JOHN H. YOUNG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2006-10-18
Nos. 4D06-1644, 4D06-2885
WARNER, GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
939 So. 2d 263 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2006) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

Young challenged his resentencing on a probation violation, claiming the trial court used an incorrect sentencing scoresheet that resulted in a sentence exceeding the guideline range applicable at his original offense. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that use of the wrong scoresheet constitutes valid grounds for post-conviction relief under Rule 3.800(a), despite the prior dismissal of the identical claim as successive.


Holding

Use of the wrong scoresheet constitutes valid grounds for relief under Rule 3.800(a) as it is akin to an incorrect scoresheet calculation. The appellate court has power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings where reliance on a previous decision would result in manifest injustice. Here, such exceptional circumstances exist because using the wrong scoresheet resulted in an unauthorized departure from sentencing guidelines in effect at the original offense.


Headnotes

[1] A claim that the wrong scoresheet was used at resentencing is a valid ground for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).

[2] Appellate courts may reconsider and correct erroneous rulings when reliance on a previous decision would result in manifest injustice.

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Key Quotes

“Use of the wrong scoresheet, however, is a valid ground for relief under Rule 3.800(a) as it is akin to an incorrect scoresheet calculation.”

Establishes that using an incorrect sentencing scoresheet is a cognizable basis for post-conviction relief

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Facts & Procedural History

In 1998, Young was sentenced to forty-five years in prison after violating probation on an original 1986 conviction for second-degree murder. Young cl…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The issue he has raised — that the wrong score-sheet was used at resentencing' — -is identical to one he raised in a prior rule 3.800(a) motion, which was denied on the merits and affirmed without opinion by this court. Because the procedural bar would result in a manifest injustice, we reverse and remand.

In 1998, the appellant was sentenced to forty-five years in prison after violating probation on an original conviction of second degree murder. He claims that the wrong scoresheet was used to resentence him on his probation violation. Specifically, he claims he was resentenced in the permitted sentencing range, which was non-existent at the time of his initial offense in 1986, and that the maximum sentence he could have received under the correct scoresheet was forty years. Thus, his challenge is that his scoresheet was incorrect, not that his sentence was illegal. The lower court denied the motion as successive, stating that appellant had been before the court on the very same issue, and that the court’s previous rejection of appellant’s claim had been subject to appellate review. See Young v. State, 901 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Use of the wrong scoresheet, however, is a valid ground for relief under Rule 3.800(a) as it is akin to an incorrect scoresheet calculation. See Parks v. State, 697 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Here, it appears that the wrong scoresheet was used, and that the sentence imposed was beyond the recommended sentence range of the correct scoresheet. The appellant is entitled to be resentenced under the correct score-sheet.

We recognize the law of the case doctrine; however, we rely on the equally known principle that appellate courts have the power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings where reliance on a previous decision would result in manifest injustice. See Zolache v. State, 687 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Such an exceptional circumstance appears to exist here, where use of the wrong scoresheet resulted in an unauthorized departure from the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the original offense.

The prior case was affirmed per curiam. The state’s response indicates that the original and resentencing scoresheets were not included in the record. Therefore, the court could have affirmed because of the failure of the record to reflect the contended eiTor. That defect has been cured in this appeal. In accordance with the foregoing, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on the claim.

In a separate appeal (case number 06-2885), appellant seeks review of the trial court’s order prohibiting him from filing any further pro se pleadings, motions or petitions. That order is based, in part, on appellant’s repeated filing of the above 3.800(a) claim, which we believe to be meritorious. We sua sponte consolidate the two appeals and direct that on remand the trial court should revisit the matter of appellant’s further pro se filings.

WARNER, GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Brumit v. State, 971 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
    …ourt’s prior opinion in her direct appeal, Zolache v. State, 687 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Line v. State, 722 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Sigler v. State, 881 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), aff'd, 967 So. 2d 835 (Fla.2007); Young v. State, 939 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), and she asserts entitlement to the same relief provided to her co-defendant, Festa, Laster v. State, 739 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding that defendant was entitled to same relief on double jeopardy claim as that obtaine…
  • …s barred under the doctrine of law of the case by its prior ruling granting entitlement to attorney's fees, absent manifest injustice. Suffolk Const. Co., Inc. v. First Sealord Sur., Inc., 63 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); see, e.g., Young v. State, 939 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (noting that appellate courts have the power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings where reliance on a previous decision would result in manifest injustice). The Court finds that permitting the award of attorney's fees to s…

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