OSCAR PATTERSON, PETITIONER,

v.

FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT

Citator

Cited By

• Simmons v. Simmons, 979 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
  …nt execution of a note and mortgage for the financing of subsequent improvements. And he testified, as did the husband in Rollar, that he wanted the wife to have the home if he predeceased her. Hill, 675 So. 2d at 169-70. See also Stough v. Stough, 933 So. 2d 603, 606-07 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). On this basis, I would reverse the judgment below insofar as it treats the marital home as a non-marital asset, and remand for an equitable distribution of all marital property, including the home. As for the parties’ pe…
• Stough v. Laurel L. Stough, 18 So. 3d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
  …ng, the [trial] court apparently overlooked the fact that the wife had placed the income into a joint checking account from which practically all of the parties’ living expenses were paid during the course of the 19-year marriage. Stough v. Stough, 933 So. 2d 603, 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). We found the decision to commingle the parties’ funds in the joint account created a rebuttable presumption that the former wife intended one-half of the trust account funds to be a gift to the former husband. Id. at 607. S…
• Cintron v. King, 961 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
  …med to be a marital asset regardless of who paid for it. § 61.075(5)(a)5, Fla. Stat. (2005). In order to overcome the statutory presumption, the party seeking a special equity has the burden of proving that a gift was not intended. Stough v. Stough, 933 So. 2d 603, 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); see also Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491, 494 (Fla.1991). In the present case, the parties’ home was jointly titled and thus enjoyed the presumption of marital property. See Stough, 933 So. 2d at 607. Yet the trial c…

Authorities Cited

• Munn v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 807 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
• Callvester Smith v. State, 807 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)