MILDRED GIBBONS SPENCER, APPELLANT,
v.
BR CONTRACTING, INC. AND MICHAEL BRANAN, APPELLEE
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Mildred Spencer appeals a trial court's orders granting motions for remittitur and additur that adjusted jury verdicts in a civil case. The court reversed, holding that Spencer's timely objection to the adjusted verdicts entitled her to a new trial on damages as required by Florida Statute 768.74(4), which the trial court erred in denying.
Spencer is entitled to a new trial on damages. Although the trial court properly granted the motions for remittitur and additur under section 768.74, the statute affords any adversely affected party the right to reject the court's adjustment and have the damages issue submitted to another jury. Spencer's timely motion requesting a new trial on damages should have been granted.
[1] A party adversely affected by an order of additur or remittitur may reject the trial court's decision and have the matter of damages submitted to another jury.
[2] A trial court errs by entering a final judgment based upon adjusted verdict amounts after granting additur or remittitur without affording the adversely affected party a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The statute clearly provides for a new trial in the event the party adversely affected by the remittitur or additur does not agree with the remittitur or additur. In other words, the complaining party need not accept the decision of the judge with respect to remittitur or additur. The party may have the matter of damages submitted to another jury.”
Establishes the statutory right of a party to reject a remittitur or additur order and demand a new trial on damages
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA jury rendered verdicts in favor of Spencer for $15,636.56 and against her on appellees' counterclaim for $2,206.70. The trial court granted appellee…
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LAWSON, J.
Mildred Gibbons Spencer appeals the trial court’s order granting appellees’ motion for remittitur, which decreased Spencer’s verdict against appellees from $15,636.56 to $11,233.50, and separate order granting appellees’ motion for additur, which increased the verdict against Spencer on appellees’ counterclaim from $2,206.70 to $6,206.70. Spencer timely objected, and requested a new trial on damages. We agree with Spencer that the trial court erred by entering a final judgment based upon the adjusted verdict amounts without affording Spencer a new trial on damages, and reverse.
Motions for additur and remittitur are governed by section 768.74, Florida Statutes. Although it appears that the trial court properly granted appellees’ motions pursuant to this statute, the statute also affords any party adversely affected by an order of additur or remittitur to reject the trial court’s decision and “have the matter of damages submitted to another jury.” ITT Hartford Ins. Co. of the Southeast v. Owens, 816 So. 2d 572, 576 (Fla.2002). As explained by our Supreme Court: “The statute clearly provides for a new trial in the event the party adversely affected by the remittitur or additur does not agree with the remittitur or additur. In other words, the complaining party need not accept the decision of the judge with respect to remittitur or additur. The party may have the matter of damages submitted to another jury. ” Id. at 576-77 (emphasis in original). Spencer filed a motion1 stating that she disagreed with the trial court’s adverse decision as to additur and remittitur, and requesting a new trial on damages “as statutorily mandated by and pursuant to § 768.74(4), Fla. Stat.” Having requested a new trial on damages, the trial court erred in not granting Spencer’s motion. Therefore, we reverse the final judgment, and remand for a new trial on damages.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
PLEUS, C.J., and GRIFFIN, J., concur. . Section 768.74(4), Florida Statutes, does not provide a timeline for filing an objection to an order of additur or remittitur, and case law provides no guidance on the issue. Spencer filed her motion within thirty (30) days of the court's orders and final judgment. Because appellees failed to raise a timeliness argument in the trial court or in their brief, any such argument has been waived. See Williams v. Salem Free Will Baptist Church, 784 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)(noting that a procedural error not timely raised in the trial court is waived unless the party asserting the error can demonstrate that such a waiver would be a denial of due process).
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Citator
Cited By
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Johnson v. Clark, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (M.D. Fla. 2007)…e injury suffered; and (e) Whether the amount awarded is supported by the evidence and is such that it could be adduced in a logical manner by reasonable persons. Fla. Stat. § 768.74(5) (2006); see also Spencer v. BR Contracting, Inc., 935 So.2d 1289 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). “This section did not, however, alter the ‘longstanding principles’ governing a trial court’s deference to a jury’s assessment of damages.” Aurbach v. Gallina, 721 So.2d 756, 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (quoting Poole v. Ve…
Authorities Cited
- Itt Hartford Ins. Co. of the Se. v. Stiles Jerry Owens and Jean A. Owens, 816 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2002)
- A.L. Williams v. Salem Free Will Baptist Church, 784 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)