WILLIE ROCHELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Willie Rochell appealed the revocation of his probation based on a cocaine possession arrest and failure to pay financial obligations. The court reversed, finding no reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and that Rochell's payment violations were not willful as required by law.
The court held that no reasonable suspicion existed to justify the stop, as merely observing two men sitting in a truck for 10 to 15 minutes during the day constitutes more than mere presence on property but lacks the particularized and objective basis required for reasonable suspicion. Additionally, Rochell's payment violations were not willful because he made reasonable efforts to comply with the probation condition.
[1] Reasonable suspicion for a trespass stop requires more than mere presence on property and cannot be based on a hunch or guess.
[2] Evidence seized as a result of an unlawful stop must be suppressed.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When applying the reasonable suspicion standard to potential trespassers, it must be 'more than mere presence on property.'”
Establishes the standard for reasonable suspicion in trespass cases and why the officer's stop was unjustified.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn undercover officer observed two men sitting in a truck for 10 to 15 minutes during the day; the men never left the truck and no one approached or i…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant Willie Rochell appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probation due to his arrest for possession of cocaine and failure to pay his financial obligations. Because we find there was no reasonable suspicion for the police officer to stop Appellant for trespass, and because his payment violations were not willful, we reverse.
When applying the reasonable suspicion standard to potential trespassers, it must be “more than mere presence on property.” Williams v. State, 910 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Such a suspicion cannot be based upon a mere hunch or guess. Tamer v. State, 484 So. 2d 583 (Fla.1986). In this case, the undercover officer observed two men sitting in a truck for 10 to 15 minutes during the day; the men never left the truck, and no one approached them or interacted with them in any way. Based on these facts, no reasonable suspicion existed to justify a stop, and all evidence seized as a result of the stop should have been suppressed. As to Appellant’s violation of probation for failing to meet financial obligations, we do not find that Appellant’s failure to pay was willful and substantial, as required by Meade v. State, 799 So. 2d 430, 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). “Where a probationer makes reasonable efforts to comply with a condition of probation, violation of the condition cannot be deemed ‘willful.’ ” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So. 2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Thorpe v. State, 642 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)). There is no indication in the record before us that a court-ordered payment schedule was created before Appellant met with his probation officer. After that meeting, Appellant made a partial payment before the due date and made reasonable efforts to satisfy his probation officer’s requests.
We have considered the State’s request to certify a question asking the Florida Supreme Court to determine whether the exclusionary rule must be applied in violation of probation hearings. We decline, as this question is settled in Florida, see State v. Scarlet, 800 So. 2d 220 (Fla.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 922, 122 S.Ct. 1217, 152 L.Ed.2d 164 (2002), and the United States Supreme Court has not issued a decision that directly prohibits application of the exclusionary rule in such hearings under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
For the above reasons, we reverse the trial court’s revocation of Appellant’s probation and remand with directions that Appellant’s probation be reinstated.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ALLEN, DAVIS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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D.T. v. State, 87 So. 3d 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)). Mere presence on the property is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of trespass and a reasonable suspicion of trespass must be based upon something more than “a mere hunch or guess.” Rochell v. State, 934 So. 2d 586, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). That “something more” was found in Ward v. State, 21 So. 3d 896 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). There, police approached appellant at 2:30 a.m. on the grounds of an apartment complex posted with numerous, large “no trespassing” signs…
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K. H. v. State, 265 So. 3d 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)…icient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of trespass and a reasonable suspicion of trespass must be based upon something more than 'a mere hunch or guess.' " D.T. v. State, 87 So. 3d 1235, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Rochell v. State, 934 So. 2d 586, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)). A posted sign or prior warning may provide that "something more" needed for reasonable suspicion, see id. at 1241-42, but there is no evidence of either in this case. "In the absence of this prior warning by communica…
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Weakley v. State, 273 So. 3d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)…4th DCA 2012) (“Mere presence on the property is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of trespass and a reasonable suspicion of trespass must be based upon something more than ‘a mere hunch or guess.’”) (quoting Rochell v. State, 934 So. 2d 586, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)). 15 Lincoln—was trying to open the back door of the hotel. 28 So. 3d at 148. The clerk told them to leave and, fearing for her safety, called the sheriff’s office. “En route to the hotel, the deputy saw a car match…
Authorities Cited
- VAN Wagner v. State, 677 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Tamer v. State, 484 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1986)
- State v. Shelton Scarlet, 800 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 2001)
- Meade v. State, 799 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Thorpe v. State, 642 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Simeon Williams v. State, 910 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
- Florida v. Scarlet, 535 U.S. 922 (U.S. 2002)
- In re Tokar, 535 U.S. 922 (U.S. 2002)