SUNSHINE TOWING, INC., AND FCCI INSURANCE GROUP, APPELLANTS,
v.
MIGUEL FONSECA, APPELLEE
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Sunshine Towing and FCCI Insurance Group appealed a Judge of Compensation Claims' denial of their motion to impose an involuntary lien on a quadriplegic worker's home as a condition for making medically necessary modifications. The Florida appellate court affirmed, holding that workers' compensation statutes provide no authority for involuntarily imposing such a lien.
The JCC properly denied the motion because workers' compensation is purely statutory in nature and there is no statutory authorization for involuntarily imposing a lien on a claimant's home. Section 440.13(2)(a) contains no lien provision, and the legislature's use of lien language in other sections of chapter 440 but not in 440.13(2)(a) precludes reading such authority into that section.
[1] Workers' compensation law is purely statutory and must be governed by the provisions of the statutes.
[2] A court will not read a term into a statute where the legislature has used the term in other sections of the same chapter but omitted it in the specific section at issue.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Workers' compensation is purely a creature of statute and, as such, is subject to the basic principles of statutory construction.”
Establishes the foundational principle that workers' compensation rights and remedies are limited to what statutes expressly provide.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClaimant suffered a workers' compensation injury resulting in quadriplegia. E/C accepted the injury as compensable, provided inpatient treatment, and …
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THOMAS, J.
Sunshine Towing, Inc., and FCCI Insurance Group (“E/C”) appeal a final order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (“JCC”) denying E/C’s motion to involuntarily impose a lien as a condition precedent to making medically necessary modifications to Claimant’s home. Because we find that the JCC did not err in determining there was no statutory or legal authority to involuntarily impose a lien on Claimant’s home, we affirm.
Claimant was injured in a workers’ compensation accident and is now a quadriplegic. E/C accepted Claimant’s injury as compensable, provided treatment at an inpatient facility, and agreed that it was responsible for modifying Claimant’s home to meet his medical needs under section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2004). E/C sought to impose a lien to prevent unjust enrichment or repetitive expenses from a variety of causes, including, but not limited to, Claimant’s sale of his home.
Workers’ compensation is purely a creature of statute and, as such, is subject to the basic principles of statutory construction. McDade v. Palm Beach County Sch. Dist., 898 So. 2d 126, 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sitko, 496 So. 2d 920, 921 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)). Where the legislature has used a term in one section of a statute but omitted the term in another section, the court will not read the term into the sections where it was omitted. Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
Here, E/C is not entitled to involuntarily impose a lien because there is no statutory authorization for a lien. Section 440.13(2)(a) does not provide for a lien, nor does any other section that E/C cites. See J.J. Murphy & Son, Inc. v. Gibbs, 137 So. 2d 553, 562 (Fla.1962) (explaining that workers’ compensation “must be governed by what the statutes provide, not by what deciding authorities feel the law should be.”). In addition, because the legislature used the term of imposing a lien in other areas of chapter 440 but not in section 440.13(2)(a), we cannot read this term into section 440.13(2)(a). See §§ 440.23 & 440.39(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). Therefore, the JCC’s order is AFFIRMED.
BENTON and POLSTON, JJ., concur.
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Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995)
- J. J. Murphy & SON, Inc. v. Gibbs, 137 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1962)
- Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sitko, 496 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- McDADE v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist. & F.A. Richard & Assocs., Inc., 898 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)