MICHAEL MORRISON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2006-06-21
No. 3D04-3049
Before COPE, C.J., and SHEPHERD and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
932 So. 2d 533 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2006) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Michael Morrison appealed an order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The court affirmed the denial of his Apprendi/Blakely claims but reversed and remanded regarding his Heggs claim, finding he was entitled to resentencing under the 1994 sentencing guidelines because enforcing a procedural bar would constitute manifest injustice.


Holding

The court affirmed the denial of Morrison's Apprendi and Blakely claims because those decisions are not retroactive and his convictions became final in 1999. However, the court reversed regarding the Heggs claim, holding that a defendant convicted at trial and sentenced under the 1995 guidelines may raise a Heggs claim under Rule 3.800(a), and that enforcing a procedural bar would constitute manifest injustice if Morrison's calculations are correct.


Headnotes

[1] Decisions in Apprendi and Blakely are not retroactive to sentences that became final on direct appeal prior to their issuance.

[2] A defendant convicted and sentenced under the 1995 Florida sentencing guidelines may raise a claim for resentencing under Heggs v. …

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Key Quotes

“The defendant in this case was convicted at trial and was sentenced under the 1995 sentencing guidelines. In that circumstance a defendant is allowed to raise a Heggs claim under Rule 3.800(a).”

Establishes that trial-convicted defendants may raise Heggs claims under Rule 3.800(a), distinguishing the procedure from Rule 3.850.

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Facts & Procedural History

Morrison was convicted of multiple offenses on December 5, 1995, and sentenced to thirty-two years under the 1995 sentencing guidelines, which showed …

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Opinion of the Court
COPE, C.J.

On Motion for Clarification

COPE, C.J.

On consideration of the State’s motion for clarification, we withdraw our previous opinion and substitute the following opinion.

Michael Morrison appeals an order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Defendant-appellant Morrison contends he is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding on account of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 961, 125 S.Ct. 21, 159 L.Ed.2d 851 (2004). The trial court correctly denied that claim. The defendant’s convictions and sentences became final on direct appeal in 1999. See Morrison v. State, 731 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). The decisions in Apprendi and Blakely are not retroactive. See Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 838 (Fla.2005); Reed v. State, 898 So. 2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

The more substantial issue is the defendant’s claim to entitlement to resentencing under Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000). The State concedes the defendant is entitled to relief and we agree.

The defendant was convicted of multiple offenses which occurred on December 5, 1995.1 At sentencing the State prepared a 1995 guidelines scoresheet which showed a sentencing range of 234.45 months (19.53 years) to 390.75 months (32.56 years). The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty-two years with a three-year minimum mandatory sentence.

In 2000 the Florida Supreme Court announced Heggs, which held the 1995 sentencing guidelines to be unconstitutional. Slightly over two years later, the defendant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence requesting resentencing under Heggs (“the 2002 motion”). The defendant alleged that under the 1994 guidelines his sentencing range would be 116.8 months to 194.7 months. Under that calculation, the defendant’s maximum permissible sentence under the 1994 guidelines would be considerably less than his thirty-two-year sentence. The trial court denied the motion to correct illegal sentence.

On appeal, the State argued that Heggs relief could be obtained only by a Rule 3.850 motion and, treated as such, the defendant’s 2002 motion was time-barred. This court affirmed without opinion. See Morrison v. State, 838 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

As part of the defendant’s current Rule 3.800(a) motion, he has reiterated his Heggs claim. The trial court denied the Heggs portion of the defendant’s motion on the basis that it had already been adjudicated adversely to him.

The defendant in this case was convicted at trial and was sentenced under the 1995 sentencing guidelines. In that circumstance a defendant is allowed to raise a Heggs claim under Rule 3.800(a). Carter v. State, 848 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (citing Copeland v. State, 842 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)).

The State concedes, and we agree, that if the defendant’s calculations are correct then it would be a manifest injustice within the meaning of State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287 (Fla.2003), to enforce a procedural bar on this claim. We therefore reverse for a hearing on the merits of the Heggs claim. The defendant shall be represented by counsel at such hearing.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

. This is within the Heggs window. See Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924, 928 (Fla.2000).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Benny Arzola Martinez v. State, 216 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)
    …an a restructured legal sentence imposed upon remand. See Brinson v. State, 995 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Allen v. State, 989 So. 2d 731, 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); King v. State, 974 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Morrison v. State, 932 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Where a defendant has been sentenced on multiple charges, there must come a time in which a facially illegal sentence must stand, even under rule 3.800(a), After multiple failed attempts at l’edress, regardless of whether a…
  • Martinez v. State, 935 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
    …chnically correct on the issue of successiveness, we think the case falls within the manifest injustice exception outlined in State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287 (Fla.2003). See also Hunt v. State, 922 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Morrison v. State, 932 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). The defendant’s claim of affirmative mis-advice appears to be documented on the face of the transcript. The defendant’s claim is not otherwise explained or refuted in the limited record now before us. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(b)(…

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