EDWARD G. KARZ, APPELLANT,
v.
FRED O. DICKENSON AND SANDRA LAMBERT, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Edward Karz appeals the trial court's decision upholding the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles' administrative imposition of an ignition interlock device restriction on his driver's license following a third DUI conviction. The court reverses, holding that the DHSMV lacks authority to administratively impose such a restriction when the trial court failed to order it as part of the original sentence.
The court holds that the DHSMV lacks authority to impose the ignition interlock device restriction administratively when the trial court did not impose it during sentencing. The mandatory requirement under Section 316.193(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes, is a sentencing matter within the exclusive province of the trial court, not an administrative function of the DHSMV.
[1] A court must order the mandatory placement of an ignition interlock device upon a vehicle after a third conviction for driving under the influence.
[2] The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles lacks administrative authority to impose an ignition interlock device restriction on a driver's license when the trial…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court shall order the mandatory placement ... of an ignition interlock device”
Establishes that Section 316.193(2)(b)(1) imposes a mandatory duty on the trial court to order the device as part of sentencing for a third DUI conviction.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKarz was convicted of a third DUI offense under Florida law, which mandates placement of an ignition interlock device on the offender's vehicle. The t…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Administrative Authority cases and more on FLexlaw
BERGMANN, CHARLES ED, Associate Judge.
Edward Karz appeals the final judgment of the trial court finding that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) has administrative authority “to place restrictions on driver[’s] licenses which would include the placement of ignition interlock devices,” although such restrictions were not part of Karz’s sentence. We reverse.
Section 316.193(2)(b)(l), Florida Statutes (2003), requires that after a third conviction of driving under the influence (DUI), “the court shall order the mandatory placement ... of an ignition interlock device” upon the convicted person’s vehicle. When Karz was convicted of a third DUI offense, the trial court suspended his driver’s license for six months but did not impose the mandatory placement of the device as part of his sentence. The State did not appeal. When the period of suspension expired and Karz applied for reinstatement of his driver’s license, the DHSMV imposed the restriction of the ignition interlock device administratively.
Karz brought an action in the trial court seeking, inter alia, injunctive and declaratory relief. Finding that the DHSMV has the authority to impose the ignition interlock device restriction on driver’s licenses, the trial court denied the relief sought, and Karz brought this appeal.
Three other district courts have ruled in similar circumstances that the DHSMV had no authority to impose the ignition interlock device administratively when the trial court did not impose the restriction during sentencing. See Embrey v. Dickenson, 906 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Dickenson v. Aultman, 905 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Doyon v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 902 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).1 We agree with those decisions and adopt the reasoning set forth therein in this case.2 Accordingly, we reverse the final order of the trial court.
Reversed and remanded.
ALTENBERND and DAVIS, JJ., Concur. . The nature of the proceedings in the circuit court and the method of review in the district court has varied among these cases. We conclude that it is unnecessary in this case to decide whether all the approaches taken were appropriate because it is clear that the circuit court’s jurisdiction could be invoked to resolve this issue and we would have jurisdiction to review that legal ruling.
. Section 322.2715(4), Florida Statutes (2005), which became effective July 1, 2005, would appear to have allowed the administrative action in this case if it had been enacted at the time of Karz’s offense.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bradsheer v. Fla. Dep't OF Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 20 So. 3d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…e trial court should have required the device does not alter the fact that the Department had no such authority with regard to persons convicted before July 1, 2005, when section 322.2715, Florida Statutes (2005), took effect. See Karz v. Dickenson, 932 So. 2d 426, 427-28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Embrey v. Dickenson, 906 So. 2d 316, 317-18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Dickenson v. Aultman, 905 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). . Justice Quince has stated the point eloquently: In today’s society, it is difficult, if no…
Authorities Cited
- Dickenson v. Aultman, 905 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)
- Jabir Fort v. State, 902 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
- Doyon v. Dep't OF Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 902 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
- Gordon v. State, 906 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
- Embrey v. Dickenson, 906 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)