DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, ON BEHALF OF: REGINA GARDNER, PETITIONER,
v.
TYLER LONG, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Department of Revenue sought review of an administrative order requiring DNA testing to establish paternity, even though the respondent had previously signed an acknowledgment of paternity. The court granted the petition for writ of certiorari, holding that the Administrative Law Judge lacked jurisdiction to determine disputed paternity issues under the applicable statute and that ordering genetic testing violated essential requirements of law.
The ALJ lacked jurisdiction to determine disputed paternity under section 409.2563(2)(b), Florida Statutes. The statute presumes paternity has already been established or is being established in a separate administrative proceeding. Because the ALJ ordered genetic testing outside her jurisdiction, and such testing would subject the mother and child to potentially intrusive procedures without jurisdiction to do so, the order constituted an irreparable harm and a departure from essential requirements of law.
[1] Administrative agencies lack jurisdiction to determine disputed paternity under statutes governing administrative child support proceedings.
[2] A request for paternity testing does not trigger the termination of administrative child support proceedings when the statute requires termination only for issues concern…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A proceeding under this statute presumes that paternity has already been established or is being established in a separate administrative proceeding pursuant to section 409.256, Florida Statutes (2005).”
Establishes the fundamental requirement that section 409.2563 proceedings presume paternity is already established, limiting the ALJ's jurisdiction.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRespondent signed an acknowledgment of paternity but requested a hearing with the Department of Revenue, writing 'Need DNA test.' Instead of pursuing …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Acknowledgment Of Paternity cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on Petitioner’s motion for rehearing. We grant the motion and, accordingly, withdraw our former opinion of June 29, 2006, and substitute in its place this corrected opinion.
In this petition for writ of certiorari, the Department of Revenue (“DOR”) seeks review of the Division of Administrative Hearing’s (“DOAH”) order directing Respondent, Mother, and Child to submit to DNA testing to establish paternity even though Respondent previously signed an acknowledgment of paternity. The hearing below was conducted under section 409.2563, Florida Statutes (2005). Because the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) departed from the essential requirements of law and an irreparable harm will result, we grant the petition.
After receiving a proposed administrative order from DOR, Respondent timely requested a hearing by letter. As part of his request, Respondent wrote, “Need DNA test.” Respondent received no response from DOR regarding circuit court action. Instead, his case was referred to DOAH and, subsequent to a hearing, DOAH issued a temporary administrative support order requiring Respondent to pay child support pending the results of genetic testing, which DOAH also ordered.
Initially, we relied on Mendez v. Department of Revenue, 898 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), and section 409.2563(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2005),1 in determining that DOR was required to halt the administrative process and continue in circuit court once the request for paternity testing was made. On rehearing, we have determined that our reasoning was misplaced because a request for paternity determination is different from “issues concerning custody or rights to parental contact” that trigger a termination of the administrative proceedings under section 490.2563(2)00. Therefore, section 490.2563(2)00 is inapplicable.
We find that neither DOR nor DOAH has jurisdiction to hear or determine issues of disputed paternity under section 409.2563(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005). A proceeding under this statute presumes that paternity has already been established or is being established in a separate administrative proceeding pursuant to section 409.256, Florida Statutes (2005). This is evidenced by the use of the term “non-custodial parent” in the statutory language of section 409.2563, as op posed to “putative father, which means “an individual who is or may be the biological father of a child whose ‘paternity has not been established and whose mother was unmarried when the child was conceived and born.” See Section 490.256(l)(g), Florida Statutes (emphasis added).
The ALJ departed from the essential requirements of law when she ordered genetic testing under section 409.2563, Florida Statutes (2005). See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 890 (Fla.2003) (explaining that failure of a court to follow a controlling statute can be a departure from the essential requirements of law and a basis to grant a petition for certiorari). Section 409.2563(2)(b) clearly establishes that DOAH does not have jurisdiction to determine disputed paternity. We find that subjecting Mother and Child to a potentially intrusive test that is outside the court’s jurisdiction is enough to constitute irreparable harm.
It should be noted that this opinion in no way precludes Respondent from contesting paternity in any other legally cognizable manner. Our holding is simply that for the purposes of this proceeding, paternity is established.
We, therefore, GRANT the petition for writ of certiorari and QUASH the order for genetic testing. We also REMAND and instruct the ALJ below to enter a final administrative order regarding support.
ALLEN, DAVIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur. . Section 409.2563(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2005), states, "The department [DOR] shall terminate the administrative proceeding and file an action in circuit court to determine support if within 20 days after receipt of the initial notice the noncustodial parent ... states in writing the noncustodial parent's intention to address issues concerning custody or rights to parental contact in court...." (Emphasis added.)
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Travis, 971 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…he mother and child to submit to DNA testing. The trial court’s order adopting the recommendation should have been vacated. Denial of the motion to vacate departed from the essential requirements of law. See Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Gardner v. Long, 937 So. 2d 1235, 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. T.E.P. v. Price, 958 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Reiss v. Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Sava, 753 So. 2d 764, 765 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Accordingly, we grant the petition, issue the writ, quas…1 / 2
-
State v. Lynch, 53 So. 3d 1154 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…pinion. PETITION GRANTED. VAN NORTWICK, LEWIS, and CLARK, JJ., concur. . This Court has repeatedly held that requiring genetic testing under similar circumstances qualifies as irreparable harm. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Gardner v. Long, 937 So. 2d 1235, 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) ("We find that subjecting Mother and Child to a potentially intrusive [paternity] test ... is enough to constitute irreparable harm.”); see also State, Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Chambers v. Travis, 971 So. 2d 157, 159 n. 1 (…
-
State v. Brown, 980 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…. R.App. P. 9.030(b)(2)(A) (2007). The order constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law, and threatens what we have held to be irreparable harm that cannot be cured on plenary appeal. See Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Gardner v. Long, 937 So. 2d 1235, 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“We find that subjecting Mother and Child to a potentially intrusive [paternity] test ... is enough to constitute irreparable harm.”); Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. T.E.P. v. Price, 958 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“Be…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keely Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 2003)
- Mendez v. Dep't OF Revenue, 898 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)