ARTURO GONZALEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2006-10-13
No. 2D05-2804
WHATLEY, SILBERMAN, and WALLACE, JJ., concur.
939 So. 2d 224 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2006) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

Arturo Gonzalez appeals his conviction for lewd or lascivious molestation of a child under twelve. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence but reversed and remanded on the issue of court costs, finding the trial court improperly imposed discretionary costs without conducting a required hearing on the defendant's ability to pay.


Holding

The court affirmed the conviction and sentence on all grounds except the imposition of court costs. The court reversed the imposition of the $50 and $65 court costs, finding they were discretionary costs that could only be imposed after a hearing on the defendant's ability to pay under the statutes effective at the time of the offense.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court does not err by refusing to define common words like "genital" or "genital area" in jury instructions when the terms are not technical or obscure.

[2] A trial court may allow the State to amend an information to correct the offense date, even at the close of the State's case-in-chief, if the amendment does not prejudice…

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Key Quotes

“These statutes, however, did not take effect until July 1, 2004. Because Mr. Gonzalez' offense date was October 8, 2003, the trial court should have assessed these costs in accordance with the statutes in effect at that time”

Establishes that the court applies the law in effect at the time of the offense, not the law at the time of sentencing

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Facts & Procedural History

Gonzalez was convicted by jury of lewd or lascivious molestation against a victim less than twelve years of age. The offense date was October 8, 2003.…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Arturo Gonzalez appeals the judgment, sentence, and fines that were imposed on him after a jury found him guilty of lewd or lascivious molestation against a victim less than twelve years of age. Mr. Gonzalez argues that the trial court erred when it (1) refused to give a definition in the jury instructions for the words “genital” and “genital area”; (2) allowed the State to amend the information at the end of the State’s case-in-chief to reflect an offense date of October 8 until October 9, 2003; (3) allowed the State to elicit testimony and argue during closing arguments that Mr. Gonzalez had subsequent contact with law enforcement on an unrelated case; (4) denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal; and (5) added forty points to his sentencing worksheet for sexual contact with the victim. We find no reversible error in the trial court’s rulings on these matters, and we affirm Mr. Gonzalez’ judgment and sentence without further comment.

In a separate issue, Mr. Gonzalez argues that two separate fines of $50 and $65 for court costs should be stricken because they were discretionary costs and the trial court failed to orally pronounce them at sentencing. On this issue, we agree. The trial court assessed these fines as mandatory costs in accordance with section 775.083(2), Florida Statutes (2004), and section 939.185, Florida Statutes (2004), respectively. These statutes, however, did not take effect until July 1, 2004. Because Mr. Gonzalez’ offense date was October 8, 2003, the trial court should have assessed these costs in accordance with the statutes in effect at that time (i.e., section 775.083(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2003),1 and section 939.18, Florida Statutes (2003)2), which required the court to conduct an inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay the fine before imposing it.

Because the trial court imposed both discretionary court costs without conducting the required inquiry concerning Mr. Gonzalez’ ability to pay, we strike these costs. On remand, the trial court may reimpose the appropriate costs if it conducts the necessary hearing. See Stewart v. State, 916 So. 2d 53, 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Waller v. State, 911 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

WHATLEY, SILBERMAN, and WALLACE, JJ., concur. . The 2004 version of section 775.083 replaced the 2003 version effective July 1, 2004. Ch.2003-402, § 117, at 3741-42, Laws of Fla. . The Florida legislature repealed section 939.18 effective July 1, 2004. Ch.2004-265, § 101, at 1026, Laws of Fla. It replaced this section, effective the same day, with section 939.185. Ch.2004-265, § 88, at 1022-23, Laws of Fla.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Griffin v. State, 946 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …v. State, 934 S6.2d 667, 668 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (stating, “Costs may not be imposed where the authorizing statutes were enacted after the date of the offense. See Hayden v. State, 753 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)”); see also Gonzalez v. State, 939 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (involving sections 775.083(2) and 939.185, Florida Statutes (2004)); Waller v. State, 911 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (involving section 939.18, Florida Statutes (2003)); Pierce v. State, 779 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998),…
  • Clark v. State, 963 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …bilitated or making restitution. § 775.083(2)(b) (emphasis added).4 As with the previous cost item, on remand the trial court shall strike the $50 fine but may reimpose it if the court finds that Clark has the ability to pay. See Gonzalez v. State, 939 So. 2d 224, 225 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). As we did in Griffin v. State, 946 So. 2d at 614-15, we certify conflict with Ridgeway v. State, 892 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (concluding that imposing the cost required by section 939.185 on a defendant who committed…
  • Watts v. State, 973 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
    …n imposing a $50 crime prevention fine pursuant to section 775.083(2), Florida Statutes (2002).1 We strike this fine because the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry and determine Watts’ ability to pay it. See § 775.083(2)(b); Gonzalez v. State, 939 So. 2d 224, 225 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (noting that section 775.083(2)(b) requires the court to conduct an inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay the fine before imposing it). On remand, this fine may be reimposed after the trial court conducts the necessary in…

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