JACK SOBOTA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2006-07-28
No. 2D05-1143
DAVIS, J., and FUENTE, WILLIAM, Associate Judge, Concur.
933 So. 2d 1277 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2006) Negative Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Jack Sobota was convicted of driving under the influence with serious bodily injury based on blood test results introduced through a toxicologist who did not perform the testing. The court reversed, holding that admitting test results from an analyst who did not conduct the testing violates the Confrontation Clause when the actual analyst is available to testify.


Holding

The court held that blood test results prepared pursuant to police investigation and admitted to establish an element of a crime constitute testimonial hearsay even if admitted as business records, and their admission violates the Confrontation Clause when the witness who performed the testing is available but does not testify.


Headnotes

[1] Admission of blood test results from a legal blood draw violates the Confrontation Clause when the toxicologist who performed the test does not testify, and the State doe…

[2] A forensic lab report prepared pursuant to a police investigation and admitted to establish an element of a crime is testimonial hearsay, even if admitted as a business r…

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Key Quotes

“an FDLE lab report prepared pursuant to police investigation and admitted to establish an element of a crime is testimonial hearsay even if it is admitted as a business record”

Establishes the court's core holding that lab reports are testimonial hearsay regardless of their classification as business records

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Facts & Procedural History

Sobota was charged with DUI with serious bodily injury. At trial, the State presented blood test results through Robin Neuenschwanger, a toxicologist …

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Opinion of the Court
FULMER, Chief Judge.

FULMER, Chief Judge.

Jack Sobota appeals from his conviction for driving under the influence with serious bodily injury. Because the trial court erred in allowing the State to admit test results from a legal blood draw through a toxicologist who was not involved with the actual testing, we reverse and remand for a new trial.1

At trial, the State called Robin Neuen-schwanger, a toxicologist at the Pinellas County Forensic Lab. Her position entailed analyzing autopsy specimens for the Medical Examiner’s Officer and testing blood samples for the DUI cases in Pinel-las and Pasco Counties. Neuenschwanger testified that she worked under Ron Bell, who had been the chief toxicologist and had retired “this past summer.”

Citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 86, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and the Confrontation Clause, the defense objected to Neuenschwanger testifying to the results of blood testing performed by Mr. Bell and reported on both a “Toxicology Report” and a document entitled “Florida Department of Law Enforcement Alcohol Testing Program!,] Blood Alcohol Analyses Affidavit.” The defense asserted that the blood test results were testimonial because the blood draw was requested by law enforcement and the blood was analyzed for the purpose of obtaining trial evidence for the prosecution. Further, the defense asserted that Mr. Bell was available to testify and “the State continues to use him in other cases as a witness.”

The State took the position that the affidavit was admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule for public records and reports. The trial court ruled the testimony of Neuenschwanger did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the blood test results were nontestimonial and qualified as business records.

Our resolution of the issue presented in this appeal is governed by this court’s opinion in Johnson v. State, 929 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), review granted, 924 So. 2d 810 (Fla.2006). In Johnson, this court discussed Crawford and held that “an FDLE lab report prepared pursuant to police investigation and admitted to establish an element of a crime is testimonial hearsay even if it is admitted as a business record.” Id. at 7. This court further concluded that the State did not establish the unavailability of the witness who prepared the lab report. Id. at 8.

Applying Johnson’s holding to the present case, we conclude that the blood test results were testimonial hearsay. Because the State did not establish the unavailability of Mr. Bell, admission of the test results violated the Confrontation Clause. As we recognized in Johnson, our holding on this issue presents a question of great public importance. Therefore, we certify to the supreme court the following question, which is substantially similar to the question certified in Johnson: DOES ADMISSION OF A TEST RESULT FROM A LEGAL BLOOD DRAW VIOLATE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON, 541 U.S. 36 [124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177] (2004), WHEN THE TOXICOLOGIST WHO PERFORMED THE BLOOD TEST DOES NOT TESTIFY?

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

DAVIS, J., and FUENTE, WILLIAM, Associate Judge, Concur. . We reject without discussion the first issue raised concerning the failure of the State to prove a corpus delicti before admission of Sobota's statements.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Belvin, 986 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 2008)
    …da courts have [*524] consistently held that records such as the FDLE report before us are testimonial in nature.” Id. at 1192. In two other cases from the Second District, Williams v. State, 933 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), and Sobota v. State, 933 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), the court confronted the same issue and found that admission of the reports without the testimony of the preparer violated the Confrontation Clause. Both cases were reversed and remanded. And in a case which involved the admissio…
  • State v. Johnson, 982 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 2008)
    …r the business record exception to the hearsay rule where the report was admitted without the testimony of the preparer of the record. When confronted with the same issue in Williams v. State, 933 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), and Sobota v. State, 933 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), the Second District applied its holding from Johnson. The court found admission of the reports without the testimony of the preparer violated the Confrontation Clause and reversed and remanded both cases. The court also certified…
  • Martin v. State, 936 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
    …DCA 2005) (explaining that while drug or alcohol tests performed by a hospital in the usual course of business are admissible as business records, similar tests performed by an FDLE lab are not pursuant to the Confrontation Clause); Sobota v. State, 933 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Here, the State has not claimed that the person who tested the substances [*1193] seized from appellant and who authored the report at issue was unavailable to testify. Also, the State has not claimed that the defense had been p…

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