating the life sentence which had been imposed on the defendant, and resentencing the defendant to a term of years under which he would serve thirty actual years of incarceration. Id. at 691-92. On remand, the Department of Corrections provided the trial court a calculation to accomplish this. The calculation indicated that under the applicable sentencing statutes, the sentence would need to be sixty-one years, eleven months, and nine days with credit for time previously served and projected allowances for gain time. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences on the defendant’s three counts, amounting to the recommended total of sixty-one years, eleven months, and nine days.
On this appeal, the defendant argues that his sentences cannot exceed thirty years concurrent on all counts. He contends that his plea agreement provided for a sentence of thirty years against which he would receive gain time and credit for time served. We disagree. We ruled in the prior appeal that the plea agreement provided for the defendant to serve thirty actual years of incarceration on the charges in this ease. 811 So. 2d at 691-92.
The defendant argues that the sentences create a double jeopardy violation. We disagree. In the prior appeal we concluded that in order to carry out the terms of the plea agreement it was necessary to vacate the life sentence and resentence the defendant to terms of years which would provide for the defendant’s actual incarceration for thirty years. Id. The resulting sentence is less than the life sentence which was vacated. See James v. State, 845 So. 2d 238, 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Further, the resentencing was in accordance with the plea agreement.
The defendant also argues that under the new sentencing structure, it is theoretically possible that he will serve longer than thirty years if any of his gain time is forfeited. If there should be such a forfeiture, then the defendant may seek appropriate relief to enforce the plea agreement. The agreement provides that the defendant will remain incarcerated for thirty calendar years, but no longer. See 811 So. 2d at 691-92.
Affirmed.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- James v. State, 845 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
- Sainz v. State, 811 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)